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9Introduction
This book was inspired by the Deleuze Studies conferences in 
Lisbon (2013), Istanbul (2014), and Rome (2016), as well as con-
ferences in Ghent (2015) and Dublin (2016). The three authors 
of the book presented their papers at these conferences1. This 
book also relies on the Deleuze Studies journal and all the books 
on Deleuze published by the Edinburgh University Press. It 
engages with the works of Anne Sauvagnargues, Ronald Bogue, 
Ian Buchanan, Alphonso Lingis, Stephen Zepke, Gregg Lam-
bert, Andre Pierre Colombat, Eugene W. Holland, François 
Dosse’s Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives. The 
book has an interdisciplinary intention: relying on insights by 
Gilles Deleuze (1925–1955) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) 
to find lines of thought for navigating from philosophy to the 
arts and back, as well through different art forms: literature, 
painting, cinema, and music. Taking into account and relying 
1 It was written after ten years of studying Deleuze’s texts with master 
of philosophy students in the Department of Philosophy at the 
Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences.
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on the dynamic cartography of problems and concepts (force of 
life, style, etc.) mapped by Sauvagnargues, Buchanan, Bogue, 
Zepke, etc. as Deleuze’s tools for thought experimentations with 
arts, this research is an attempt to take one more step further 
and to include some other concepts practicable in reflecting 
upon philosophy’s meeting with other different arts. Such are 
the concept of rhythm and refrain.
In the realm of the arts the concept of rhythm, first of all, 
is applied to describe the features of the experiences of music, 
poetry and dance. The rhythms as the patterns of stress and 
intonation in a language are discussed as prosody in poetry. 
Musicians expand Plato’s definition of rhythm as “an order of 
movement” and define rhythm as the organic process of music 
in time: it is music’s direction in time. But Deleuze and Guattari 
broaden the limits of the usage of the concept. In Cinema 2: 
The Time-Image (Cinema 2 – L’image-temps, 1985) Deleuze 
quotes Alejo Carpentier’s insight from French theoretician of 
cinema Jean Mitry’s book Esthetique et psychologie du cinema, 
saying that even “Conversation has a rhythm, a movement, an 
absence of sequence in the ideas, with, on the contrary, strange 
associations, curious reminders, which bear no resemblance 
to the dialogues that usually fill’ novels and plays” (Deleuze 
1989: 322). The concept of rhythm unites three heterogeneous 
realities: the world of the nature, the social world and the realm 
of the arts. The concept’s origin stems from the Latin rhythmus 
and from Greek rhythmós (see also sreu- in Indo-European 
roots) and designates the movement or variation characterized 
by the regular recurrence or alternation of different quantities 
or conditions. The world of nature, the sequence of regularly 
recurring functions or events expresses by the rhythm of the 
cosmic movements, the alteration of the day and night, the 
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change of the seasons, and the rhythm of the living hearts, the 
rhythm of the ovulation, etc. There is the common rhythm 
of the universe. The social world is also organized by its own 
rhythms. It is very visible in societies with dum experiences and 
voodoo practices. There is a rhythm of a dance, the rhythm of 
a language, the rhythm of a speech.
Rhythm is different from refrain. Rhythm stems from 
refrain: “Children’s, women’s, ethnic, and territorial refrains, 
refrains of love and destruction: the birth of rhythm” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 300). Their difference is rather subtle. Milieus 
and Rhythms are born from chaos, say Deleuze and Guattari. 
Every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time 
constituted by the periodic repetition of the components. The 
milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaus-
tion and intrusion. “Rhythm is the milieus’ answer to chaos. 
What chaos and rhythm have in common is the in-between – 
between the milieus, rhythm-chaos and the chaosmos…” 
Deleuze and Guattari say (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 313). 
Jūratė Baranova in the first chapter “Deleuze and Guattari: 
Rhythm as a Philosophical Concept” deals with the questions: 
Why is Rhythm so Important to Guattari and Deleuze? How 
does Rhythm from a musical concept become a philosophical 
one? She notices that the Deleuzean insights about rhythm in 
Difference and Repetition (Différence et repetition, 1968) have 
their origin not in arts, but first of all in mathematical, biologi-
cal, genetic, and psychoanalytic sources. Art has something to 
do with the ontological repetition, which Deleuze discerned 
beyond physical repetition and psychic or metaphysical repeti-
tion. But genetics and biology are primary sources of different 
rhythms. They seem to integrate a much more intensive force 
than art. How is repetition connected with rhythm? Deleuze 
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is more concerned with justifying or detecting the differences 
between repetitions by their kind and rhythm. Therefore, he 
defines the difference between two important psychological 
drives invented by Freud – Eros and Thanatos – as the two 
drives of different rhythm and amplitude. Deleuze also discerns 
two types of repetition: static and dynamic, taking into account 
that they have different rhythms. The study of these rhythms al-
lowed Deleuze to distinguish two kinds of repetition: cadence-
repetition and rhythm-repetition. In order to distinguish 
these two types of repetition, Deleuze suggests the criterion: 
regularity of time. Cadence-repetition is a regular division of 
time, an isochronic recurrence of identical elements. He also 
discerns a poly-rhythm. Is it repetition which does something 
in common with rhythm? It seems not at all. In A Thousand Pla-
teaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme 
et Schizophrénie: 2, 1980), Deleuze is already influenced by 
French composer, organist and ornithologist Olivier Messiaen 
(1908–1992) and also Guattari, so they both change the accent 
and formulate very clearly: “It is the difference that is rhythmic, 
not the repetition, which nevertheless produces it: productive 
repetition has nothing to do with reproductive meter” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 314).
How does Rhythm as a philosophical concept unite painting 
and music? Baranova notices that “the most musical chapter” of 
“the most musical book,” “1837 – De la ritournelle (1837: Of the 
Refrain)”, starts not with a discussion on music, but on reflec-
tions upon the possibility to find the calm and stable centre in 
the heart of chaos. The philosophers discern three steps in this 
way leading to the centre surrounded by chaos: the first step is 
singing the little songs of those who are lost in the dark. The 
second step is creating a wall of sound by sonorous and vocal 
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components enabling it to resist or even take something from 
chaos. In creating this wall, the rhythmic moving in a cycle 
plays a very important role. Rhythmic vowels and consonants 
are supposed to correspond to the interior forces of creation as 
to the differentiated parts of the organism. “A mistake in speed, 
rhythm, or harmony would be catastrophic because it would 
bring back the force of chaos, destroying both creator and 
creation,” Deleuze and Guattari conclude (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 311). But at least this circle has a tendency to open itself 
onto the future in order to join them with the cosmic forces 
of the future. In order to illustrate how the refrain exposes 
all these three aspects in arts, Deleuze and Guattari take the 
example not from any musical compositions, but from painting. 
They saw the typical example of the interlinkage of these three 
aspects in German artist Paul Klee’s (1879–1940) paintings. 
Baranova in this book applies this idea suggested by Deleuze 
and Guattari for experimental reflection on the Lithuanian 
modernist Vincas Kisarauskas’ (1934–1988) creation. Baranova 
in the second chapter “Philosophy and Literature: Rhythm and 
Life” investigates the trajectories of the concept of Rhythm in 
Marcel Proust’s novel In Search of Lost Time and comes to the 
conclusions that Deleuze in his book Marcel Proust and Signs 
(1964) started to explore the concept of rhythm much earlier 
than his reflections on Messiaen’s rhythms in 1980 and 1981, 
before Henri Maldiney’s book Regard, Paral Espace in 1973, and 
before meeting Guattari in 1969. Baranova notices that the con-
cept of rhythm in Proust’s novel emerges from reality, passes 
from reality to arts, steps further, leaves arts and returns to the 
reality from which it approached arts. Life itself rests upon “the 
rhythm of heart or breath” (Proust 1927: 164). The poetic order 
affects us by a certain rhythm as the point of meeting between 
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the main narrator and the pulsation of the surrounding world. 
Deleuze warned the decipherer of the different signs in Proust’s 
text: all these different worlds of signs have different rhythms. 
The intellectual intrigue for Deleuze was Proust’s ability to 
discern the rhythm not only in the signs of the world, but also 
in the constant change of the complex set of inter-human love 
relations. Deleuze notices that the rhythm of the interchange 
of beliefs and disappointments consists of the very essence of 
the sign of love, between the objective and the subjective side 
of the sign.
Baranova also compares the concept of rhythm in Deleuze’s 
and Emmanuel Levinas’ texts, and discerns similarities and dif-
ferences between these two approaches. Levinas, the same as 
Deleuze, concludes that rhythm transcends the sphere of music 
and has something to do with ontology. Deleuze in reflecting 
on arts searched for the possible overcoming of representation. 
Levinas in his reflections on rhythm comes very close to the 
overcoming of representation as well. Overwhelmed by the 
rhythm, reflects Levinas, the subject becomes a part of its 
own representation. Deleuze more than Levinas discerns in 
Proust’s reading the hint that the concept of rhythm has, first 
of all, something to do with time. Deleuze notices that rhythm 
defines the sequence of segments in time: the rarity or density 
of the passing moments, the appearance of segments, the oc-
curring of events. Baranova concludes that Deleuze discovers 
in Proust’s texts two dimensions of time: the time of radical 
beginning as the essence of the beginning of the World in 
general. According to Deleuze, Proust in the novel In Search 
of Lost Time noticed that mainly time forms different series 
and contains more dimensions than space. Space is included 
in time. But in Proust’s novel, Baranova notices, rhythm can 
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also be connected with space. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari were already 
influenced by Messiaen and they treat Proust’s literary novel as 
a piece of musical theory. They say that Proust was among the 
first to reveal how musical motifs become autonomous from the 
dramatic action, impulses, and situations, and independent of 
characters and landscapes. Proust, according to them, revealed 
how musical motifs themselves become melodic landscapes 
and rhythmic characters. The concept of rhythmic characters is 
composers Messiaen’s invention, elaborated further by Deleuze 
and Guattari.
 Baranova in the third chapter “Philosophy and Cinema: 
Rhythm and Time” analyzes the usage of the concept of 
Rhythm by Deleuze in his philosophy of cinema and notices 
that Deleuze uses the concept of rhythm to discern the differ-
ence between classic and modern cinema: classic cinema prefers 
rhythmic montage (such as Sergei Eisenstein’s) and modern 
prefers arhythmic montage (such as Jean-Luc Godard’s). Mon-
tage, according to Deleuze, is not technical procedures at the 
end of the shooting. Montage always has something to do with 
philosophy: it is directly connected with time and the rhythm. 
Baranova notices that the concept of rhythm can be used also 
to discern different types of montage (Griffith’s, Eisenstein’s, 
German expressionism’s, French, lyrical abstraction). David 
Llewelyn Wark “D. W.” Griffith (1875–1948) created the 
montage of rhythmic alternation and Deleuze discerns three 
forms of it: the alternation of differentiated parts, the alterna-
tion of relative dimensions and the alternations of convergent 
actions. To Griffith’s rhythm of relative changes, Eisenstein in 
his “montage of attractions” or “jumping montage” opposes the 
rhythm of absolute change in dimension – a qualitative leap. 
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The pre-war French school of cinema had chosen rhythm in 
montage rather different from American or Soviet schools. 
Deleuze defines the French school by a sort of Cartesianism: 
French directors were primarily interested in the quantity of 
movement and in the metrical relations of it. As opposed to 
French school, the rhythm in German expressionism is free 
from the geometrical metrical relationships which regulated 
movement and is also emancipated from co-ordinates which 
condition the extensive quantity. The montage in this school 
is based on the interchange between dark and light, between 
the non-organic life of things which culminates in a fire acting 
as a spirit of evil or darkness and the non-psychological life of 
the spirit. Deleuze in a seemingly unimportant hint in brackets 
mentions and compares this type of montage to Hans Richter’s 
Rhythms. Why Richter? German Dadaist painter and avant-
garde filmmaker Hans Richter (1888–1976) was fascinated with 
the interplay of different rhythms. Baranova summarises that 
Deleuze’s analysis of classical montage cinema also suggests 
this conclusion: there is no single rhythm, but different usages 
of different rhythms, revealing unknown possibilities of the 
cinema and, of course, of different arts. Baranova also opposes 
the conception of Rhythm expressed by Russian film director 
Andrei Tarkovsky to the understanding of Rhythm by Eisen-
stein. Our hypothesis is that Tarkovsky’s writings on rhythm 
and montage in cinema art have an influence on Deleuze’s 
conception of cinematic time in Cinema 2: The Time-Image. 
There is no particular rule for what particular rhythm has to 
be used in creating a film: rhythm in cinema is conveyed by the 
life of the object visibly recorded in the frame. Tarkovsky alerts 
us that if time is slowed down or speeded up artificially, and 
not in response to an endogenous development, if the change 
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of rhythm is wrong, the result will be false and strident. On the 
other hand this experiment with joining segments of unequal 
time-value which necessarily breaks the rhythm may be an es-
sential factor in the carving out of the right rhythmic design. 
“To take the various time-pressures, which we could designate 
metaphorically as brook, spate, river, waterfall, ocean – joining 
them together engenders that unique rhythmic design which is 
the author’s sense of time, called into being as a newly formed 
entity”, Tarkovsky concludes (Tarkovsky 1987: 121). The chap-
ter also deals with the possible plurality of rhythms in cinema as 
well as with the concept of Rhythm in the ‘theatre of cruelty’ of 
Antonin Artaud. Baranova concludes that Deleuze, mentioning 
Eisenstein and Artaud in one chapter “Thought and Cinema,” 
nevertheless considers them the mentors of a different type of 
cinema: Eisenstein was the creator of the classic cinema, based 
on movement-image and the rhythmicity of montage. Artaud 
inspired modern cinema based on the time-image and the 
destruction of senso-motor causal links and atonal montage.
Laura Junutytė in the fourth chapter “Philosophy and Paint-
ing: Rhythm and Sensation” concentrates on Deleuze’s book 
Francis Bacon: the Logic of Sensation (1981) and points out that 
the consistency and suggestibility of sensation depend on the 
rhythm – an unliveable vital power that exceeds every domain 
of painting and traverses them all. It also traverses through the 
line of flight from chaos to rhythm by the usage of diagram-
chance. The modulating character of the diagram creates the 
effect of movement from one level of sensation to the other – 
the rhythm. Tom Conley in his Afterword compares modulating 
with Deleuze’s other concept, Fold, explored in the book The 
Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, where baroque was understood as 
the world of the continuous process of folding, unfolding, and 
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refolding (Conley 2003: 147). Folding also could be understood 
as the same modulation or rhythm: expansion-contraction-
expansion. Thus, the modulation of colours expresses the 
pulsatile force, the vibration of the matter, but at the same time 
it lets some consistent form emerge. Such painters as Mikalojus 
Konstantinas Čiurlionis, Paul Klee, and Wassily Kandinsky are 
also included in the sources of research. Čiurlionis was both a 
painter and musician. He painted music. Junutytė notices that 
Klee invoking his own experience as a musician as well as a 
painter also tried to find his unique way of painting music. In 
the book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Deleuze and Guattari treated Klee as a cosmic artisan whereas, 
in the book The Fold: Leibniz and Baroque (Le pli – Leibniz et 
le baroque, 1988), Klee emerges as a true Baroque painter. We 
see that the problem is the same as in the age of Cosmos – the 
task for an artist is to capture invisible forces and to give the 
consistency to the infinitely molecularised matter. Even more, 
deterritorialization as a Cosmic escape and the Fold have the 
same issue – the problem of the indiscernibility or territory 
in-between. There are no strict limits between material folds 
and immaterial folds as there are no clear limits between differ-
ent milieus or territories. It is impossible to discern exteriority 
and interiority, the beginning and end (which actually does 
not exist), because each fold or milieu is in perpetual flow 
and transition, becoming and periodic repetition. In his ear-
lier compositions, the connection between linear and musical 
rhythms was expressed by including the symbolic language 
of music (notes or the contours of musical instruments) and 
through motifs taken from nature. According to Klee, nature 
itself, its landscapes and objects, has rhythmic character. Invok-
ing Bach’s Sonata No. 6, Klee taught that there are two basic 
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rhythms: ‘structural’ or ‘dividual’ and ‘individual’. Dividual 
rhythm is quantitative or measured, it produces the regular and 
repeatable structure of the piece. The elements of such musical 
composition are divisible in the smaller ones and their rep-
etition is without variation. Individual rhythm is qualitative: 
the components of such a rhythm are dynamic, independent, 
irregular and thus unrepeatable. Different melodic lines are 
obtained when we fuse these two rhythms. Namely, the colour 
provides the painting with a suggestive power, intensity and the 
effect of the rise and fall of the rhythm. Compared with a line 
that is more or less quantifiable, colour has something mysteri-
ous and irrational, even cosmic. To use the concept of cosmos 
in the context of artistic creation, it is a strong characteristic 
not only for Deleuze and Guattari’s project, but also for the 
phenomenological view towards art. Junutytė also concludes 
that Klee’s ability, through the language of painting to express 
the musical rhythm as much as to show the unity of colour 
and sound in his painter compositions, shows his affinity to 
the French composer and ornithologist Messiaen’s synesthesia 
project. Noticing the deep relation in sensing the colours while 
hearing musical sounds, Messiaen also paid a lot of attention to 
bird songs and integrated that into his musical compositions. 
To Messiaen’s mind, it is not only the human being, but all of 
nature and the universe which is full of musical refrains, and 
this made a strong impact on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
becoming-animal, becoming-cosmic. Junutytė concludes that 
to Deleuze’s mind, to even make such operation as to let the 
multisensible Figure appear visually, the sensation of a particu-
lar domain should be in “direct contact with a vital power that 
exceeds every domain and traverses them all” (Deleuze 2003: 
42). Deleuze calls this vital power the Rhythm. The Rhythm 
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is something non-representable at all, which is more profound 
than any senses such as vision, hearing, touch, smell, etc. The 
Rhythm is insensible if we use the ordinary notion of sensing, 
but at the same time it can only be sensed as an unknowable 
power that makes visual sensations appear. The Rhythm can-
not be captured by any rational and perceptual way but instead 
it gives order and consistency to all sensations. In his book on 
painter Francis Bacon, Deleuze discerns three rhythms: “ac-
tive” with an increasing variation or amplification; “passive” – of 
decreasing variation or elimination, and an “attendant” rhythm 
(Deleuze 2003: 71). Namely, the existence of these rhythms 
constitutes the Figure. “Rhythm would cease to be attached to 
and dependent on a Figure: it is rhythm itself that would become 
the Figure, that would constitute the Figure” (Deleuze 2003: 71). 
Junutytė notices that abstract expressionism (Jackson Pollock’s 
line, Morris Louis’s stain) follows a completely different way of 
engaging the diagram. Deleuze characterises it as “the optical 
catastrophe and the manual rhythm” (Deleuze 2003b: 106). 
Through the subordination of the eye to the hand, abstract 
expressionism creates a manual space where it is impossible to 
see any visual coordinates.
Lilija Duoblienė in the fifth chapter “Philosophy and Music: 
Deterritorialization and Refrain” deals with the other musical 
concept ritournelle (in French) from the chapter ‘1837 – De la ri-
tournelle’ in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1980: 381–433). This concept was translated 
into English by Brian Massumi as ‘refrain’ (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 310–350). Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina translat-
ing Deleuze’s essay ‘Nous avons inventé la ritournelle (avec 
Félix Guattari)’ in the book Two Regimes of Madness; Texts and 
Interviews 1975–1995 used the Italian word ritornello (Deleuze 
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2003b: 353–356; Deleuze 2006b: 377–381). Duoblienė inves-
tigates how this concept from a musical concept is becoming 
a philosophical one in the process of moving from territori-
alization towards deterritorialization and reterritorialization. 
The author searches the interconnections between Messiaen’s, 
Boulez’s, and Uexküll’s ideas on rhythm and refrain with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s approach. She concludes that melody 
and rhythm are of biggest importance in order to mark the 
territory in music as well as leaving it. Rhythm marks terri-
tory by distinction of one-type elements from the other and 
keeping them at a distance, while melody shows the position 
of different sounds or motif in a moment. For the visualisation 
of the Deleuzoguattarian concept of refrain Duoblienė uses the 
example from Herzog’s documentary film Herdsmen of the Sun 
(1989). In order to distinguish between small refrain and great 
refrain, first type of refrain and the second type of refrain, she 
compares the two examples of the old man’s singing in Bryars’ 
composition “Jesus’ blood never failed me yet” (1971), recorded 
with Tom Waits in 1990, and in Herzog’s extract from the film 
The Transformation of the World into Music (1994). In both 
pieces of art, the focus is put on the old man’s non-professional 
singing. She also reflects on the possibility of becoming cosmic 
in a (non)Deleuzean way by using the examples of such Lithu-
anian creators as George Maciunas, Vladimir Tarasov, Gitenis 
Umbrasas and Andrius Šarapovas. The Deleuzoguattarian 
concept of the refrain is also used for the experimental read-
ing of Keith Jarrett’s jazz creation. Jarrett’s speed in arpeggiato 
and ostinato, as well as his rhythmic line of chords travelling 
through atonality allows him to get into this plane of consist-
ency, where “Speeds and slownesses inject themselves into 
musical form, sometimes impelling it to proliferation, linear 
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microproliferations, and sometimes to extinction, sonorous 
abolition, involution, or both at once… And that is because 
he or she affirms the power of becoming” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 296–297). On this plane of thickness Jarrett unfolds “it”, 
the sound block, the new texture and meaning of sound. His 
own voice affirms this event of becoming. Duoblienė concludes 
that using the Deleuzoguattarian perspective on overstepping 
the personal, cultural and geographic borders in music, as well 
as borders of music styles, is possible to extend the idea of ar-
tistic performance to becoming music, harnessing non-sonorous 
forces from chaos and achieving an effect in the event. 
I 
DElEuZE AnD guATTARI:  
RhYThM As  
A PhIlosoPhICAl ConCEPT 
Jūratė Baranova
gitenis umbrasas. Potato. 1994. Ceramic.
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Rhythmic Difference  
versus Metrical Repetition
Was Deleuze’s interest in music inspired by Guattari? Unlike 
Guattari, he started listening to music quite late in his life. 
Deleuze first discussed music in public in 1978 when he was 
working with Guattari. From a Deleuzean perspective music 
was reflected in written form for the first time in their common 
book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Claire 
Parnet was rather sceptical about Deleuze’s interest in music in 
the filmed interview with Deleuze, which was broadcasted in 
accordance with Deleuze’s instructions only posthumously in 
1996 on TV as L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze. In her questions 
she insisted Deleuze is an admirer for only one singer, namely 
Edith Piaf and knows little or almost nothing about contempo-
rary music. Dosse noticed that Deleuze liked not only Piaf, but 
also Paul Anka and Claude François: according to Dosse; he 
also liked Ravel’s Bolero, about which he had planned to write 
something (Dosse 2010: 444).
As a matter of fact, Deleuze never wrote a book on music 
as he did on literature, painting and cinema. But, according 
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to Dosse, Deleuze also worked with musicians. He was trying 
to learn from musicians, as he was learning from the writers, 
painters, and cinema directors. He was a close friend to com-
poser Richard Pinhas, who attended his courses at Vincennes. 
Pinhas was one of the first to introduce synthesizers into 
French rock music. Pinhas took classes from Deleuze starting 
from 1971 until his retirement in 1987. Deleuze, according to 
Dosse, occasionally asked Pinhas to write short texts for him 
on musicological topics and their mutual cooperation was in-
cluded into the chapter ‘1837 – De la ritournelle’ (1837: Of the 
Refrain) in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
on synthetic music. Pinhas thinks that some concepts created 
by Deleuze inspired his synthetic music. Pinhas was amazed: 
“If I take the last pages in the chapter on the ritornello in A 
Thousand Plateaus, he manages to say in four pages what no 
musician theorizing even slightly about music could possibly 
dream of being able to write. That’s where his genius lies” 
(Dosse 2010: 444). 
 Deleuze cooperated with a musician and musicology 
student Pascale Criton. In creating piano compositions, she 
claimed she was influenced by Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas 
and tried to reach the molecular material and fluidity of the 
material of sound.
After retirement when he reflected on his own practice of 
teaching philosophy, Deleuze compared it to a piece of music: 
he suggested imagining it as a rock concert, where the listen-
ers are from very multiple spheres: the first-year and nth-year 
students, students and non-students, philosophers and non-
philosophers, young and old, and many different nationalities. 
There were always young painters and musicians there, film-
makers and architects. It seems Deleuze was fascinated by this 
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multiplicity and did not see his aim as a philosophy professor 
of “building up knowledge” progressively (Deleuze 1995: 139). 
The musician Criton as a student remembers: “He didn’t pre-
tend to be a musical specialist. It was a laboratory, live thinking 
taking form. He used to say to me, “Is this right?’’ Can I say it 
this way?” (Dosse 2010: 446).
Was the chapter “1837: Of the Refrain” in the book A Thou-
sand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia inspired more by 
Deleuze or by Guattari?
Anne Sauvagnargues in the book Artmachines in the chapter 
“Ritornellos of Time” refers to Guattari for the reason that the 
idea of refrain was formulated in Guattari’s book The Machinic 
Unconscious in 1979 – a year before their common book with 
Deleuze A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
in 1980 appeared (Sauvagnargues 2016: 132). In this book, 
Guattari debates with psychoanalysis introducing into it at 
once transhuman, transsexual, and a transcosmic dimension 
and reveals the “machinic” – the potential of the unconscious. 
Guattari reflects not only on “refrain,” but also on the associ-
ated “faciality” – the key concepts in the subsequent book A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia written with 
Deleuze. Guattari in his book in the chapter “The Time of 
Refrains” starts from a sociological analysis: from capitalist 
refrains, comparing pre-capitalistic and capitalistic societies, 
and discerns in the latter the simplification of the basic rhythms 
of temporalization, what he calls refrains. He also reflects a lot 
on the ethology of sonorous, visual and behavioral refrains in 
the animal world, following the work of Dutch biologist and or-
nithologist Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907–1988), searching for the 
difference between animal desire and human desire and pays 
tribute to the multidimensionality of territories, keeping the 
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discussion with Klein and Lacan. In the chapter “The Refrain 
of the Blade of Grass,” Guattari pays tribute to a certain number 
of bird species (sparrows, web-footed birds, wading-birds, etc.), 
and all these topics the reader can notice in the chapter “1837: 
Of the Refrain” in the book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia written with Deleuze. In some sense, Guat-
tari’s text can serve as an introduction to the chapter “1837: Of 
the Refrain” for those who consider the latter as too opaque. 
Guattari’s text is less sophisticated and more elaborated and 
structured. But at the same time, it lacks the force of intensities 
and the vitality of expression as one can find in “1837: Of the 
Refrain.” Guattari’s text also has very little digression towards 
arts. There are some remarks about Marcel Proust, but the Mes-
siaen is never mentioned.
Deleuze in his philosophical reflections was impressed by 
Messiaen’s rhythmicly complex music and conceptualised his 
ideas. Deleuze relied on Messiaen’s insights not only in the 
chapter “1837 – De la ritournelle” (1837: Of the Refrain) in the 
book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, but 
also by reflecting upon the relations of color to sound in Francis 
Bacon’s paintings in the book Francis Bacon – Logique de la 
sensation (1981, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation). Along 
with Barthes and Foucault, Deleuze was attending a seminar 
on musical time, organised by the Institute for Research and 
Coordination in Acoustics / Music (IRCAM), directed by 
Messian’s scholar Pierre Boulez. Boulez later reflected that, 
“Gilles Deleuze is one of the very rare intellectuals to be 
deeply interested in music” (Dosse 2010: 443). As a matter of 
fact, Guattari started to collaborate with Deleuze in 1969 and 
in the 1979 publication (only one year before the appearance 
of their joint project), he also could have been influenced by 
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Deleuze. In any case, the aim of our research is not to follow 
the complex mutual influences between Deleuze and Guattari. 
In some cases, Guattari would also be mentioned separately 
from Deleuze.
Thus in this book we’ll follow the premise of the communal 
genesis of such concepts as “rhythm”, “refrain”, “faciality”, and 
“line of flight” in the Deleuzean-Guattarian extraordinarily 
intensive thinking-writing machine. As Deleuze reflected upon 
the problem of their authorship with Guattari, they “understood 
and complemented, depersonalised and singularized in short, 
loved one another”. Readers as usual are eager to know: “who is 
who?”, “Which of the ideas belongs to whom?”, and in Deleuze 
words: “So they try to disentangle inseparable elements and 
identify who did what. But since each of us, like anyone else, 
is already various people, it gets rather crowded” (Deleuze 
1995: 7). Deleuze supposed that in creation mediators are very 
important. They can be real or imaginary, animate or inani-
mate: people, things, even plants or animals (as in Castaneda). 
The mediator helps the creator to express himself. Deleuze 
concludes: “And still more when it’s apparent: Félix Guattari 
and I are one another’s mediators” (Deleuze 1995: 125). How 
do mediators help to create the truth?
The production of truth, Deleuze considers, involves a se-
ries of operations or a series of falsifications: “When I work with 
Guattari, each of us falsifies the other, which is to say that each 
of us understands in his own way notions put forward by the 
other. A reflective series with two terms takes shape. And there 
can be a series with several terms, or a complicated branching 
series. These capacities of falsity to produce truth, that’s what 
mediators are about” (Deleuze 1995: 126).
Why is Rhythm so Important to Guattari and Deleuze?
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Just before meeting with Guattari in 1969, Deleuze pub-
lished two very important philosophical books, Différence et 
répétition (1968) and Logique du sense (1969). Writing in the 
Preface to the English Edition, Deleuze concludes that it was 
his first autonomous study: in the earlier books he expressed 
his enthusiasm for the studies of Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche and 
Proust but Difference and Repetition was his first book in which 
he tried to ‘do philosophy’ (Deleuze 1994: xv). In the Logic of 
Sense, Deleuze mentions no musician’s name. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze mentions Richard Wagner, but only in his 
relation to Nietzsche, more exactly Nietzsche’s break with him 
(Deleuze 1994: 8). Deleuze also mentions Mozart in relation 
to Kierkegaard, saying that “Mozart’s music resonates even in 
Abraham and Job; it is a matter of ‘leaping’ to the tune of this 
music” (Deleuze 1994: 9). There is no word about Messiaen in 
both of them. The composer is still waiting for Deleuze’s atten-
tion. Not one word about rhythm in The Logic of Sense. But in 
Difference and Repetition reflections on rhythm continue and 
the reflections about Proust are also included.
The Deleuzean insights about rhythm in Difference and Rep-
etition have its origin not from arts, but first of all from math-
ematical, biological, genetic, and psychoanalytic sources. He 
also returns to the traditional studies of rhythm in connection 
to rhyme in poetry and says that it is indeed verbal repetition, 
but repetition which includes the difference between two words 
and inscribes that difference at the heart of a poetic Idea, in a 
space which it determines: “Nor does its meaning lie in mark-
ing equal intervals, but rather, as we see in a notion of strong 
rhyme, in putting tonal values in the service of tonic rhythm, 
and contributing to the independence of tonic rhythms from 
arithmetic rhythms” (Deleuze 1994: 214). And only in the end 
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of the book does Deleuze conclude: “Perhaps the highest object 
of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions, 
with their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective dis-
placements and disguises, their divergences and decentrings…” 
(Deleuze 1994: 293).
Art has something to do with the ontological repetition, 
which Deleuze discerned beyond physical repetition and psy-
chic or metaphysical repetition. He also concluded that the role 
of the ontological repetition would not be to suppress the other 
two – physical and psychic – but, on the one hand, to distribute 
difference to them and to produce the illusion by which they are 
affected while nevertheless preventing them from developing 
the related error into which they fall. So art, in any case, is the 
highest repetition of all? As in Proust’s novel?
Deleuze uses the concept of repetition in order to approach 
from the one criterion the different types of contemporary art: 
modern music, painting, literature and cinema. Deleuze sees 
the same tendencies in the development of the leitmotiv in Aus-
trian musician Alban Berg’s (1985–1936) opera Wozzeck as an 
example of diverse and disparate repetitions in modern music2 
with American painter Andy Warhol’s (1928–1987) “remarkable 
‘serial’ series in painting, in which all the repetitions of habit, 
memory and death are conjugated,” the French director Alain 
Resnais’ (1922–2014) movie Last Year at Marienbad (1961), 
“which shows the particular techniques of repetition which 
2 Willi Reich in ‘A Guide to Alban Berg’s Opera Wozzeck’ explains how 
in this opera coherence is sustained and variety is created: “Such an 
emphasis was arrived at, first of all, by making every act steer its way 
toward one and the same final chord in a sort of cadence to rest there 
as on a tonic. These final chords always appear in a different form 
although they are made up of the same notes” (Reich 1932).
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cinema can deploy or invent,” and French writer Michel Butor’s3 
novel La modification (1957) as “the novelistic manner in which 
little modifications are torn from the brute and mechanical rep-
etitions of habit and all these repetitions coexisting and yet being 
displaced in relation to one another” (Deleuze 1994: 293–294).
But genetics and biology are primary sources of different 
rhythms. They seem to integrate a much more intensive force 
than art. For example, says Deleuze, embryology shows that the 
division of an egg into parts is secondary in relation to more 
significant dynamic morphogenetic movements: the augmenta-
tion of free surfaces, stretching of cellular layers, invagination 
by folding, and the regional displacement of groups. “Types of 
egg are therefore distinguished by the orientations, the axes of 
development, the differential speeds and rhythms which are the 
primary factors in the actualization of a structure and create a 
space and a time peculiar to that which is actualized” (Deleuze 
1994: 213). Reflecting about chromosomes and genes as biologi-
cal structures, Deleuze notices that they are incarnated in actual 
organisms “according to rhythms that are precisely called dif-
ferential,’ according to comparative speeds or slownesses which 
measure the movement of actualization” (Deleuze 1994: 185).
How is repetition connected with rhythm? Deleuze is more 
concerned with justifying or detecting the differences between 
3 Michel Marie François Butor was born in 1926 in Mons-en-Barœul, 
a suburb of Lille. He studied philosophy at the Sorbonne. Journalists 
and critics have associated his novels with the nouveau roman, but 
Butor himself has long resisted that association. The main point of 
similarity is a very general one, not much beyond that; like exponents 
of the nouveau roman, he can be described as an experimental writer. 
His best-known novel, La Modification, for instance, is written entirely 
in the second person.
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repetitions by their kind and rhythm. Therefore, he defines 
the difference between two important psychological drives 
invented by Freud’ – Eros and Thanatos – as the two drives of 
different rhythm and amplitude (Deleuze 1994: 111).
Deleuze also discerns two types of repetition: static and dy-
namic, taking into account that they have different rhythms. The 
first one concerns only the overall, abstract effect, and the other 
the acting cause. “One is a static repetition, the other is dynamic. 
One results from the work, but the other is like the ‘evolution’ of 
a bodily movement. One refers back to a single concept, which 
Paul Klee. Camel in Rhythmic Landscape with Trees. 1920. oil on canvas. 
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leaves only an external difference between the ordinary instances 
of a figure; the other is the repetition of an internal difference 
which it incorporates in each of its moments, and carries from 
one distinctive point to another” (Deleuze 1994: 20). Deleuze 
concludes that in the dynamic order there is no representative 
concept, nor any figure represented in a pre-existing space. 
There is only an Idea or a pure dynamism which creates a cor-
responding space. Studies on rhythm or symmetry, according to 
him, confirm this duality. Deleuze draws a distinction between 
arithmetic symmetry, which refers back to a scale of whole or 
fractional coefficients, and geometric symmetry, based upon 
proportions or irrational ratios. It is also a distinction between 
a static symmetry which is cubic or hexagonal, and a dynamic 
symmetry which is pentagonal and appears in a spiral line or in 
a geometrically progressing pulsation – in short, in a living and 
mortal ‘evolution’. In a network of double squares, Deleuze also 
discovers radiating lines which have the centre of a pentagon 
or a pentagram as their asymmetrical pole (Deleuze 1994: 20).
According to Deleuze, the network is like a fabric stretched 
upon a framework, but the outline, the principal rhythm of that 
framework, is almost always a theme independent of the network: 
such elements of dissymmetry serve as both genetic principle 
and principle of reflection for symmetrical figures. The static 
repetition in the network of double squares thus refers back to a 
dynamic repetition, formed by a pentagon and ‘the decreasing 
series of pentagrams which may be naturally inscribed therein’. 
The study of these rhythms allowed Deleuze to distinguish two 
kinds of repetition: cadence-repetition and rhythm-repetition. 
In order to distinguish these two types of repetition, Deleuze 
suggests the criterion: regularity of time. Cadence-repetition is 
a regular division of time, an isochronic recurrence of identical 
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elements. He also discerns a poly-rhythm. How does a poly-
rhythm appear? Deleuze notices that a period of time exists 
only in so far as it is determined by a tonic accent, commanded 
by intensities and notices that we would be mistaken about 
the function of accents if we said that they were reproduced 
at equal intervals. On the contrary, tonic and intensive values 
act by creating inequalities or incommensurabilities between 
metrically equivalent periods or spaces. They create distinctive 
points, privileged instants which always indicate a poly-rhythm. 
Here again, the unequal is the most positive element:
A bare, material repetition (repetition of the Same) appears 
only in the sense that another repetition is disguised within it, 
constituting it and constituting itself in disguising itself. Even 
in nature, isochronic rotations are only the outward appearance 
of a more profound movement, the revolving cycles are only 
abstractions: placed together, they reveal evolutionary cycles or 
spirals whose principle is a variable curve, and the trajectory of 
which has two dissymmetrical aspects, as though it had a right 
and a left. It is always in this gap, which should not be confused 
with the negative, that creatures weave their repetition and 
receive at the same time the gift of living and dying. Finally, to 
return to nominal (Deleuze 1994b: 21).
Is it repetition which does something in common with 
rhythm? It seems not at all. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capital-
ism and Schizophrenia (1980), Deleuze is already influenced by 
Messiaen and also Guattari, so they both change the accent and 
formulate very clearly: “It is the difference that is rhythmic, not 
the repetition, which nevertheless produces it: productive rep-
etition has nothing to do with reproductive meter” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 314).
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Rhythm-Chaos as the Chaosmos
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia written 
together with Guattari and published in 1980 is Deleuze’s 
most “musical book” as well as “the most musical” book 
written by the two philosophers. In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia they mentioned only Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart. But in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia one can see the variety of different composers: Philip 
Glass, Johann Sebastian Bach, Franz Liszt, Hector Berlioz , 
Gustav Mahler, Georges Bizet, Giuseppe Verdi, Frederic Cho-
pin, Igor Stravinsky, Gioacchino Rossini, Robert Schumann, 
Arnold Schoenberg, Maurice Ravel and his Bolero, and Mod-
est Mussorgsky. In What is Philosophy? besides Stravinsky, 
Schumann, Chopin and Mahler, some additional composers 
are mentioned: Bella Bartok and Claude Debussy.
But “the most musical chapter” of “the most musical 
book,” “1837 – De la ritournelle (1837: Of the Refrain)”, starts 
not with a discussion on music, but on reflections upon the 
possibility to find the calm and stable centre in the heart of 
chaos. Deleuze and Guattari suggest treating sonorous sounds 
as Ariadne’s thread or the song of Orpheus in the search of 
their own organised space. They even discern three steps in this 
way leading to the centre surrounded by chaos: the first step 
is singing of little songs of those who are lost in the dark. The 
second step is creating a wall of sound by sonorous and vocal 
components enabling it to resist or even to take something from 
chaos. In creating this wall, the rhythmic moving in cycle plays 
a very important role. Rhythmic vowels and consonants are 
supposed to correspond to the interior forces of creation as to 
the differentiated parts of the organism. “A mistake in speed, 
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rhythm, or harmony would be catastrophic because it would 
bring back the force of chaos, destroying both creator and 
creation,” Deleuze and Guattari conclude (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 311). But at least this circle has a tendency to open itself 
onto the future in order to join them with the cosmic forces 
of the future. “One launches forth, hazards an improvisation. 
But to improvise is to join with the World, or meld with it. One 
venture from home on the thread of a tune,” they conclude 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 311). These three steps are simulta-
neously mixed aspects of the refrain (ritournelle). In order to 
illustrate how the refrain exposes all these three aspects in arts, 
Deleuze and Guattari take the example not from any musical 
compositions, but from painting. The typical example of the 
interlinkage of these three aspects they saw in German artist 
Paul Klee’s (1879–1940) paintings. So the concept from music 
(ritournelle) is applied to give a more profound analysis of the 
painter’s work in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. In Klee’s 
paintings, Deleuze and Guattari discerned the way from a “gray 
point” (black hole) as nonlocalizable, nondimensional chaos to 
“jump over itself ” to dimensional space with a horizontal line, 
vertical cross-sections, where the “gray point” finds its home, 
and afterwards “the point launches out of itself, impelled by 
wandering centrifugal forces that fan out to the sphere of the 
cosmos…” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 312).
So this wall in the midst of the chaos and distancing from 
chaos can be created not only by sounds, but with visual im-
ages as well. It seems that some painters in their paintings are 
hearing the musical refrain. This Deleuzean-Guattarian insight 
is very productive when approaching the works of some artist 
painters, as for example one of the first modernist painters in 
Lithuania, Vincas Kisarauskas (1934–1988). 
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His early paintings express a shunned question: How can 
one keep stability in the midst of chaos? And the visual answer 
is such: to define the circle and by this to structure the com-
fortable, close, recognisable space as a micro-world, as a centre 
for the universe to spin about without being involved by this 
droning universe. “The nomos,” write Deleuze and Guattari in 
Vincas Kisarauskas. Oedipus Wednesday. 1981. linocut.
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A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia: “as custom-
ary, unwritten law is inseparable from a distribution of space, a 
distribution in space” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 312). Very often 
in Kisarauskas’s pictures, the main point which fiddles itself 
around the space of everyday things is the table. The table can 
function in the painted world in a wide range of varieties: it can 
be a table for writing, designing, constructing, cooking; it can 
be an empty table or the table as a place for different decorative 
trimmings (vases, fruits, various goods as in Flemish pictures). 
But in Kisarauskas’ paintings, the table becomes the square 
centre of the universe, uniting separate rhythmic characters. 
The table creates the space for the possible meeting, conversa-
tion and dining. In the picture The Conversation about Simple 
Things (1973), the table as the centre of the universe connects 
and brings closer two almost identical orange figures reflecting 
each other like in a mirror. The rhythm, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, is interdependent with territory: “The territory 
is first of all the critical distance between two beings of the 
same species: Mark your distance. What is mine is first of all 
my distance; I possess only distances. Don’t anybody touch me, 
I growl if anyone enters my territory, I put up placards. Criti-
cal distance is a relation based on matters of expression. It is a 
question of keeping at a distance the forces of chaos knocking 
at the door” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 319–320). Two figures in 
Kisarauskas’ picture have found the distance expressing rhyth-
mic harmony. They reverberate repeating each other as in the 
harmonic rhythm and cover all the space around them. There 
is no other world left behind this one table and the two figures. 
In the centre of the table there is some vase, or some bottle 
and small emerald circle the same colour as the background 
of the picture. This small emerald circle is reminiscent of the 
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“grey point” (black hole) that Deleuze and Guattari noticed in 
Klee’s pictures. So the space of the picture The Conversation 
about Simple Things is totally completed, it deploys itself into an 
unshakable world – the new monolith. The world gains a bal-
ance. A Balance – such is the title for one of Kisarauskas’ works.
“Sometimes,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “one goes from 
chaos to the threshold of a territorial assemblage: directional 
components, infra-assemblage. Sometimes one organises the 
assemblage: dimensional components, intra-assemblage” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 312).
The other strategy for overcoming the chaotic instability of 
the world is the constant return to the same point. The stability 
is regained by repeating and repeating the same refrain, the 
same motive, the same title in the different milieu, at differ-
ent times, at the different regime. In the early period, even six 
pictures are created by the same title At the table (1967, 1968, 
and four in 1975). The refrain of the titles seems to stabilise 
the tragedy in constant return to the fate of the king Oedipus 
and his children. Step by step Kisarauskas again and again 
creates the works entitled King Oedipus, Blind Oedipus (1960), 
Oedipus in Despair (1966), The First Day of Blind Oedipus (1975), 
Antigone and Creon, Blind Oedipus, Self-portrait and Somebody’s 
Head, Oedipus and Antigone (1976), Antigone and Ismene, The 
evening Sunday of Oedipus (1979–1980).
But as Deleuze and Guattari reflected, this circle as the wall 
against the chaos unnecessarily has to be opened. What can 
happen when the circle opens itself onto the future in order to 
join with the cosmic forces of the future? In Kisarauskas’ later 
and especially the latest pictures, we are given an apocalyptic 
answer – the universe loses its centre and the figures lose their 
stability. The Lurch in Time (1982–1983) is the title of one of 
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Kisarauskas’ latest pictures. In the space noted by emptiness 
the body loses its stability: it leans as if following an indiscern-
ible attraction to eternity. During 1984–1985, Kisarauskas 
returned to his beloved motif in the picture Near the table. But 
in difference to the space in the former picture The Conversation 
about Simple Things (1973), stability does not return. Refrain 
Vincas Kisarauskas. Composition on Oblivion. 1982–1983. Etching.
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loses its power. Two figures do not repeat each other’s being in 
the rhythmic harmony. On the contrary: they are torpid and 
heeled. Stability is lost forever. The table as the centre of the 
universe does not unite the figures in the rhythmic harmony. 
Six heeling figures embrace the right edge of the picture (Six 
People with Turbulent Thoughts, 1983). “Sometimes,” Deleuze 
and Guattari write, “one leaves the territorial assemblage for 
other assemblages, or for something new entirely: interas-
semblage, components of passage or even escape” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 312). Sometimes the lonely figure in Kisaraus-
kas’ late pictures succeeds in escaping to the other space, but 
stability does not return. It puts its head out of the home seg-
ment in the picture 20 Century and finds itself in the heeled 
Nobody’s land without any living spirit. Such a figure is not 
looking for the centre of the world for stability any more than 
the figures in the picture The Conversation about Simple Things 
(1973). On the contrary, he flees trying to escape to another 
non-existing world, to another dimension. All three aspects of 
refrain described by Deleuze and Guattari simply collapse and 
the world going in a reverse direction returns to its primary 
chaos. This arhythmic movement of heeled figures is the sign 
that the universe will never straighten itself again. Why can 
this defensive wall of refrain collapse? Something happened 
somewhere in-between.
What does this mean, this “in-between”? This position “in-
between” seems the most important in the concept of rhythm 
in comparison to refrain. Rhythm is different from refrain. But 
in what sense? By which aspect? Rhythm stems from refrain: 
“Children’s, women’s, ethnic, and territorial refrains, refrains 
of love and destruction: the birth of rhythm” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1987: 300). Their difference is rather subtle. Milieus and 
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Rhythms are born from chaos, say Deleuze and Guattari. Every 
milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time consti-
tuted by the periodic repetition of the components. The milieus 
are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion and 
intrusion. “Rhythm is the milieus’ answer to chaos. What chaos 
and rhythm have in common is the in-between – between the 
milieus, rhythm-chaos and the chaosmos…” Deleuze and 
Guattari say (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 313). In explanations of 
what these different milieus can mean, Deleuze and Guattari 
returned to the binary aspects of the universe, which Derrida 
tried to deconstruct by the means of a language. Deleuze and 
Guattari, on the contrary, base on them their ontology. They 
discern the differences between different milieus: between the 
night and day, between the contraction and the natural growth, 
between inorganic and organic, between plant and animal, be-
tween animal and humankind. The passage from one binary 
milieu to another needs transcoding. And transcoding means 
the communication of milieus which happens with different 
rhythms. “In this in-between,” they write, “chaos becomes 
rhythm, not inexorably, but it has a chance to. Chaos is not 
the opposite to rhythm, but the milieu of all milieus. There is 
rhythm whenever there is a transcoded passage from one milieu 
to another, a communication of milieus, coordination between 
heterogeneous space-times. Drying up, death, intrusion have 
rhythm” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 313).
“Not inexorably” – means that the usual rhythm of 
transcoding and passage from one milieu to the other can col-
lapse. What happens then? What are the peculiarities of the 
rhythm of death? They do not develop this insight further. But 
one of the possible answers can be: it can happen as the imbal-
ance and the lurch in time as in Kisarauskas’ later pictures.
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For the rhythm to become expressive it needs territory. 
There is interdependence between rhythm and territory. From 
the one side – territory affects milieus and rhythms, and from 
the other – the territory itself is the product of the territoriali-
zation of milieus and rhythms (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 314). 
“The refrain,” Deleuze and Guattari conclude, “is rhythm 
and melody that have been territorialized because they have 
become expressive – and they become expressive because they 
are territorializing” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 317).
“Human music also goes this route,” at least at the ninth 
page of the chapter Deleuze and Guattari announce. It seems 
the topic from rhythm in the painting had changed to the topic 
about rhythm in music. Not at all.
The Rhythm of Sensation:  
Music and Painting
In Cinema 2: The Time-Image Deleuze quotes Alejo Carpentier’s 
insight from French theoretician of cinema Jean Mitry’s book 
Esthetique et psychologie du cinema, saying that even “Conver-
sation has a rhythm, a movement, an absence of sequence in 
the ideas, with, on the contrary, strange associations, curious 
reminders, which bear no resemblance to the dialogues that 
usually fill’ novels and plays” (Deleuze 1989: 322).
 Messiaen in in his conversations with Claude Samuel when 
asked how can rhythm be defined in a simple manner answered 
that Plato’s definition ”Rhythm is the ordering of movement” is 
applicable to dance, to words, and to music, but it’s incomplete. 
Messiaen supposes that rhythm is the primordial and perhaps 
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essential part of music, which existed before melody and har-
mony. Rhythm is inspired by the movements of nature, move-
ments of free and unequal durations. Messiaen has his own 
approach towards the rhythm in music. He does not discern 
it in Bach’s compositions, but sees Mozart as an extraordinary 
rhythmician (Messiaen 1994: 68).
Messiaen was also the author of the idea of uniting colour 
and sound. He said he perceived colours when he heard cer-
tain musical chords (a phenomenon known as synaesthesia in 
its literal manifestation). Combinations of these colours, he 
said, were important in his compositional process. Messiaen’s 
musical language is derived from a number of varied sources, 
including Greek metrical rhythms, Hindu tradition, the serial-
ism of Schoenberg, Debussy and birdsongs, with his whole work 
and life deeply influenced by the spirit of Catholicism. His ideas 
influenced Deleuze who made the reverse gesture: he used the 
ideas from music to describe the diversity of colour in Bacon’s 
paintings. Deleuze engenders the concepts of rhythms from 
Messiaen’s music in order to interpret the triptychs of Francis 
Bacon’s paintings in the book Deleuze published after his depar-
ture with Guattari, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. He took 
from Messiaen the concept of the rhythmic character, referring 
to Claude Samuel’s book Conversations with Olivier Messiaen and 
Antoine Golea’s book Rencontres avec Olivier Messiaen.
 Deleuze treats Bacon in painting as the alternative to Mes-
siaen in music. He writes:
These are monsters from the point of view of figuration. But from 
the point of view of the Figures themselves, these are rhythms 
and nothing else, rhythms as in a piece of music, as in the music 
of Messiaen, which makes you hear “rhythmic characters.” If 
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one keeps in mind the development of the triptych, and this way 
Bacon has of effecting relationships between painting and music, 
then one can return to the simple paintings (Deleuze 2003b: xv).
Ronald Bogue in his article Gilles Deleuze: The Aesthetics of 
Force published in Deleuze: A Critical Reader noticed the strik-
ing similarities between interpretation of Cézanne’s painting by 
French phenomenologist theoretician of art Henri Maldiney in 
his book Regard Parole Espace (1973) and Deleuze’s experimen-
tal reading of Bacon’s paintings in his book Francis Bacon. The 
Logic of Sensation: “both critics frame their analyses in terms of 
sensation, systolic and diastolic movements, the force of colour 
and light, and the rhythms of time” (Bogue 1996: 264). Was 
Deleuze following Maldiney’s suggested reading of painting, or 
was it only by accident that their approaches are parallel and co-
incide? It seems Bogue considers that Deleuze was influenced 
by Maldiney. Bogue notices that “the essence of sensation is 
rhythm, and the elementary rhythm of a Bacon painting is the 
systolic and diastolic vibration that passes between field and 
figure” (Bogue 1996: 263). According to Maldiney, Cézanne’s 
painting reveals all the “logic of senses,” our immediate partici-
pation in the world, that of being in the world, the Rhythm. “It 
is diastole-systole: the world that seizes me by closing in around 
me, the self that opens to the world and opens the world itself,” 
Deleuze says, reciting Maldiney (Deleuze 2003b: 41–42). The 
critic also notices that the concept of rhythm used to interpret 
painting is coming from music and that in the book A Thou-
sand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia treat “the refrain 
as any rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territory” (Bogue 
1996: 265). The broader analysis of the concept of rhythm in 
Deleuze’s writing about painting and music was elaborated on 
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in Bogue’s earlier book Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts 
(2003). In this book Bogue discusses Messiaen’s possible influ-
ence on Deleuze’s thinking about music. Bogue notices that for 
both of them rhythm and meter are antithetical concepts and 
the “rhythmic music” in jazz or military marches they saw as 
the negation of true rhythm. As a matter of fact, Deleuze and 
Guattari do not mention jazz, only military marches, saying: 
“Most people believe that rhythm means the regular values of a 
Paul Klee. Polyphony. 1932. oil and chalk on canvas. 
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military march. Whereas, in fact, rhythm is an unequal element, 
following fluctuations, like the waves of the sea, like the noise 
of the wind, like the shape of tree branches … there is nothing 
less rhythmic than a military march” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
313). Whereas meter indicates an even division of a uniform 
time, rhythm is based on a time of flux of multiple speeds and 
reversible relations. Messiaen defined rhythm as “the change 
of number and duration.” Messiaen was able to reflect the 
metaphysical sources of the birth of the rhythm: “Suppose that 
there were a single beat in the universe. One beat; with eternity 
before it and eternity after it. A before and after. That is the birth 
of time. Imagine then, almost immediately, a second beat. Since 
any beat is prolonged by the silence which follows it, the second 
beat will be longer than the first. That is the birth of Rhythm” 
(Bogue 2003: 25).
Messiaen created highly structured rhythms that do not 
fall into periodical meters. Deleuze was fascinated by Messi-
aen’s idea to create music based on ametrical regularity. Mes-
siaen was influenced by the relatively ametrical sound when 
compared to most Western rhythms of Greek rhythms, of the 
rhythms of the Indian provinces (the 120 Indian ‘deçî-tâlas’ 
listed in Sharngadeva’s treatise Samgîta-ratnâkara), of Japanese 
and Balinese rhythms. Deleuze and Guattari also noticed and 
mentioned, “Greek modes and Hindu rhythms are themselves 
territorial, provincial, regional” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 312). 
As the investigators of Messiaen’s musical techniques noticed, 
“the rhythmic complexities of Stravinsky were another great 
impetus; they fascinated the younger composer, who in the 
second volume of the Traité sought to codify the irregular 
pulsations of The Rite of Spring” (Healey 2013: 21). Messiaen 
presupposed that the musician through rhythm can experiment 
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with time: to chop up time and put it together again in reverse 
order. Messiaen experimented himself and created the am-
etrical rhythms using the techniques of “added value” (that 
traditionally associated with certain regular meters but have 
irregularly added or deleted notes, dots, ties, and hesitations 
(commonly called “additive rhythm”), “rhythmic characters”, 
and “nonretrogradable rhythms” (palindromic rhythmic pat-
terns with a central common value). In these experimentations 
with time, Messiaen succeeded in extracting time from its flow 
and to include it in the frame of space in order to extract the mo-
ment of eternity. Messaien was first of all a Catholic musician. 
Deleuze and Guattari were not interested in his confessional 
views. But they took very seriously his innovations in the con-
cept of music, and especially rhythm, and reflected upon them 
from a philosophical perspective. Deleuze for the first time 
mentioned Messiaen’s concept of rhythm in the most “musical” 
chapter “1837 – De la retournelle” (1837: On Refrain) in their last 
book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1980). 
One year later he published his own experimental reflection on 
painting, Francis Bacon – Logique De La Sensation (1981), in 
which he used the insights from Messiaen’s musical theory to 
interpret the features of Bacon’s works. Deleuze equates the 
content of Bacon’s triptych’s with three panels to the three basic 
rhythms in music, discovered by Messiaen and indicates three 
different rhythms: “one steady or “attendant” rhythm, and two 
other rhythms, one of crescendo or simplification (climbing, 
expanding, diastolic, adding value), the other of diminuendo 
or elimination (descending, contracting, systolic, removing 
value)” (Deleuze 2003b: xv).
Was Deleuze using the concept of rhythm only for a philo-
sophical treatment of painting and music, or also for different 
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arts – literature and cinema as well? What are the other sources 
of the concept of rhythm Deleuze used as one of the main tools 
in his philosophy of arts? Our hypotheses is that the concept of 
rhythm is one of the possible answers to the question of how 
it is possible to reflect different arts as the same order of the 
creative events in Deleuze and Guattari’s books. We suggest 
that the concept of rhythm from their point of view oscillates 
between the heterogeneity and multiplicity of creative events in 
different arts. The second part of our hypothesis states that the 
concept of rhythm was elaborated as a philosophical concept in 
Deleuze’s work Difference and Repetition and was taken not only 
from philosophy itself but from ancient cosmogonies and from 
arts: literature, cinema and music. First of all, Deleuze was a 
careful reader of Marcel Proust’s novel In the Search for the Time 
Lost. Secondly, he also took seriously reflections about rhythm 
and time in Russian director Sergei Eisenstein’s (1898–1948) 
and Andrei Tarkovsky’s (1932–1986) books. Thirdly, he took 
into account the composer Messiaen’s (1908–1992) message 
woven in his music and his reflections. As a consequence of 
these influences, the concept of rhythm included into Deleuze’s 
(and Guattari’s as well) philosophical writing machine became 
one of the most productive interdisciplinary philosophical 
concepts whickering the rhizomatic cobweb threads between 
thought, word, sound and image. But the multiplicity of con-
texts Deleuze is using in the concept of rhythm as a tool allows 
us to conclude that he is speaking not about rhythm, but about 
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The Concept of Rhythm in Proust’s Novel
Deleuze started to explore the concept of rhythm much earlier 
than his reflections on Messiaen’s rhythms in 1980 and 1981, 
before Henri Maldiney’s book Regard, Paral Espace in 1973, and 
before meeting Guattari in 1969. In 1964 Deleuze published an 
investigation reflecting on literature: on the four heterogeneous 
series of signs he deciphered in Marcel Proust’s novel In Search 
of Lost Time. Deleuze quotes Proust’s phrase from the volume 
Within a Budding grove saying: “and the very rhythm of this 
discomposed city” in translator Richard Howard’s translation 
(Deleuze 2000a: 162). In Proust’s book translated by Charles 
Kenneth Scott Moncrieff, it is the rhythm of the “disintegrated 
town” (Proust 1924: 430). It sounds as follows: “…et le rythme 
même de cette ville bouleversée…” in Proust’s and Deleuze’s 
language (Proust 1987: 195).
Catarina Pombo Nabais, in her thorough analysis in the 
book Gilles Deleuze: philosophie et littérature, revealed the 
conceptual difference between the three editions of Proust et 
les signes in 1964, 1970 and 1973. Nabais considers every new 
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edition as a new theoretical field (le nouveau champ théoretique) 
and Deleuze’s way through them compared to the rhizome 
Deleuze himself used to interpret Kafka’s writings (Nabais 
2013: 47–48). One can notice that the title of the book has 
changed: the two first editions were Marcel Proust et les signes. 
The last one is shorter: Proust et les signes. The title of Proust’s 
novel À la recherche du temps perdu (1913–1927) in English also 
experienced a metamorphosis in Kafka’s style. Translator Euan 
Cameron in the translation of Jean-Yves Tadie’s book Marcel 
Proust. A life from French into English avoids the English 
translation of the title and leaves the French À la recherche du 
temps perdu. The translation avoided the necessity of choosing 
between the two translations of the title: Remembrance of Things 
Past (1981), stemming from Shakespeare4, and the new one 
from 1992 – In Search of Lost Time. In this text we are going to 
use the latter translation of In Search of Lost Time. We are going 
to rely on the last and complete text of Proust et les signes in the 
7th edition from 1987, as well as the complete and last English 
translation of Proust and Signs, published in 2000.
Proust’s novel In Search of Lost Time consists of seven 
volumes – Du côté de chez Swann (Swann’s Way), À l’ombre des 
jeunes filles en fleurs (Within a Budding Grove), Le Côté de Guer-
mantes (The Guermantes Way), Sodome et Gomorrhe (Sodom and 
Gomorrah), La Prisonnière (The Captive), Albertine disparue (The 
Fugitive), Le Temps retrouvé (Time Regained) – is one of the most 
popular novels among French philosophers who take literature 
seriously. Emmanuel Levinas wrote about Marcel Proust 
even earlier than Deleuze did. In 1947 he published an article 
L’Autre dans Proust (The Other in Proust). He turned towards 
4 See Gopnik, Adam (2015).
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Proust, inspired by his life-long friend Maurice Blanchot, who 
was Proust’s admirer. Gérard Genette in his book Narrative 
Discourse. An Essay in Method suggests separating the writer’s 
life from his text (Genette 1980). The same idea was expressed 
by Roland Barth in his text Proust and Names. Proust’s novel 
attracted as well the attention of non-French philosophers. 
American pragmatist Richard Rorty in his book Contingency, 
Irony, Solidarity also returns to the figure of Proust as an exam-
ple of a strong poet – as the real bearer of contingency (Rorty 
1989: 105). Lithuanian-born American phenomenologist Algis 
Mickūnas suggested a phenomenological reading of Proust’s 
text from a possible Husserlian perspective (Mickūnas 2007: 
191–210). Guattari in his book The Machinic Unconscious also 
turns towards Marcel Proust (Guattari 2011).
Deleuze’s approach to Proust in some respect comes clos-
est to Levinas’ reading. As Seán Hand notices, “an interesting 
comparison can be drawn between Levinas’s ethical reading 
of Proust, and Deleuze’s view of ‘the opposition of Athens and 
Jerusalem’ in the same writer in Proust and Signs…” (Hand 
1989: 160). At the very first sight, these two philosophers have 
very little or even nothing in common. Levinas’ philosophi-
cal background was the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, 
the ontology of Martin Heidegger, and the philosophy of the 
dialogue of Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. Deleuze 
opposed Husserl and phenomenology in general; he expelled 
the subject and consciousness from his philosophy and to the 
notion of intentionality and experience opposed the semiology 
of signs. Deleuze also considered that philosophy has nothing 
in common with dialogue, and he did not like to speak much 
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about ethics5. He based his approach on the image of thought 
created by Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Aabye Kierkegaard 
and, neglecting the critical powers of philosophy revealed by 
Immanuel Kant and in some sense following Salomon Mai-
mon, he returned to the dogmatic, from a Kantian point of 
view, premises of Baruch Spinoza’s and Gottfried W. Leibnitz’ 
metaphysics. Deleuze also relies on the theory of “pre-individ-
ual fields” of Gilbert Simondon. Levinas was inclined to speak 
about transcendence, Deleuze about immanence. These two 
different approaches become visible in comparison of their two 
different readings of Proust. Deleuze in this reading extracted 
the concepts of time and sign. Levinas extracted the concept of 
the Other, compatible with his philosophy of dialogue. Levinas 
sees Proust as a poet of social reality, Deleuze as an interpreter 
of signs. But despite all these differences they both notice 
and philosophically processed the concept of rhythm used by 
Proust himself.
5 Contrary to our opinion, some interpreters discern ethics in Deleuze’s 
concept of time: Sam B. Girgus wrote: “Deleuze’s theoretical 
imagination opens a way of seeing film from a Levinasian perspective 
that proffers the importance of a discordant temporal order for new 
ethical discourse. Deleuze contrives a whole new vocabulary and 
terminology to describe the ethical and philosophical implications of 
the dynamic composition and perennial movement of film” (Girgus 
2007: 91). 
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Rhythm and Ontology: Deleuze and Levinas
Usually, the interpreters of the concept of rhythm in Deleuze’s 
philosophy start from his reflections on rhythms (in plurality) 
together with milieus as cosmic forces, reflected in A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia in the chapter “1837: Of 
the Refrain”. The chapter is considered to be Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s music philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari here are trying to 
detect the ontological basis of music in the cosmic confronting 
chaos. They say that milieus are open to chaos, which threatens 
them with exhaustion or intrusion. They wrote: “Rhythm is the 
milieus’ answer to chaos. What chaos and rhythm have in com-
mon is the in-between – between two milieus, rhythm-chaos 
or the chaosmos” (Deleuze, Guattari 1887: 313).
Levinas, the same as Deleuze, concludes that rhythm 
transcends the sphere of music and has something to do with 
ontology: “The disincarnation of reality by an image is not 
equivalent to a simple diminution in degree. It belongs to an 
ontological dimension that does not extend between us and 
a reality to be captured, a dimension where commerce with 
reality is a rhythm” (Levinas 1987: 5). The difference is that 
there is not such cosmic scope in Levinas’ ontological approach 
towards the concept of rhythm as in Deleuze’s.
Levinas noticed that “the rhythm certainly does have its 
privileged locus in music, for the musician’s element realises 
the pure deconceptualization of reality6. Sound is the quality 
most detached from an Object” (Levinas 1987: 4). For Proust’s 
6 As a matter of fact, Levinas was surrounded by music in his family life: 
his wife Raisa was a pianist and his son Michaël Levinas a pianist and 
composer.
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narrator, rhythm is also connected with some important sound: 
for example, the repeating sounds of the Combray bells – “now 
to one rhythm, now to another” which neutralised the centrifu-
gal force of the narrator’s insomnia.
Levinas considers that rhythm is a feature first of all of 
poetry and music. In Proust’s writings, the rhythm from music 
moves further and pervades all other spheres of arts and wraps 
reality. Proust himself reflected on the connection between lit-
erature and music. In essay The Return to the Present he notices:
When I began to read an author I very soon caught the tune of the 
song beneath the words, which in each author is distinct from that 
of every other; and while I was reading, and without knowing what 
I was doing, I hummed it over, hurrying the words or slowing them 
down, or suspending them, in order to keep time with the rhythm 
of the notes, as one does in singing, where in compliance with the 
shape of the tune one often delays for a long time before coming 
to the last syllable of a word (Proust 1984: 265).
Proust’s idea on time kept within the rhythm from the notes 
on literature switches into his novel In Search of Lost Time. The 
rhythm in Proust’s novel is also a part of literary creation and 
its effects. The writer Bergotte in the volume Within a Budding 
grove “gave a rhythm to the words – often at such times quite 
insignificant – that he wrote” (Proust 1924: 229). Rhythm is 
also one of the functions in poetry and in poetical prose. In 
the volume Swann’s Way, the narrator’s friend speaks with him 
about “the Titanic masterbuilder of rhythm who composed 
Bhagavat and the Lévrier de Magnus” (Proust 1922: 98).
According to Levinas, the idea of rhythm, “designates not 
so much an inner law of the poetic order as the way the poetic 
order affects us, closed wholes whose elements call for one 
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another like the syllables of a verse, but do so only insofar as 
they impose themselves on us, disengaging themselves from 
reality” (Levinas 1987: 4).
The concept of rhythm steps further, leaves arts and returns 
to the reality from which it approached arts. Life itself rests 
upon “the rhythm of heart or breath” (Proust 1927: 164). The 
poetic order affects us by a certain rhythm as the point of 
meeting between the main narrator and the pulsation of the 
surrounding world. Proust’s narrator mentions how “violent 
rhythms succeed a graceful andante” in a symphony or a ballet. 
But it happens not by sitting at a concert or listening to music, 
but watching Saint-Loup angrily approaching some journalist 
with the words: “In any case, sir, you are not very civil” (Proust 
1924: 184). The narrator sees Saint-Loupe gesticulating. He 
hears his voice and understands the meaning of the words. But 
all this picture in the imagination of the narrator becomes like 
a symphony, like a piece of music with violent rhythms. As if the 
world is like the big orchestra from Frederico Fellini’s movie 
Orchestra Rehearsal (Prova d’orchestra, 1978).
The Different Worlds of Signs  
and Different Rhythms
Deleuze suggests an unusual reading of Proust. He says that 
the search for time in Proust’s In Search of Lost Time is oriented 
to the future, not to the past, and that the main notions of the 
search are sign, meaning, and essence. The Search unites the 
continuity of apprenticeship and the abruptness of revelation. 
Deleuze in his experimental reading of Proust concludes that 
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the signs are specific and constitute the substance of one world 
or another. In this plurality of worlds, signs are not of the same 
kind, and they do not have the same way of appearing; they do 
not allow themselves to be deciphered in the same manner, nor 
do they have an identical relation with their meaning. Deleuze 
deciphered four types of the world and four types of signs in 
Proust’s created literary universe: the worldly signs, the signs 
of love, the sensuous signs and the signs of art. The researcher 
who is learning from signs is trying to grasp the essence, but 
it always escapes him in the case of worldly signs, signs of love 
and sensuous signs. One is able to reach the essence only on 
the level of art. ”But once they are manifested in the work of art 
they react upon all the other realms; we learn that they already 
incarnated, that they were already there in all these kinds. of 
signs, in all the types of apprenticeship” (Deleuze 2000: 38). 
Julia Kristeva opposes this Deleuzean insight – his idea of signs. 
She agrees with Deleuze that Proust never stops ‘deciphering’, 
and yet, according to her opinion, his world is not made of ‘signs’. 
Or at any rate, it is not made up of word-signs, or idea-signs, or 
even less of signifiers and signifieds (Kristeva 1993: 77). Kristeva 
concludes that Proust deciphers the impressions which are as-
sociative and situationist. She notices that “in his magnificent 
reading of Proust, Gilles Deleuze, puts the accent on the way in 
which these signs inflict a dematerialization of the real people 
to whom they refer, and he sees this as the proof of Proust’s Pla-
tonism” (Kristeva 1993: 82). It seems that Deleuze in difference 
to Kristeva was a more attentive reader of Proust’s text.
Deleuze notices that Proust himself crystallised the rich 
world of the impressions into particular signs. Deleuze was not 
the first who suggested deciphering these crystallised signs. 
It was the everyday occupation of Proust’s created characters. 
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So Françoise in Swann’s Way disbelieved the main narrator 
immediately for “she could immediately detect, by signs imper-
ceptible by the rest of us, the truth or falsehood of anything that 
we might wish to conceal from her” (Proust 1922: 33). Deleuze 
warned the decipherer of the different signs in Proust’s text: all 
these different worlds of signs have different rhythms.
Proust constructs the narrative of the novel creating some 
parallel and intermixing lines of flight of possible sensations: the 
line of sight, the line of sound, the line of smell. All of these ex-
pose themselves in a certain rhythm. The very important event 
from the childhood of the main narrator from Swann’s Way was 
the voice of Mamma reading the new books. He admired these 
narratives the same as he admired people. But his sensitivity 
to the course of the narrative, where it tended to arouse his 
Paul Klee. Rhytmic, Stricter and Freer. 1930. Coloured paste on paper on cardboard. 
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curiosity or melt into pity received certain modes of rhythmic 
expression: “Beneath the everyday incidents, the commonplace 
thoughts and hackneyed words, I could hear, or overhear, an 
intonation, a rhythmic utterance fine and strange” (Proust 
1922: 45). Listening to the uniform rhythm of Mamma’s read-
ing aloud of the different love-scenes, the narrator felt that his 
agony was soothed (Proust 1922: 46–47). The world approaches 
the narrator’s consciousness as a rhythmic, musical piece of art: 
“A little tap at the window, as though some missile had struck 
it, followed by a plentiful, falling sound, as light, though, as if a 
shower of sand were being sprinkled from a window overhead; 
then the fall spread, took on an order, a rhythm, became liquid, 
loud, drumming, musical, innumerable, universal. It was the 
rain” (Proust 1922: 110). Even meeting with the flowering haw-
thorns and trying to breathe their beauty and their ‘invisible 
and unchanging order’ leads the main narrator to the feeling in 
which he absorbs himself in the rhythm which “disposed their 
flowers here and there with the light-heartedness of youth, and 
at intervals as unexpected as certain intervals of music” (Proust 
1922: 151). The awakening is the morning Proust compares to 
the “great changes of rhythm” in a musical concert. In The Cap-
tive he writes: “A splendid, sixteen-fold error in multiplication 
which gives so much beauty to our awakening and makes life 
begin again on a different scale, like those great changes of 
rhythm which, in music, mean that in an andante a quaver has 
the same duration as a minim in a prestissimo, and which are 
unknown in our waking state” (Proust 1929: 117).
The intellectual intrigue for Deleuze was Proust’s ability to 
discern the rhythm not only in the signs of the world, but also 
in the constant change of the complex set of inter-human love 
relations. Deleuze writes: “Proust constantly insists on this: at 
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one moment or another, the hero does not yet know this or that; 
he will learn it later on. He is under a certain illusion, which he 
will ultimately discard. Whence the movement of disappoint-
ments and revelations, which imparts its rhythm to the Search 
as a whole” (Deleuze 2000a: 3–4). In Proust’s volume The Cap-
tive, neurotic, jealous lovers construct their complex relations 
according to a certain rhythm: “It is a question of the rhythm to 
be adopted, which afterwards one follows from force of habit” 
(Proust 1929: 101). The signs of love by their essence are de-
ceptive. Deleuze notices that the rhythm of the interchange of 
beliefs and disappointments consists of the very essence of the 
sign of love, between the objective and the subjective side of the 
sign. Deleuze says that we believe at first that we must see and 
hear; or else, in love, that we must avow our love (pay homage 
to the object); or else that we must observe and describe the 
sensuous phenomenon; that we must work, must think in order 
to grasp significations and objective values. “Disappointed, we 
fall back into the play of subjective associations. But for each 
kind of sign, these two moments of the apprenticeship have a 
rhythm and specific relations” (Deleuze 2000a: 85).
Deleuze accepts art as a creative machine where subject 
loses its subjectivity. Levinas starts from phenomenology: he 
relies on the subject and consciousness. But it is mainly rhythm, 
according to his point of view stemming from arts, which sub-
dues the subject’s initiative and freedom, because the subject 
is caught up and carried away by it. The rhythm has nothing to 
do with the unconscious, nor with pure consciousness. Because 
of the rhythm in arts, consciousness becomes paralysed in its 
freedom and play, totally absorbed in this playing. Deleuze in 
reflecting arts searched for the possible overcoming of represen-
tation. Levinas in his reflections on rhythm comes very close 
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to the overcoming of representation as well. Overwhelmed by 
the rhythm, says Levinas, the subject becomes a part of its own 
representation:
It is so not even despite itself, for in rhythm there is no longer a 
oneself, but rather a sort of passage from oneself to anonymity. 
This is the captivation or incantation of poetry and music. It is 
a mode of being to which applies neither the form of conscious-
ness, since the I is there stripped of its prerogative to assume, its 
power, nor the form of unconsciousness, since the whole situa-
tion and all its articulations are in a dark light, present. Such is a 
waking dream (Levinas 1987: 4).
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze defines signs as the 
habitudes or contractions referring to one another and con-
cludes that they always belong to the present. Deleuze says he 
took this insight from Stoicism which revealed that every sign 
is a sign of the present, “from the point of view of the passive 
synthesis in which past and future are precisely only dimen-
sions of the present itself ”. Deleuze relying on Stoicism found 
the distinction between natural signs and artificial signs:
Natural signs are signs founded upon passive synthesis; they are 
signs of the present, referring to the present in which they signify. 
Artificial signs, by contrast, are those which refer to the past or 
the future as distinct dimensions of the present, dimensions on 
which the present might in turn depend. Artificial signs imply 
active syntheses – that is to say, the passage from spontaneous 
imagination to the active faculties of reflective representation, 
memory and intelligence (Deleuze 1994: 77).
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Rhythm, Time and Space
Deleuze more than Levinas discerns in Proust’s reading the 
hint that the concept of rhythm has, first of all, something to do 
with time. Deleuze notices that rhythm defines the sequence of 
segments in time: the rarity or density of the passing moments, 
the appearance of segments, the occurring of events. Deleuze 
discovers in Proust’s texts two dimensions of time: the time of 
radical beginning as the essence of the beginning of the World 
in general. This second dimension of time, says Deleuze, is like 
the beginning of the universe coinciding with the moment of 
creation in art and the time of a heterogeneous series with dif-
ferent rhythms. Deleuze writes: “But so defined essence is the 
birth of Time itself. Not that time is already deployed: it does 
not yet have the distinct dimensions according to which it can 
unfold, nor even the separate series in which it is distributed 
according to different rhythms” (Deleuze 2000a: 44–45).
In Proust’s novel, rhythm can be connected also with space. 
Proust’s narrator looks at the town with the eye of the painter 
who sees the arhythmic pulse of the river running beneath the 
bridges of a town, now broadened into a lake, now narrowed 
into a rivulet, “broken elsewhere by the interruption of a hill 
crowned with trees among which the burgher would repair 
at evening to taste the refreshing breeze” (Proust 1924: 430). 
The dislocation of the river decomposes the town, but every 
landscape need its own rhythm, as Proust’s narrator concludes, 
that “the rhythm of this disintegrated town was assured only 
by the inflexible uprightness of the steeples which did not rise 
but rather, following the plumb line of the pendulum marking 
its cadence as in a triumphal march, seemed to hold in suspense 
beneath them all the confused mass of houses that rose vaguely 
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in the mist along the banks of the crushed, disjointed stream” 
(Proust 1924: 430). Why landscape? Is not rhythm first of all 
connected with music and time?
According to Deleuze, Proust in the novel In Search of Lost 
Time noticed that mainly time forms different series and con-
tains more dimensions than space. Space is included in time. 
Deleuze will return to this relation between space and time 
in the second volume of Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Deleuze 
considers that the characters of the Search have importance 
only insofar as they emit signs to be deciphered, according to 
a more or less profound rhythm of time. An important feature 
of these dimensions for Deleuze is that they do not seem to be 
identical: what is gained in one series is not gained in the other. 
They are heterogeneous and have different rhythms. Every 
rhythm is composed of multiple factors. Deleuze concludes that 
“the Search is given a rhythm not simply by the contributions 
or sediments of memory, but by series of discontinuous disap-
pointments and also by the means employed to overcome them 
within each series” (Deleuze 2000a: 26).
Later on in Difference and Repetition Deleuze concludes that 
“all our rhythms, our reserves, our reaction times, the thousand 
inter-twinings, the presents and fatigues of which we are com-
posed, are defined on the basis of our contemplations” (Deleuze 
1994: 77). In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Deleuze and Guattari were already influenced by Messiaen and 
treat Proust’s literary novel as a piece of musical theory. They 
say that Proust was among the first to reveal how musical mo-
tifs become autonomous from the dramatic action, impulses, 
and situations, and independent of characters and landscapes. 
Proust, according to them, revealed how musical motifs them-
selves become melodic landscapes and rhythmic characters. The 
concept of rhythmic characters is Messiaen’s invention:
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In the system of rhytmic characters you have, as a rule, several 
characters present. Let’s imagine a scene in play in which we 
place these characters: the first one act, behaving in a brutal 
manner by striking the second; the second character is acing 
upon, his actions dominated by those of th first; finally, the 
third character is simply present at the conflict and remains 
inactive. If we transport this parable into the field of rhythm, 
we obtain three rhytmic groups: the first, whose note-values are 
ever increasing, is the character who attacks; the second, whose 
note-values decrease, is the character who is attacked; and the 
third, whose note-values never change, is the character who 
doesn’t move (Messiaen 1994: 71).
Paul Klee. Rhythms of Plantation. 1925. Watercolour on paper.
68
This idea was elaborated richly further by Deleuze and 
Guattari. What are the results of such a discovery? They answer:
The discovery of the properly melodic landscape and the prop-
erly rhythmic character marks the moment of art when it ceases 
to be silent painting on a signboard. This may not be art’s last 
word, but art went that route, as did bird: motifs and counter-
points that form an autodevelopment, in other words, a style. The 
interiorization of the melodic and sonorous landscape finds its 
exemplary form in Liszt and that of the rhythmic character in 
Wagner (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 319).
Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of a heterogeneous series with 
different rhythms resonates not only with Messiaen’s concept 
on heterogeneous rhythms but returns to Deleuze’s experimen-
tal viewing of Francis Bacon’s pictures. Deleuze equates the 
content of Bacon’s triptych’s with three panels to the three basic 
rhythms in music, discovered by Messiaen and indicates three 
different rhythms: “one steady or “attendant” rhythm, and two 
other rhythms, one of crescendo or simplification (climbing, 
expanding, diastolic, adding value), the other of diminuendo 
or elimination (descending, contracting, systolic, removing 
value)” (Deleuze 2003a: xv). The approach towards rhythm as 
the very origin of time echoes in the second volume of Deleuze’s 
philosophy of cinema, resonating also with Russian directors 
Eisenstein’s and Tarkovsky’s insights.
III
PhIlosoPhY AnD CInEMA: 
RhYThM AnD TIME 
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Rhythmic Montage in Soviet  
and French Classical Cinema
How can philosophy enter into cinema art? How is such a thing 
as ‘philosophical cinema’ possible?
In his philosophy of cinema, Deleuze uses the concept of 
rhythm to discern the difference between classic and modern 
cinema: classic cinema prefers rhythmic montage (such as 
Sergei Eisenstein’s) and modern prefers arhythmic montage 
(such as Jean-Luc Godard’s). There are many more film direc-
tors included in Deleuze’s reflections on cinema and the final 
schema is much more complex. One can count approximately 
four hundred different movies mentioned in both volumes. But 
on his way to the philosophy of classical cinema, Deleuze starts 
with French philosopher Henry Bergson and Russian film di-
rector Sergey Eisenstein. His first reference in this volume is to 
Bergson’ Creative Evolution and the second to Eisenstein’s text 
translated into French as La non-indifférante Nature. Deleuze 
is very familiar as well with Eisenstein’s other writings. In the 
chapter on montage, he refers also to Eisenstein’s Mémoires 
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and rather frequently to Film Form. Deleuze calls Eisenstein’s 
reflections on parallel montage, pathetic and organic aspects 
of montage a “brilliant analysis” and uses Eisenstein’s term ‘or-
ganic’ in his suggested classification of four types of montage: 
“the organic-active, empirical, or rather empiricist montage of 
American cinema; the dialectical montage of Soviet cinema, 
organic or material; the quantitative-psychic montage of the 
French school, in its break with the organic; the intensive-
spiritual montage of the German school, which binds together 
a non-organic life and a non-psychological life” (Deleuze 1986: 
55). Montage, according to Deleuze, is not technical procedures 
at the end of the shooting. Montage always has something to 
do with philosophy: it is directly connected with time and 
the rhythm. “Montage,” says Deleuze, “is composition, the 
assemblage (agencement) of movement-images as constituting 
an indirect image of time” (Deleuze 1986: 30). The inventor 
of montage is not Eisenstein, but the first director of action 
movies, David Llewelyn Wark “D. W.” Griffith (1875–1948). 
Deleuze reflects upon his movies Birth of a Nation (1915), In-
tolerance (1916), Broken Blossoms (1919) and notices that it was 
Griffith’s discovery of how to compose very different parts of 
diverse movement-images with men and women, rich and poor, 
town and country, North and Soul into a great organic unity. 
Deleuze follows Eisenstein in naming Griffith’s invented type 
of montage as a parallel alternate montage. The peculiar feature 
of such a montage is that the image of one part succeeds another 
according to rhythm (Deleuze 1986: 30). Deleuze even names 
such type of montage rhythmic alternation and discerns three 
form of it: the alternation of differentiated parts, the alternation 
of relative dimensions and the alternations of convergent ac-
tions. In the film Intolerance, Griffith succeeded in using these 
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three forms to include into rhythmic alternations not merely 
families and society, but also different epochs and civilisations. 
“Never again,” concludes Deleuze, “will such an organic unity 
be achieved, by means of rhythm, from parts which are so dif-
ferent and actions which are so distant” (Deleuze 1986: 31).
Eisenstein criticises Griffith for his “bourgeois” empiricism 
and inability to understand the law of dialectical development. 
Eisenstein uses the Marxist dialectic stemming from Hegel 
to the spiral concept of montage expressed by three steps: 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis. According to Eisenstein, there is no 
organic link between two instances or two shots but a pathetic 
jump. To Griffith’s rhythm of relative changes, Eisenstein in 
his “montage of attractions” or “jumping montage” opposes the 
rhythm of absolute change in dimension – a qualitative leap. 
Deleuze considers it a key point of Eisenstein’s revolution. 
According to Deleuze, “he gives the dialectic a properly cin-
ematographic meaning, he tears rhythm away from the purely 
empirical and aesthetic value which it had, for example, in 
Griffith, he reaches an essentially dialectical conception of the 
organism” (Deleuze 1986: 37). It seems that Deleuze is quite 
impressed by Eisenstein’s achievements and in this not very 
fair (for the reason that it was ideological) critique of Griffith’s 
montage by Eisenstein he even takes the latter’s side. The purely 
aesthetic and empirical rhythm of Griffith is leaving the space 
to perceive in parallel alternatives the complex nature of differ-
ent values. It reveals an aporial and incommensurable nature 
of different values. Eisenstein, in tearing rhythm away from 
purely empirical and aesthetic value, and raising the power 
of a variable present to one instant, one moment succeeds in 
imposing its own value in the consciousness of the viewer. The 
rhythm of his montage was harmonised with the revolutionary 
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ideas of Marxism-Leninism. His movies Strike (1925) The Bat-
tleship Potemkin (1925), and October: Ten Days That Shook the 
World (1927) not only demonstrated the genial achievements 
of rhythm in montage, but also imposed the dominance of the 
Bolshevik party, persuading viewers that there was no other 
way for history except this dialectical instance of the power 
they gained. Deleuze never mentioned any critical word con-
cerning the ideological effects of Eisenstein’s movies. Was it for 
this reason he shared leftist ideas or for the reason he distanced 
himself from the content of movies and declared that he was 
dealing only with a topology of signs?
The director, according to Eisenstein, should have the 
“inner ear” and hear the rhythm of the movie he is creating 
and the rhythm of the material he wants to use in this process. 
In the preparation process for creating the movie Alexander 
Nevsky, Eisenstein was trying to catch the rhythm of the thir-
teenth century not from the books, but from stone – touching 
the old buildings of Novgorod. He stood on the walls of their 
town and tried to imagine what they saw, “tried to capture the 
rhythm of their movements” (Eisenstein 1959: 38). In creating 
movies, Eisenstein collaborated with Russian composer Sergei 
Prokofiev (1891–1953). In his book Notes from a Film Director, he 
talked about their bargain over ‘which is to be the first’: mon-
tage first and music afterwards or vice versa. “This is because 
the first has a more difficult task to solve: he must determine 
the rhythmic course of the scene” (Eisenstein 1959: 156). It seems 
that Eisenstein often succeeded in being first. In remembering 
their mutual cooperation, Eisenstein praises Prokofiev for his 
ability to correspond unerringly and precisely not only with the 
general rhythm of the entire episode, but with all the subtlest 
nuances of the montage development. Nevertheless, Eisenstein 
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considers that the director’s ‘inner ear’ defers from musicians. 
Eisenstein reflects that during montage they arranged the 
pieces of representation to correspond with the ‘score’ they 
heard with their inner ear, and not with the incomparable music 
of Prokofiev. And even more: no montage can be accomplished 
if there is no inner ‘melody’ to determine its construction. What 
is this particular ‘inner ear’ hearing the rhythm of the director’s 
future movie?
Eisenstein does not answer very clearly. Instead, he inter-
prets it as the common emotional personal state of the creator. 
The editing of the rhythm of different scenes can influence the 
rhythm of the behaviour and soul of the director. “For instance,” 
writes Eisenstein, “I remember very well the ‘subdued’ rhythm 
with which I did everything on the days I edited the ‘mists’ 
and ‘mourning over Vakulinchuk’ and the ‘sharp’ rhythm on 
the days I edited the ‘Odessa steps’ sequence. On this second 
occasion I walked in march tempo, treated my family harshly, 
spoke brusquely and staccato’ (Eisenstein 1959: 157).
Eisenstein had a broader conception of rhythm derived 
from the study of different arts. He discovered the impor-
tance of rhythm, reflecting not only on film theory, but also 
on creative psychology altogether. In his book The Psychology 
of Composition, Eisenstein says that rhythmization combined 
with concrete thinking and personification is a means in the 
palette of the creative work of every master in all epochs, among 
all nationalities. He himself uses the concept of rhythm in ap-
proaching Edgar Allan Poe and Vladimir Mayakovski’s poetry. 
In Poe’s poem The Raven, Eisenstein discerns “the true sequence 
of the origin and appearance of the element of sadness, whose 
tone truly was clearly transposed (as the second phase of the 
process) into the structure of the refrain, its rhythm, its verbal 
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image, and the form of its vehicle” (Eisenstein 1988: 42). Maya-
kovski in his single-minded service to his class through verse 
was a master of putting the ideological purpose into patterns 
and fractures of rhythm. How can rhythm serve ideological 
purposes?
Perhaps the rhythm mainly opens the way to sensuous 
thought. In his uncompleted and as yet unpublished book, 
Method (1940–8), in a section entitled ‘The Rhythmic Drum’, 
Eisenstein analyses methods of cultivation of sensuous thought 
by the “rhythmic drum” one can find in the ritual drums of the 
voodoo cult (in Cuba) or religious ritual: “Their measured beat-
ing, in a continuously accelerating tempo, leads the responsive 
listeners into a state of total frenzy. And they are totally in the 
power of the images flashing through their excited imagination, 
or of whatever their leader suggests to them… The rhythmic 
drum of the Catholic religious machine is described by Zola 
in Lourdes… For Orthodox ecstasy-Gorky has left a descrip-
tion… In short-the answer to a natural question: why does a 
rhythmic drum thus return us to regressive stages of thought? 
The answer suggests itself if we recall that everything in us that 
occurs apart from consciousness and will occur rhythmicly: the 
beating of the heart and breathing, peristalsis of the intestines, 
merger and separation of cells, etc. Switching off consciousness, 
we sink into the inviolable rhythm of breathing during sleep, 
the rhythm of sleepwalking, etc. And conversely-the monotony 
of a repeated rhythm brings us closer to those states “next to 
consciousness”, where only the traits of sensuous thought are 
capable of functioning fully” (Eisenstein 1988: 101–102).
Was not the rhythm in montage in cinema art as a means 
leading towards the pathos inserting a certain ideology? Rus-
sian film director Tarkovsky in his book Sculpting in Time 
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opposed Eisenstein’s concept of montage: “I feel that Eisenstein 
prevents the audience from letting their feelings be influenced 
by their own reaction to what they see. When in October he 
juxtaposes a balalaika with Kerensky, his method has become 
his aim, in the way that Valery meant. The construction of the 
image becomes an end in itself, and the author proceeds to 
make a total onslaught on the audience, imposing upon them 
his own attitude to what is happening” (Tarkovsky 1987: 118).
In any case, Deleuze tries to analyse all the four variations 
of possible rhythms as alternatives without giving to each more 
value in achievement. The pre-war French school of cinema had 
chosen rhythm in montage rather different from American or 
Soviet schools. Deleuze defines the French school by a sort 
of Cartesianism: French directors were primarily interested 
in the quantity of movement and in the metrical relations of 
it. Every sort of montage, Deleuze states, has a set of metrical 
relations which constitute the numbers and the rhythm, and 
give the ‘measure’ of the greatest quantity of relative move-
ment. Montage always implied such calculations, sometimes 
empirical or intuitive. But Deleuze discerns a rather different 
approach to rhythm in montage in French montage school: 
“it simultaneously raised the calculation beyond its empirical 
condition, to make it into ‘algebra’ – to use Gance’s word – 
and made the result of this each time the maximum possible 
quantity of movement as a function of variables, or the form of 
that which goes beyond the organic” (Deleuze 1986: 44). For 
the best example for describing the rhythm in French cinema, 
Deleuze had chosen French directors Abel Gance’s movies La 
Roue (1923) and Napoleon (1927). Gance used different types of 
montage: “successive vertical montage”, “accelerated montage” 
and “simultaneous horizontal montage”. In the latter, Gance 
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superimposed a very large number of super impressions (six-
teen at times) and introduced few temporal shifts in-between, 
aware that the imagination of the viewer is not able to see what 
is superimposed. Gance expected that these superimpressions 
would leave the effects in the soul of the viewer and constitute 
“a rhythm of added and subtracted values, which presents to the 
soul the idea of a whole as the feeling of measurelessness and 
immensity” (Deleuze 1986: 48). Mainly these superimpressions 
create the ‘non-retrogradable’ rhythms’7. Gance invented the 
triple screen and achieved the simultaneity of three aspects of 
the same scene. Two extremes in this rhythm are the retrogra-
dation of the one by the other, with a central value. Deleuze no-
tices that by uniting the simultaneity of superimpression, and 
the simultaneity of counter impression, Gance constituted the 
image of absolute movement of the whole which changes. Thus 
Gance, according to Deleuze, created a cinema of the sublime 
in which rhythm does not mean the relative domain of variable 
interval, but the absolute domain of luminous simultaneity.
7 Deleuze describes the attendant rhythm by evoking another term by 
Messiaen, non-retrogradable rhythm, which is a rhythmic pattern that, 
when played in reverse, produces the same pattern as when played 
forward, just as with such palindromic sentences as “fall leaves after 
leaves fall”. Or as Messiaen explains, “it’s as if in traversing a landscape, 
beginning from two opposite points, you were to meet the same things 
at the same times in the same positions and in the same order”. He also 
offers the example of the wings of a butterfly: “When butterflies are 
enclosed in their chrysalis, their wings are folded and stuck one against 
the other; the pattern on one is thus reproduced in the opposite direction 
on the other. Later, when the wings unfold, there will be a pattern with 
colours on the right wing which mirror those on the left, and the body 
of the butterfly, the thorax and the antennae placed between the two 
wings constitute the central value. These are marvellous living non-
retrogradable rhythms” (Messiaen 1994: 76–77).
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French cinema writer Georges Sadoul (1904–1967), re-
flecting upon the features of pre-war French cinema school, 
compared it to Impressionism – the popular trend in French 
painting at the beginning of the 20th century (Садуль 1961). 
Deleuze, without mentioning Sadoul’s name, opposes this 
insight by asking the rhetorical question: should we call it Im-
pressionism in order to contrast it to German Expressionism? 
Deleuze answers this question negatively. For him it might be 
better defined as Cartesianism. It is very close to Descartes’ 
philosophy for the reason that French directors (Deleuze 
mentions Abel Gance (1889–1981), Jean Epstein (1897–1953), 
Marcel L’Herbier (1888–1979), Jean Grémillon (1901–1959), 
Jean Vigo (1905–1934), René Clair (1898–1981), and Jean 
Renoir (1894–1979) were first of all interested in the quantity 
of movement and metrical relations but not into organic or dia-
lectical compositions as in American or Soviet cinema schools. 
Instead of organics and dialectics, the French school chooses 
mechanics. Its philosophy is as following: one goes beyond the 
moving bodies to extract a maximum quantity of movement in 
a given space (Deleuze 1986: 41), (un maximum de quantité de 
mouvements dans un espace donné) (Deleuze 1983: 62). Deleuze 
compares the mechanistic aspect of pre-war French cinema 
school with the machines of Soviet cinema. Eisenstein and 
Dziga Vertov (1896–1954) filmed great energy machines which 
formed the dialectical unity of man and machine. In contrast, 
the French school conceived the kinetic unity of the quantity 
of movement in a machine and the direction of movement is a 
soul, positing this unity as a passion. This search for a kinet-
ics as proper visual art raised the problem of the relationship 
between the movement-image, colour and music.
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The Rhythm of Dark and Light  
in German Expressionism
Deleuze follows Kant in calling the French cinema of sublime 
‘mathematical sublime’, and the cinema of German expres-
sionism ‘dynamic sublime’. The rhythm of montage in Ger-
man expressionism is of a rather different kind. As opposed 
to French school, the rhythm in German expressionism is free 
from the geometrical metrical relationships which regulated 
movement and is also emancipated from co-ordinates which 
condition the extensive quantity. “It is a ‘Gothic’ geometry 
which constructs space instead of describing it: it no longer 
proceeds by measuring out but by extension and accumulation” 
(Deleuze 1986b: 51). The montage in this school is based on the 
interchange between dark and light, between the non-organic 
life of things which culminates in a fire acting as a spirit of 
evil or darkness and the non-psychological life of the spirit. 
Deleuze in a seemingly unimportant hint in brackets mentions 
and compares this type of montage to Hans Richter’s Rhythms. 
Why Richter? German Dadaist painter and avant-garde film-
maker Hans Richter (1888–1976) was fascinated with rhythm. 
Experimenting with cinematic rhythm, Richter created three 
films Rhythms 21 (1921), Rhythms 23 (1923), and Rhythms 25 
(1925) discovering the interplay between a series of shapes, 
squares, rectangles and lines. This is the interplay with rhythms 
of movement, time and light. In Rhythms 23, the objects collide 
into each other and hypnotically alter the size and shade, and 
it is the rhythm of the objects that takes centre stage. In Ghosts 
before Breakfast (1927), hats, clocks, beards and teacups take on 
a life of their own, dancing across the screen whilst people are 
left helpless to control them. Rhythm is again alluded to when 
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a clock is shown to periodically move forward by 10 minutes 
every second. Richter also reflected about the essence of cin-
ematic rhythm: “Rhythm expresses something different from 
thought. The meaning of both is incommensurable. Rhythm 
cannot be explained completely by thought nor can thought be 
put in terms of rhythm, or converted or reproduced. They both 
find their connection and identity in common and universal 
human life, the life principal, from which they spring and upon 
which they can build further” (Brown 2016).
Deleuze’s analysis of classical montage cinema also suggests 
this conclusion: there is no single rhythm, but different usages 
of different rhythms, revealing unknown possibilities of the 
cinema and, of course, of different arts. As already mentioned, 
the main principle of the French school of montage, according 
to Deleuze, was “more movement”. The main principle of the 
German expressionism’s school of montage was “more light” 
(Deleuze 1986: 73). We saw that Deleuze sees a connection 
between the French school of montage and the philosophy 
of Descartes. The philosophical suppositions of the German 
school of montage in Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema are Goe-
the’s and Kant’s insights.
In the French school, the Cartesian concept of movement 
allows viewers to avoid the affect of fear. It is structured by 
the other affect; namely, passion. An altogether different af-
fect pulses in the cinema of German expressionism. Deleuze 
mentions it as a classical cinema of fear (cinema de la peur). 
Expressionism as an esthetic style in architecture, painting 
and cinema attracted attention after the First World War. In the 
history of cinema, as usual, it is indicated that expressionism 
was the direct opposite to realism because it concentrated on 
intrinsic emotions but not outside reality. Some critics consider 
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expressionism as one of the sources of film noir (Syska 2010: 
30–33). In publications on the history of film noir, the turning 
point of trespassing from expressionism to film noir was Fritz 
Lang’s film with the title “M” (1931) (Stephens 1995: 220–221). 
Robert Wiene’s movie Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Das Cabinet des 
Dr. Caligari, 1920) is also remembered as a possible turning 
point. In any case, film noir was a Hollywood production. It is 
concentrated on the action, and German expressionism on the 
intrinsic spiritual tension. The plots of the movies in German 
expressionism as usual are connected with insanity, betrayal, 
strange spiritual experiments, and trespassing the possibilities 
of a man.
As one of the possible sources of horror, Deleuze mentions 
the non-organic life of things he discerned in Paul Wegener’s 
movie The Golem: How He Came into the World, (Der Golem, 
wie er in die Welt kam, 1920)8, as well as James Whale’s Franken-
stein and The Bride of Frankenstein, and Victor Hugo Hélperin’s 
White Zombie. According to an old Jewish legend, the Golem is 
the human figure created from some inanimate material – clay 
or stone – and first mentioned in Jewish psalms and different 
stories. The most famous golem narrative involves Judah Loew 
ben Bezalel, the late-16th-century rabbi of Prague. The Vilna 
Gaon “the saintly genius from Vilnius” (1720–1797) was the 
only rabbi who had actually claimed that he tried to create a 
Golem when he was a child under 13, but during the process 
he received a sign from Heaven ordering him to desist because 
of his tender age. As Clemens Brentano notices, after uttering 
the magical kabalistic formula and writing the word “anmanth” 
8 The two first versions of The Golem (1914) and The Golem and the 
Dancing Girl (1917) were lost.
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(truth) on the head, they come to life and resemble the creature 
they represent. But for the magician they are rather danger-
ous, they grow so quickly that very soon they become more 
powerful than their creator. Their shape is threatening, but 
inside is empty. They can be destroyed in case the creator is 
able to erase the first two letters from the word ‘anmanth’ on 
the forehead so that only ‘manth’ remains, which means death. 
The Golem would thus be transformed into clay again (Bren-
tano 2002: 105). Today there are numerous cinematic versions 
of the Golem story. Paul Wegener together with Carl Boese 
made the first three attempts to create the movie and played 
the role of the Golem. First two versions (The Golem, 1917, The 
Golem and the Dancing Girl, 1917) disappeared. The last version, 
The Golem: How He Came into the World (1920), survived and 
Deleuze has in mind mainly this version when he describes the 
intensity of the non-organic life expressed in somnambulists, 
zombies and golem figures (see: Deleuze 1986b: 52). The plot 
takes place in the Jewish ghetto of medieval Prague, where 
Rabbi Loew, the head of the city’s Jewish community trying 
to protect the Jews from expulsion from the city because of 
practicing black magic, created the Golem, who returned to the 
Jews the lost confidence in themselves because he had propped 
up the falling palace ceiling. The Emperor pardons the Jews and 
allows them to stay in the city. But finally the creator lost his 
control over the Golem. The creature revolts against its creator 
and sets fire to his house. Deleuze reflects mainly on the sign 
of fire in this and other movies of German expressionism. He 
writes: “The infinite had not ceased to work in the finite, which 
reinstates it in this still sensible form. Spirit has not left nature, 
it animates all non-organic life, but it can only discover and 
rediscover itself as the spirit of evil which burns Nature in its 
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entirety. It is the flaming circle of the invocation of the demon, 
in Wegener’s The Golem or F. W. Murnau’s.” He continues, “It 
is the ‘phosphorescent demon’s head with sad and empty eyes’ 
in Wegener” (Deleuze 1986b: 53; 1983: 78–79).
The script for The Golem: How He Came into the World was 
written by the Austrian-born actor, screenwriter and film direc-
tor Henrik Galeen (1881–1949). Deleuze very rarely mentions 
script writers. Galeen is not mentioned: nevertheless, he is a 
classic of German expressionism. He also wrote the script for 
director Paulo Leni’s movie Waxworks (Das Wachsfigurenkabi-
nett) (1924) and Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922). The legends about 
vampires living in Transylvania were well known in European 
tales and stories. They were not invention of cinema. Bram 
Stoker, the Irish-born business manager for the world-famous 
Lyceum Theatre in London, wrote the Gothic horror novel 
Dracula (1897) about the vampire Count Dracula for the real 
actor and manager Sir Henry Irving and even prepared a ver-
sion for theatre. But the actor never staged this role. In 1922, 
German director F. W. Murnau (1888–1931, real name Plumpe; 
the nickname is taken from the name of the small German city 
Murnau am Stadffelse) decided to direct the movie on the basis 
of Stoker’s story, but he did not succeed in receiving permis-
sion from Bram’s widow Florence Stoker. Henrik Galeen had 
changed numerous details9 but nevertheless could not avoid 
legal trouble. Florence Stoker sued Prana Film and all prints 
of the film were destroyed. But the film nevertheless survived 
9 Galeen transplanted the action of the story from 1890s England to 
1830s Germany and reworked several characters, dropping some (such 
as Lucy and all three of her suitors), and renaming others (Dracula 
became Orlok, Jonathan Harker became Thomas Hutter, Mina became 
Ellen, and so on).
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as Nosferatu: A Symphony of Horror (Nosferatu, eine Symphonie 
des Grauens, 1922). One can discern many differences between 
the novel Dracula and the film Nosferatu: changed names of the 
main heroes, the place and the date (from 1890 to 1838) of the 
action transferred from England to Germany. Daily Dracula 
was rather elegant; Nosferatu on the other hand was disgusting, 
with long nails and a dead expression on his face, resembling a 
rat. But the main change transferred all other signs of the story: 
In contrast to Dracula, Orlok does not create other vampires, 
but instead kills his victims, causing the townsfolk to blame the 
plague ravaging the city. This particular change transfers the 
action of the plot. Murnau and Galeen with this change created 
the possibility of escape from the vampire. When Nosferatu 
came to the imagined city of Visbor (as a matter of fact, the 
film was shot in Wismar, Lubek, in the mountains of North 
Slovakia), with the intention to taste the blood of Hutler’s be-
loved Nina and carrying with him a coffin with plague-infected 
rats to distribute the illness, Nina in Galeen-Murnau’s version 
decided to sacrifice herself and save the city from plague. She 
had read in the secret book on vampires about the possibility of 
death of the immortal vampire. If they were deeply involved in 
drinking the blood of the woman they love, they do not notice 
the crow of the morning cocks, and they die. She did this and 
Nosferatu disappeared in a puff. Nina also died saving the in-
habitants of the city and her beloved from the plague. It could 
not happen in the latter versions of Nosferatu, for example in 
Werner Herzog’s version, when the people bitten by vampire 
became vampires themselves. Siegfried Kracauer in the book 
From Caligari to Hitler: a Psychological History of the German 
Film, referencing Nina’s sacrifice and triumph over Nosferatu 
created by Gallen, discerns the concept characteristic of that 
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time’s German mentality (and close to Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 
insights) that great love might force tyranny into retreat (see: 
Kracauer 1971: 79).
Deleuze describes Murnau as the true master in simultane-
ously announcing the arrival of the Devil and the wrath of God 
by the way of rhythmic interchanges of light and color. Fol-
lowing Eric Rohmer’s ideas from the article L’Organisation de 
l’espace dans le Faust de Murnau and Eliane Escoubas’ Nosferatu 
analysis, Deleuze describes the movie’s effects of horror as the 
interchange of colors, following Goethe’s color theory. He also 
refers to Michel Bouvier and Jean-Luis Leutrat’s analysis of 
Nosferatu in Cashiers du cinema with the quotation:
Light spots which describe a white circle behind the characters, 
such as the forms seem to be excluded by their own movement 
more than they are determined by it; chased from a bottomless-
ness (sans-fond) or from a background more native than that 
of their rear-ground which in this way drowned in light… By 
this rupture, what is actualized in front of this spot of light, and 
bursts forth, a phantom divorced from the background, is not 
that which normally remains hidden in the deep evanescence which 
is suggested by chiaroscuro, for example. This is the source of the 
frequently flat character of the figures illuminated in this way, 
and of the feeling that they are the heirs, by their very nature, 
of the shadow without romantically getting their nourishment 
from it… This effect cannot be reduced to one which is produced by 
backlighting (Deleuze 1986b: 225).
Deleuze reflects that this phenomenon is the non-organic 
life of things, and in this case, the life of shadows. The powerful 
light should necessarily be red, analogous to the blazing red 
light Goethe discerned. In expressionism the non-organic life 
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of things necessarily culminates in a fire. But by sacrifice it 
arouses also a non-psychological life of the spirit. Deleuze in his 
experimental reading of Nosferatu and other Murnau movies 
also returns to Kant, noticing that this dynamic sublime is so 
intense that it dazzles or annihilates our organic being, striking 
terror into us. But mainly in this effect Deleuze discerns the 
mission of film: by striking terror “it gives way to a thinking 
faculty by which we feel superior to that which annihilates us, 
to discover in us a supra-natural organic spirit which domi-
nates the whole inorganic life of things: then we lose our fear 
knowing our spiritual destination is truly invincible” (Deleuze 
1986b: 54; 1983: 80).
This experimental reading by Deleuze is suitable only for 
the version of Nosferatu created by Galeen and directed by 
Murnau. One can know his / her spiritual destination when 
his / her sacrifice has its positive consequences. But if the chain 
of new vampires is not broken, the meaning of the sacrifice is 
dissolved. That is how it happens as mentioned in the version of 
Nosferatu: The Vampyre (Nosferatu: Phantom der Nacht, 1979), 
created by contemporary German director Herzog: in the end 
of the movie Jonathan becomes the vampire and flies away as 
a bat to prolong the destiny of Nosferatu. Herzog considered 
Galeen-Murnau’s movie the best German movie altogether 
and created his own version of the story, following not Stoker’s 
Dracula, but Murnau’s movie, but taking from Stoker’s Dracula 
the last point: people bitten by vampires also became vampires. 
Klaus Kinski plays the main hero Nosferatu. The action takes 
place in beautiful landscapes and esthetically-shot images. 
Even Nosferatu’s terrible rats are not so horrible, and the horror 
can be experienced only because of their large amount (11 000 
experimental rats were used). Herzog was trying to avoid the 
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comic acceptance of vampire stories and had changed the 
‘happy ending’ of Galeen-Murnau’s version.
In 1967, film director Roman Polanski of Polish origin 
created the parody of vampire stories Dance of the Vampires 
as an absurd comedy. In 2000, director E. Elias Merhige in 
the film Shadow of the Vampire (Great Britain, USA) created 
a new ironic version of Gallen-Murnau’s’ Nosferatu: A Sym-
phony of Horror as a movie inside a movie. The actor John 
Malkovich plays the director Murnau, Willem Dafoe the actor 
Max Schreck, who played the role of Nosferatu in Murnau’s 
film, and Catherine McCormack plays the role of the actress 
Greta Schroder who played the role of Nina in Murnau’s 
movie. Nosferatu looks like the real Nosferatu in Murnau’s 
film, but is much more dynamic and persuasive. The character 
Murnau presents him to his film group as the successor of 
Stanislavsky’s school, who feels his part very deeply. The act-
ing film group for some time believes that he is really such 
a type of actor, but for the viewer it becomes clear that he is 
the real Nosferatu playing the role of himself. Nosferatu kills 
everyone, except the director Murnau. When the cameraman 
dies, Murnau continuities shooting the film himself and at 
the end with satisfaction concludes that it turned out well. It 
sounds like an allusion to the vampire’s proximity to the film 
director, who for the success of the movie signed an agreement 
not only with the devil, but also with the real vampire, reveal-
ing they both have something in common.
In 1992 Francis Copolla created his own version of Dracula 
after Bram Stoker’s Dracula, deliberately following not Mur-
nau’s version, but Stoker’s. In 2014, almost a hundred years 
after Stoker’s novel and Galeen-Murnau’s movie, Jim Jarmusch 
created his own new story of the vampires in the movie Only 
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Lovers Left Alive. The vampires are presented in a new light: 
as artists and composers living in eternity and from time to 
time presenting their music to some worldly composers, such 
as Mozart or Beethoven, as their own creation. These vampires 
have changed their habits and are drinking blood they receive 
from medical institutions, but this blood is so poisoned that 
they have to return to the older habits in order to survive.
Šarūnas sauka. Escape. 1990. oil on canvas. / lATgA. Vilnius. 2016.
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Deleuze says no word of Copolla’s or Jarmush’s movies. 
Two of Polanski’s other movies, not The Fearless Vampire Kill-
ers / Dance of the Vampires, can be deciphered as having been 
created in the tradition of the cinema of fear. For example, 
in Repulsion (1965), based on scripts written by himself and 
Gérard Brach, Polanski slowly reveals the sources of horror as 
a repulsion to men and the possible sexual closeness in a young 
Belgian woman named Carol’s (played by Catherine Deneuve) 
consciousness. The clash of her inner horror and tension and 
the pressure of the outer world (the young man who is following 
the banality of his drives and cannot understand the sources of 
her repulsion) ends in a total nightmare. Rather sophisticated 
sources of possible horror stemming from a crisis of personal 
identity, split personality and the clash between the individual’s 
fear of the crowd and its omnipotence are also revealed in Po-
lanski’s movie The Tenant (1976). This movie can be compared 
to Lithuanian painter Šarūnas Sauka’s picture Escape.
The main character, the painter’s alter ego, is becoming a 
fly and trembles on the ceiling. The omnipotent crowd with 
identical faces are approaching like the soldiers somewhere 
beneath. In Polanski’s movie, the scared person just jumped 
from his height, not maintaining the tension. In Sauka’s picture, 
he is frozen in fear and eternal escape. In this aspect cinema is 
more dangerous for the escapers than painting is for the reason 
it requires a solution by action. Polanski himself plays the main 
role of the tenant, as in Sauka’s picture the artist paints his alter 
ego. The tenant slowly approaches his mental and emotional 
breakdown similar to the heroine in The Repulsion. They both 
are subtle personalities, very sensitive and very alone and no 
one can discern the future madness in their behaviour just by 
seeing them in the street. In this aspect, these two movies are 
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created in the tradition of Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho. Deleuze 
sees Hitchcock’s cinema as the turning point from classical to 
modern cinema for the reason that he pushed the movement-
image of classical cinema to its limit by introducing mental 
image into cinema. With Hitchcock, according to Deleuze, new 
types of figures appear which are figures of thought (Deleuze 
1986b: 206). The mental image in Hitchcock’s movies not only 
frames the other images, but transforms them by penetrating 
them. It can be said about Polanski’s movies as well. In both of 
Polanski’s abovementioned movies, mental images are unseen 
but are more real than the real events. These thoughts that came 
to the mind of the characters are the effects of the inner horror. 
Deleuze ignores Polanski’s creation.
But Deleuze obviously enjoys what Herzog is doing. In 
the second volume Cinema 2: The Time-Image reflecting time-
crystal, Deleuze takes the example of Herzog’s movie Heart of 
Glass as ‘the greatest crystal-images in the history of cinema’ 
(Deleuze 1989: 72). In the first volume reflecting upon small 
and big ideas in cinema, Deleuze discerns two obsessive themes 
in Herzog’s movies, which are like visual and musical motifs: 
two aspects, the figures of the small and the sarge ideas. The 
sarge idea concerns the crazy enterprises born in the head of 
visionaries. In the Aguirre, Wrath of God (1972), Fitzcarraldo 
(1982), and Heart of Glass (1976) “a man, who is larger than life 
frequents a milieu which is itself larger than life, and dreams of 
an action as great as the milieu” (Deleuze 1986b: 187). Deleuze 
treats the other group of Herzog’s films (Land of Silence and 
Darkness (1971), The Enigma of Kaspar Houser (1974), Stroszek 
(1977) as the small which becomes an idea and is realised not by 
visionaries but by weaklings and idiots. Nosferatu is classified 
as an example of this second obsession. Deleuze writes: “This 
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is Nosferatu, who is treated in the opposite way to Murnau’s 
character, caught in a uterine regression, a foetus reduced to 
its feeble body and to what it touches and sucks, who will only 
propagate himself in the universe in the form of his successor, a 
tiny point fleeing towards the horizon of a flat earth” (Deleuze 
1986b: 188).
Mental images obsessed with the delirium and hallucina-
tions transform and penetrate the other images in Murnau’s 
movie Phantom (1922). Deleuze hadn’t seen the movie, because 
at that time it was lost and Deleuze, mentioning it as lost, fol-
lows Herman Warm’s description. Twenty years after the publi-
cation of Deleuze’s book Cinema the movie at last was found in 
2003 and restored by Spanish film historian Luciano Berriatua. 
Berriatua also restored Murnau’s Nosferatu.
The script for Phantom was written by the scriptwriter Thea 
von Harbou (1888–1937), the permanent script writer for Franz 
Lang movies when he directed in Germany, and the plot was 
taken from Gerhart Hauptmann’s novel Phantom (1922). The 
main hero Lorenz Lubota is caught by his own impotence: he 
understands that he is a failed poet and very poor clerk, so he 
rejects the unbearable reality, substituting it with hallucina-
tions and dreams. He is obsessed by the non-reciprocal love 
of Baroness Veronica and gradually, like the main hero in 
Polanski’s Tenant, approaches his own mental and emotional 
breakdown. What seemed important for Deleuze in this par-
ticular film for describing the cinema of fear is the way the fear 
becomes embodied into things. Deleuze describes the example 
of the metaphysical sources of fear which cause the non-organic 
life of things: “A wall which is alive is dreadful; but utensils, 
furniture, houses and their roofs also lean, crowd around, lie 
in wait, or pounce. Shadows of houses pursue the man running 
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along the street” (Deleuze 1986b: 51). The terror of the main 
hero persecuted by these living non-organic things, without 
any additional gesticulation, only by the change of his facial 
expressions, was created by the excellent actor of silent cinema 
Alfred Abel (1879–1937), who also starred in Franz Lang’s Me-
tropolis as the capitalist John Fredersen and in Wiener’s Doctor 
Mabuse as the count Told.
In his conclusion, Deleuze discerns a new type of a vital 
movement and the dominance of intensity over extensity. The 
difference between the mechanical and the human has been 
dissolved, but this time to the advantage of the potent non-
organic life of things. He claims that in this type of source of 
fear, it is not the mechanical which is opposed to the organic: 
“it is the vital as potent pre-organic terminality, common to 
the animate and the inanimate, to a matter which raises itself 
to the point of life, and to a life which spreads itself through 
all matter. The animal has lost the organic as much as matter 
has gained life” (Deleuze 1986b: 51). Deleuze discerns the new 
type of movement invented by German expressionism: it is the 
movement which respects neither the organic contour nor the 
mechanical determinations of the horizontal or vertical; its 
course is that of a perpetually broken line, where each change 
of the direction simultaneously marks the force of an obstacle 
and the power of a new impulse, the subordination of the exten-
sive to intensity, as the opposition of the vital force to organic 
representation. Deleuze follows Worringer, the inventor of the 
term ‘Expressionism’, who noticed that this opposition of vital 
force to organic representation creates the image of broken 
line like a zigzag between things. In this new type of geometry, 
diagonals and cross-diagonals tend to replace the horizontal 
and the vertical, the cone replaces the circle and the sphere, and 
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acute angles and sharp triangles replace curved and rectangular 
lines (see: Deleuze 1986b: 52).
The best example of this type of geometry of German ex-
pressionism is Robert Wiene’s film The Cabinet of Dr Caligari 
(Das Cabinet des Dr Caligari, 1920). From the beginning, it 
seems that the plot of the movie tells the story of an insane 
hypnotist (Werner Krauss) who uses a somnambulist (Conrad 
Veidt) initially to predict the future, but as a result to commit 
murders. But the main intrigue of this movie is that it creates 
a new type of mental representation. It is a story recreated by 
the principle of flashback as something that happened before, 
as a memory. The storyteller Francis sits on the bench with the 
listener and impresses him with his story about the terrific hor-
rors he and his beloved Jane experienced because of the vicious 
deeds of Doctor Caligari. But suddenly, at the end it appears that 
Caligari is the psychiatrist of the mental hospital and Francis 
and the listener of the story patients of the asylum. The entire 
story is created by Francis’ imagination right there: at that time 
when the viewer is watching the film and starts to believe in the 
reality of what is happening. The idea of the monstrous psychia-
trist who experiments with the bodies and consciousness of his 
patients was elaborated further much more straightforwardly 
in the series of films about the doctor Frankenstein in Turner 
Fisher’s films. The Cabinet of Dr Caligari avoids this straightfor-
wardness for the reason the mental representation of the tension 
of inner life in it overbalances the action.
In the second volume about modern cinema, Deleuze once 
more returns to the example of German Expressionism. When 
comparing European cinema to American, he notices that 
European cinema even at an early stage confronted a group 
of phenomena from psychology and psychoanalysis: amnesia, 
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hypnosis, hallucination, madness, and the vision of dying, 
nightmare and dream. Deleuze sees in this feature of European 
cinema first of all a break from the action-image of American 
cinema. And secondly, “what is very differently,” he writes, “it 
is the whole temporal ‘panorama’, an unstable set of floating 
memories, images of a past in general which move past at dizzy-
ing speed, as if time were achieving a profound freedom. It is as 
if total and anarchic mobilising of the past now responds to the 
character’s motor powerlessness. Dissolves and superimposi-
tions arrive with a vengeance. It is in this way that expression-
ism attempted to restore the “panoramic vision’ of those who 
feel mortally threatened or lost…” (Deleuze 1989: 55).
Deleuze extends the limits of the cinema of fear (cinema 
du peur), and to the German cinema of fear he ascribes not 
only classical German expressionism, but also contemporary 
directors such as Wim Wenders and Rainer Werner Fass-
binder (1945–1982)10 and even Swiss director Daniel Schmid 
(1941–2006). But, as Roland Bergan notices, there is a distance 
of half a century between the golden age of German cinema-
tography – silent cinema – and the flowering of it in the 1970s 
(Берган 2008: 202). Ulriche Sieglohr also notices radical his-
torical and conceptual and formal changes between classical 
and contemporary German cinema. The new German cinema 
cannot be expressed by one formula: too many different styles, 
10 Rainer Werner Fassbinder (1945–1982) – the actor, screen writer 
and the director of new German cinema. According to our opinions 
Fassbinder revealed the sado-masochistic aspects of human relations. 
His films Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant (Die bitteren Tränen der Petra 
von Kant, 1972) and Martha (Martha, 1974) can be compared with the 
sadomasochistic concrete relations with the Other in Sartre’s book 
Being and Nothingness.
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concentrations on details and at first sight, not very important 
events. New German Cinema filmmaker Wim Wenders says 
that for him and his generation the tradition of old German cin-
ema is not accessible anymore, because they lost the confidence 
in German images, stories and myths. He states that, “Never 
before and never anywhere else (images and language) were so 
deeply impoverished that they could become the means of dis-
tributing the lies”, rather radically distancing himself from the 
tradition of pre-war German cinema (Sieglohr 1998: 468–469). 
On the other hand, his cinema, as well as Fassbinder’s, has some 
common features uniting them with German Expressionism: 
the emphasis on intensive mental states, but not on the exterior 
actions and the ambiguity of the happening. Deleuze does not 
notice these nuances and does not comment them. He simply 
jumps over historical barriers more than a half a century old and 
embraces German expressionism, Wenders’ and Fassbinder’s 
films are united by one concept-sign, namely cinema of fear 
(cinema du peur). He expresses this insight in one sentence and 
further does not develop this idea, opening one more trajectory 
for analysis and comparison.
Alternative Rhythm of Light and White  
in the Cinema of Spiritual Choice: Bresson
The term ‘spiritual’, expressed by Deleuze in utterances, seems 
to go contra materialism when he says the ‘brain is the screen’. 
But mainly in the interview Brain is the Screen, Deleuze recol-
lects his own turn towards cinema art. “Something bizarre,” 
Deleuze says, “about the cinema struck me: its unexpected 
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ability to show not only behaviour, but spiritual life (la vie 
spiritualle) as well, at the same time as aberrant behaviour” 
(Deleuze 2000b: 366). Deleuze defines spiritual life not as a 
dream or fantasy, but rather the domain of cold decision, of 
absolute obstinacy, of the choice of existence. He asks the 
rhetorical question: “How is it that the cinema is so expert at 
excavating this spiritual life?” Deleuze discerns one alternative, 
described by Tomas Sodeika, and says that this can lead to the 
worst, a cinematic Catholicism or religious kitsch (sulpicisme) 
specific to cinema (Sodeika 2013: 221–316). On the other side, 
Deleuze sees the possibility of the alternative of the cinema as 
the spiritual art which studies the spheres of existence. Deleuze 
designates the acting characters in contemporary cinema with 
the name ‘spiritual automaton’, but in writing the conclusions 
for the two volumes of cinema, notices that cinema becomes 
spiritual art for the reason that “it confronts automata, not ac-
cidentally, but fundamentally” (Deleuze 1989: 243).
The concept of ‘spiritual choice’ (un choix de l’esprit) in 
Deleuze’s film philosophy, different from other critics’ reflec-
tions, is based on Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophical concept of 
spiritual stages: esthetic, ethical and religious. Deleuze sees the 
dimension of the spirit revealed in the cinema of spiritual choice 
as even going beyond Kierkegaard’s three stages of spirit. This 
new spiritual space is fourth or even fifth dimensions of spirit.
In the chapter Thought and Cinema, Deleuze notices that 
cinema from the very beginning built a special relationship 
with belief (croyance). There is, according to Deleuze, even a 
Catholic quality to cinema (il y a une catholicité du cinema) and 
many directors, even in America, openly professed their Ca-
tholicism, and those who did not profess it maintained complex 
relationships with it. Deleuze was interested in the reasons: 
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why does it happen so? He suggests his own answer, which 
leads to his own concept of belief. He sees a similar scale of the 
amount in Catholicism and the cinema and asks rhetorically: 
“Is there not in Catholicism a grand misè-en-scene, but also, in 
the cinema, a cult which takes over the circuit of the cathedrals, 
as Elie Faure said?” (Deleuze 1989: 171) Deleuze notices that 
cinematography as a mass art was always attracted by the same 
phenomena which attracted the masses as well: the Christian 
faith and the revolutionary faith.
Why? Deleuze answers: cinema, in difference to the theatre, 
shows us the link between the man and the world. The necessity 
of the link between the man and the world is Deleuze’s personal 
belief. But Deleuze is following the multiplicity of every phe-
nomena and notices that “there is as much difference between 
the Catholicism of Rossellini or Bresson, and that of Ford, as 
between the revolutionary qualities of Rocha or Güney, and 
gitenis umbrasas. St. Francis’ Vision. 2008. Kite.
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those of Eisenstein” (Deleuze 1989: 171). All of those men-
tioned are the directors Deleuze took inspiration from when 
reflecting upon his taxonomy of signs in cinema. And spiritual 
cinema (une cinéma de l’esprit), according Deleuze, can be as 
charming as any cinema.
“You do not like theatre. Why?” asks Claire Parnet in one of 
the series of the Abécédaire. As a matter of fact, Deleuze wrote 
some texts on theatre. His text Exhausted was his reflection 
on Beckett’s theatre and, when reflecting on the insight of the 
unity between thought and the body, he received inspiration 
from Artaud’s concept of the theatre of cruelty and Carmelo 
Bene’s (1937–2002) experiments on body, which he reflected 
on in the second volume of Cinema 2. The Time – Image in the 
chapter “Cinema, Body and Brian, Thought”. On the other 
hand, all three mentioned creators were not only theatre men. 
Beckett was a writer, and Artaud wrote as well, Bene was an 
Italian actor, poet, film director and screenwriter. and the 
three also received inspiration from cinema. Deleuze discerns 
different possibilities of cinema in comparison to theatre. 
Cinema, according to Deleuze, as opposed to theatre, provides 
the possibility to achieve the Fourth and the Fifth dimensions 
of Spirit (la quatrième or cinquième dimension, l’Esprit), if one 
starts to count from the three dimensions of spirit as the stages 
of personality (esthetic, ethical, and religious).
In what sense is this dimension so unique? Deleuze says 
that in this dimension the Spirit “blows where he will” (souf-
fle où il veut) (Deleuze 1989: 172; 1985: 232). What allows for 
the spirit to flow so easily and to blow where he will? Deleuze 
considers that it happens because of the automatic character of 
the cinema (le caractère automatique du cinéma). It is the feature 
only of cinema, not of the theatre. The automatic character of 
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the cinema demands not only the new concept of the role and 
the actor, but also the new concept of thought. This idea of the 
automatic character of cinema and the contrast of the cinema 
to the theatre brings back the insights of the leader of spiritual 
cinema (speaking in Deleuze’s terms), French cinema director 
Robert Bresson (1907–1999). In 1965 François Weyengans shot 
his dialogue with Bresson and in 1994 in the series of Cineates 
de notre temps, it appears in the new documentary Bresson ni 
vu ni connu. Bresson is not creating films anymore, but he is 
concentrated on the formulation of his own concept of cinema 
art. He calls this concept of cinema art ‘cinematography’ and 
opposes it to the cinema that, according to him, is such an in-
dustry that utilizes different attractive effects to try to wheedle 
to the audience and attract their attention. “Cinematography is 
a writing with images in movement and with sounds”, Bresson 
reflects in his notes (Bresson 1958: 2). Bresson in his cinema-
tography was trying to approach reality as it is, to approach the 
“essence of things”, to show things as they are. Cinematography 
has to show without showing. It has to approach reality in such 
a way as to cross through it in order to meet the supernatural. 
Cinematography is already a trick, says Bresson. So there is no 
more need to show other tricks, trick inside of tricks. “Nothing 
rings more false in a film than that natural tone of the theatre 
copying life and traced over studied sentiments”, he notes in 
written form (Bresson 1958: 4). Bresson believes in cinematog-
raphy and considers it as a new writing for a new generation. 
Literature is tired; visual creation is sunken into the quest; 
thus, cinematography is the only art left to penetrate reality as 
if it were something supernatural. But Bresson concludes that 
cinematography had not yet realized its potentialities. It was 
interfered by theatre. Theatre is based on learned gestures and 
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mimes, but it does not allow for the transformation of images. 
The images of cinematography are different: when approaching 
each other, they modify and transform each other. In theater, 
the learned text is governed by thought, but in cinematography 
the so-called ‘models’ are acting automatically. For Bresson, the 
actors playing in his movies are not actors, but models. When 
asked why he calls them so, Bresson reflects on his concept of 
the rejection of the theatrical performance in order to more 
closely approach reality. There are no celebrities in Bresson’s 
movies. His models are first-time actors; he advises them to 
absorb themselves into things from the outside, and afterwards 
to close themselves and act naturally, which means automati-
cally. It is the same manner as in real life, when we act without 
thinking about exactly what we are doing: putting our hands 
on our knees, gesticulating or scratching our heads without any 
reflection. The same should happen also in cinematography: 
Bresson intends to automate the actions of his models when 
the legs and the hands move almost independently and not 
coordinated from the centre.
Deleuze refers to Bresson’s ideas published in his Notes 
on Cinematography (Notes sur le cinématographe), saying that 
“automatism is the real life”, excluding thought, intention and 
feeling. In real life we act without reflecting on the idea that 
we are participating in some role; we just act, even without 
much feeling. Such an automatic character in cinematography 
unexpectedly knots the relationships with the outside (auto-
matically inspired or invented models), but the reason for it is 
not hidden inside the models. Dues to this automatic mechanics, 
what is unknown (l’inconnu) unexpectedly emerges.
Bresson in this video interview takes into his hands the text 
of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), reads it and quotes it. Deleuze, 
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when writing about spiritual cinema, also turns back towards 
Pascal, as well as Søren Kierkegaard. Deleuze notices a para-
doxical combination in the creation of Bresson: radical moral-
ism which opposes itself to morality, and belief which opposes 
itself to religion. It has nothing to do with religion, Deleuze 
notices, but there are many points of coincidence with Pascal 
and Kierkegaard, with Jansenism and even Jean-Paul Sartre. It 
is mainly the cinematography of Bresson, Deleuze concludes, 
that weaves the thinnest tissue between philosophy and arts. 
How does Deleuze justify this insight?
Deleuze in the second volume of Cinema distinguished 
theater from cinematography by also taking into account 
Andre Bazin’s point of view: “In short,” Deleuze writes, “it 
is the whole of the real, life in its entirety, which has become 
spectacle, in accordance with the demands of a pure optical and 
sound perception. The scene, then, is not restricted to provid-
ing a sequence but becomes the cinematographic unity which 
replaces the shot or itself constitutes a sequence shot. It is a 
properly cinematographic theatricality, the ‘excess of theatri-
cality’ that Bazin spoke of, and that only cinema can give to 
theatre” (Deleuze 1989: 84).
Deleuze notices two important aspects in Bresson’s crea-
tion. First of all, he considers him sometimes together with the 
Danish director Carl Dreyer and sometimes with French Éric 
Rohmer (1920–2010) or Italian Roberto Rossellini (1906–1977) 
as the classical examples of this spiritual cinema (une cinéma de 
l’esprit). Secondly, reflecting on the innovations of Bresson’s 
created cinema space, Deleuze reflects upon it as an example 
of modern cinema. Deleuze discerns in Bresson’s cinema one 
of the necessary aspects of modern cinema: the breaking of the 
sensory-motor link. Bresson creates the new cinematic space, 
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which Deleuze calls Riemannian11. In Riemannian space, as it 
is understood by Deleuze, the connecting of parts is not pre-
determined but can take place in many ways, by optical, sound 
or even tactile (in the style of Bresson) signs (Deleuze 1989: 
129). Deleuze sees Bresson’s visual space as fragmented and 
disconnected, but its parts have manual continuity. In Bresson, 
Deleuze notices, opsigns and sonsigns cannot be separated from 
genuine actisigns which perhaps regulated their relations, and 
this is the originality of Bresson’s any-space whatever (Deleuze 
1989: 13). Instead of characters created by actors, Bresson sug-
gests the cinema of spiritual automaton, when the thought 
seizes from the outside, as the unthinkable in thought. The 
automaton is cut from the outside world, but there is a more 
profound outside which will animate it. So Bresson in Deleuze’s 
philosophy of cinema appears both spiritual and modern: the 
creator of modern spiritual cinema.
Deleuze’s initial approach to Bresson in the first volume of 
Cinema 1 The Movement-Image is connected with the concept of 
the lyrical abstraction as the notion of some tuning of harmony 
between light and dark in cinema. Deleuze opposes the lyrical 
abstraction to German expressionism, which was based on the 
contrast change between the dark and the light. Lyrical abstrac-
tion composed the white and the light. German expressionism 
11 Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann (1826–1866) was an influential 
German mathematician who made lasting and revolutionary 
contributions to analysis, number theory, and differential geometry 
Riemann’s idea was to introduce a collection of numbers at every point 
in space (i. e., a tensor) which would describe how much it was bent or 
curved. Riemann found that in four spatial dimensions, one needs a 
collection of ten numbers at each point to describe the properties of a 
manifold, no matter how distorted it is. This is the famous construction 
central to his geometry, known now as a Riemannian metric.
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with this interchange between the dark and the light revealed 
the principle of opposition in the fight of the spirit with the 
darkness, but in the cinema of lyrical abstraction the spirit is 
not fighting anymore but succumbs to the certain alternative. 
In the first volume of Cinema, as was mentioned Deleuze follows 
Kierkegaard in discerning three alternative forms of the spirit: 
esthetic, ethical and religious. For examples of the esthetic 
type of spiritual cinema, Deleuze indicated the films created by 
Austrian-American director Josef von Sternberg (1894–1969), 
in whose movies German-American actress and singer Marlene 
Dietrich (1901–1992) starred, and who created one of the first 
sound movies, The Blue Angel (Der blaue Engel, 1930), also with 
Dietrich. But Deleuze, as usual, does not mention the actor’s 
name and does not pay attention to celebrities. To the ethical 
stage of the spirit, Deleuze ascribes the films of Carl Theodor 
Dreyer (The Passion of Joan of Arc (1928), Vampyr (1932), Day 
of Wrath (1943), Ordet (1955), and Gertrud (1964). With Bres-
son’s (cinematography Deleuze concludes a religious stage of 
the spirit. And, as mentioned, he discerns the possibility of the 
fourth and the fifth stage, in which the spirit is totally free. But 
is this absolutely free spirit able to make any choice or does it 
merely succumb to the automatic movements depending on 
circumstances? Deleuze considers that in this stage the new 
type of cinema, mainly a visionary cinema, starts and the signs 
connected with movement are replaced by the optical, sonsigns, 
and in the case of Bresson, tactical signs.
Deleuze unexpectedly connects the formal principle in film 
creating – the interchange between light and dark – with inner 
spiritual choice. In the Bresson’s film Diary of a Country Priest 
(Journal d’un curé de campagne, 1951). According to Deleuze, 
the harmony between white and black progresses as rhythmic 
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alternations and in the film Lancelot of the Lake (Lancelot du 
Lac, 1974) as the interchange between the day and night.
Deleuze postulates that these formal aspects of film are 
somehow connected with the spiritual choices coming from 
Pascal and Kierkegaard. He makes a non-articulated jump from 
the formal aspects of film to the spiritual mode of being beyond 
it. What seemed important for Deleuze in the understanding of 
choice is the insight that the choice happens not between the 
terms, but between the existential modes of being of the one 
who is making the choice. Deleuze is particularly interested 
in the choices that can only be made on condition that one 
persuades himself or herself (as usual Deleuze notices visionar-
ies as women characters) that one has no choice. Sometimes 
this situation happens because of moral necessity, sometimes 
by virtue of physical necessity, created by the situation, and 
sometimes by psychological necessity when one is obsessed 
with desire. The spiritual choice, according to Deleuze, is 
made between the mode of existence of choice or non-choice. 
Deleuze writes: “If I am conscious of choice, there are therefore 
already choices that I can no longer make, and modes of exist-
ence I can no longer follow – all those I followed on the condi-
tion of persuading myself that ‘there was not choice’.” Deleuze 
compares his insight with Pascal’s wager, which says that: “the 
alternation of terms is indeed the affirmation of the existence of 
God, its negation and its suspension (doubt, uncertainty); but 
the spiritual alternative is elsewhere, it is between the mode of 
existence of him who ‘wages’ and the mode of existence of him 
who wages for non-existence or who does not want to wager” 
(Deleuze 1986b: 117).
Deleuze does not make a distinction between philosophers 
(Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Sartre) and film directors (Dreyer, 
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Bresson): the former and the latter in his film philosophy 
reflect the same alternatives of spiritual choice. The common 
feature of all of them is, in Deleuze’s words, ‘the strange way 
of thinking’: as already mentioned, the extreme moralism 
which is opposed to morality and the faith which is opposed 
to religion. Deleuze writes about a whole line of inspiration 
which can be traced from Pascal to Bresson, from Kierkegaard 
to Dreyer, and gives the name of lyrical abstraction for the 
film directors following this line of inspiration. It is mainly 
lyrical abstraction, according to Deleuze, that weaves a whole 
set of relations of great value between philosophy and cinema. 
It does not mean that the characters in lyrical abstraction films 
are all on the side of virtue or the good. Dreyer and Bresson 
created the multiplicity of different types of the modes of exist-
ence possible in the situation of spiritual choice. This is not the 
choice between good and evil. Some characters are despotic, 
some hypocritical, some are guardians of the order, some are 
grey men of uncertainty (as in Dreyer’s Vampyr or Bresson’s 
Lanceloy or Pickpocket), and some are creatures of evil (Helen 
in Bresson’s Ladies of the Park, Gérard in Balthazar, Yvon in 
L’Argent). Deleuze asks the cardinal question: is it possible to 
choose evil in full knowledge of the facts and answers using 
the reflection of the commissioner from Pickpocket: in this case 
one has chosen a situation which no longer allows choosing. 
And it seems for Deleuze even personally or in Nietzsche’s 
affirmative style very important to emphasize the possibility 
of starting afresh at every moment, as the spirit of the child 
starts afresh in every moment – the creator of the new values 
which overcome the spirit of the camel and lion from Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, with which Deleuze starts his reflection 
in Nietzsche (Deleuze 2001: 53). Deleuze emphasizes that in 
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lyrical abstraction the choice is not between Good and Evil but 
by the alternative of the existential being without choice and 
the alternative of the mode of existence with the possibility of 
starting afresh at every instant. “And even,” Deleuze writes, “if 
this choice implies the sacrifice of the person, this is a sacrifice 
that he only makes on condition of knowing that he will start it 
afresh each time, and that he does it for all times…” (Deleuze 
1986b: 118). Deleuze enumerates different types of existential 
modes of self-sacrifice in Bresson’s movies: Joan of Arc, the 
person condemned to death, the parish priest. This tradition 
of a choosing choice is interconnected with sacrifice. But what 
possibility of choice – to sacrifice or not to sacrifice oneself – do 
the two submissive characters, the poor little girl Mouchette 
from Bresson’s Mouchette (1967) and the ass from Balthazar 
(Au hasard Balthazar, 1966), have? Is Mouchette’s sacrificing 
for her dying mother and her poor family her own choice? Or 
is it a situation when there is no choice, so Mouchete chooses 
suicide as the only one possible choice? Mouchette as a child 
in an unbearable everyday situation is not able somehow to 
change this situation and to start afresh at every moment. She 
chooses to escape from her own everyday sacrifice. From Pas-
cal’s wager she wages for non-existence, not seeing any sign in 
her world of the traces of God. The ass has no such possibility. 
The animals in difference to human beings do not commit 
suicide when they are humiliated, tortured or oppressed. 
“The ass only knows the effect of the non-choices or choices 
of man”, Deleuze notices reflecting on Bresson’s Balthazar. The 
beast experiences the execution without being able to reach 
that which is going behind the execution and to understand 
its spiritual determination. The ass is also not able to betray. 
“Thus the ass,” Deleuze concludes, “is the preferred object of 
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men’s wickedness, but also the preferential union of Christ or 
of the man of choice” (Deleuze 1986b: 119)
Where is the spirit (l’Esprit) able to flight when it trespasses 
the esthetic, ethical and religious stages? In Deleuze’s philoso-
phy of cinema, it does not transcend this world, it returns to 
immanence and the concrete. But spiritual choice is also the 
inextricable part of the immanence. In this fourth and fifth 
dimension of spirit, space is no longer determined, but, Deleuze 
concludes, has become the any-space-whatever which is identi-
cal of the power of the spirit (see: Deleuze 1989: 120).
The Arhythmic Flow of Reality: 
Phenomenology, Bazin and Italian Neorealism
Deleuze considers montage to be an indirect image of time. But 
the uniqueness of the modern cinema, according to Deleuze, is 
its direct image of time. Montage loses its importance. Instead 
of movement-image and its sensory-motor signs connected 
with the montage and indirect image of time, a new type of 
signs appears: from pure optical situations – opsigns and from 
sound situations – sonsigns, which are directed connected to 
a time-image (chronosigns), readable image (lectosigns) and 
thinking image (noosigns). The main peculiarity of modern 
cinema, according to Deleuze, is this change in relation to 
time, which resulted in the turn that time-image subordinated 
movement. In classical cinema connected with montage the 
situation was vice versa: time was subordinated to movement. 
“It is this reversal,” Deleuze writes in Cinema 2 “which means 
that time is no longer the measure of movement but movement 
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is the perspective of time: it constitutes a whole cinema of 
time, with a new conception and new forms of montage…” 
(Deleuze 1989: 22).
The second volume starts with Italian neo-realism and its 
reflection in Andre Bazin’s film conception. André Bazin (1918–
1958) was an influential French film critic and film theorist. 
He started to write about film in 1943 and wrote to different 
journals, co-founded the renowned film magazine Cahiers du 
cinéma in 1951 along with Jacques Doniol-Valcroze and Joseph-
Marie Lo Duca, and editeduntil his early death (at 40 years 
old). Bazin advocated for the use of deep focus (Orson Welles), 
wide shots (Jean Renoir) and the “shot-in-depth”, and preferred 
what he referred to as “true continuity” throughmise-en-scène 
over experiments in editing and visual effects. This placed him 
in opposition to film theory of the 1920s and 1930s, which em-
phasised how cinema could manipulate reality. Deleuze tries to 
construct the taxonomy of signs in classical and modern cinema 
beyond his personal approach. He starts from Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s semiotics, Henry Bergson’ concept on time as duration 
and Kant’s insights on time. It seems he is not expressing his per-
sonal approach. Deleuze was a philosopher, Bazin a film critic. 
Nevertheless, they both – Bazin and Deleuze – meet in some 
important aspects: they both believe that cinema theory should 
rely on the movies themselves by escaping biased theories, such 
as Marxism, psychoanalysis (Lacanism) and Feminism. They 
both had the disposition that cinema has something to do with 
reality and both had their own cinema ontology. They both 
reflected on how cinema is connected with time. They both 
consider Italian neorealism as a turning point in the history of 
cinema. Deleuze, just like Bazin, also stressed not the social as-
pects of neo-realism, but the new concept of reality it suggested.
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“According to him [Bazin – J. B.],” Deleuze wrote in the 
opening of the second volume of Cinema, “it was a matter of 
a new form of reality, said to be dispersive, elliptical, errant 
or wavering, working in blocs, with deliberately weak connec-
tions and floating events. The real was no longer represented or 
reproduced but ‘aimed at’. Instead of representing an already 
deciphered real, neo-realism aimed at an always ambiguous, 
to be deciphered, real; this is why the sequence shot tended to 
replace the montage of representations. Neo-realism therefore 
invented a new type of image, which Bazin suggested calling 
‘fact-image’”. Neo-realism, according to Deleuze, produced a 
formal or material ‘additional reality’ (Deleuze 1989: 1). Bazin 
noticed that neo-realism (Vittorio De Sica (1901–1974), Ros-
sellini, Luchino Visconti (1906–1976), Antonioni, Fellini) 
together with the new notion of reality suggested also the 
new conception of cinema time. This new cinema time was 
not imposing its own created rhythm upon reality, but, on the 
contrary, tried to catch and to follow after the arhythmic flow 
of reality itself. This cinema time, without imposing the direc-
tor’s created rhythm, was not betraying the essence of things in 
allowing them first of all to exist for their own sake. To artificial 
time – theatrical time (just as musical time or dance time) neo-
realists, according to Bazin, opposed the “life time” – “the sim-
ple continuing to be of a person to whom nothing in particular 
happens…” (Bazin 2011: 111–112). Neorealism, according to 
Bazin’s and also Deleuze’s view, was more an ontological posi-
tion than an aesthetic one.
Vivian Sobchack in her book The Address of the Eye: A Phe-
nomenology of Film Experience elaborates her phenomenological 
conception of cinema and evaluates Bazin’s work as ‘naïve real-
ism’ for the reason he “apotheosized the cinema’s capacity for 
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‘revelation’ of the ‘real’ world” (Sobchack 1992: xiv–xv). From 
the one side, Sobchack recognises Bazin as the precursor of 
film phenomenology theory; on the other side, she places the 
words “revelation” and “real” in quotations, as if showing her 
own distance with Bazin and never returning to his insights in 
the book again. 
As already mentioned, Sobchack began writing her book 
about the embodied nature and dialectical structure of the 
film experience in opposition to two theoretical paradigms 
and approaches that had dominated the American enterprise 
of cinema studies for some time: once seen as theoretically 
incommensurable, but in cinema studies compatible – Lacan-
ian psychoanalysis and neo-Marxism. Lacanian psychoanalysis 
was taken up by feminist film theories. Deleuze also avoids 
the schematics of Lacanian and neo-Marxist film theory. But 
their approaches are different. Sobchack in contrast to these 
structuralist theories reflected on the film experience following 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and avoiding Edmund Husserl’s ap-
proach”. Sobchack concludes that her conception is more close 
or parallel to Deleuze’s than to Bazin’s insights. Sobchack reacts 
to both of Deleuze’s Cinema volumes, noticing that Deleuze’s 
work bears some relation to her study and stands in many re-
spects as parallel to it (Sobchack 1992: 30). 
In this aspect – in opposing psychoanalysis and neo-Marx-
ism – Deleuze’s conception of cinema, the same as Bazin’s, is 
a real alternative to Sobchack’s phenomenological project. On 
the other hand, Deleuze, the same as Foucault, was following 
Nietzsche’s way and showed the distance to phenomenology 
in his pre-cinema texts. In Difference and Repetition, he came 
to the conclusion that in phenomenology the passive synthesis 
of sensibility creates the dependence upon doxa as a sign of the 
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new dogmatism: “Does it not discover a fourth common sense, 
this time grounded upon sensibility as a passive synthesis – one 
which, even though it constitutes an Ur-doxa, remains no less 
prisoner of the form of doxa?” asks Deleuze (Deleuze 1994: 
137). In this sense, Deleuze discerned the parallel between 
Kant’s approach and the phenomenological understanding of 
common sense and indicated Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s book 
Phenomenology of Perception as an example of the common 
sense and the persistence of the model of recognition he op-
posed (Deleuze 1994b: 320). To this approach of common sense 
based on doxa, Deleuze opposes the possibility of a new type 
of thought based not on common sense, but on schizophrenic 
experience described (as already indicated and to be analysed 
further) by Antonin Artaud.
In his philosophy of cinema, Deleuze indicates two possible 
alternatives of overcoming the confrontation between material-
ism and idealism, between movements in space and the images 
of consciousness – Edmund Husserl’s and Henry Bergson’s. 
“Each had his own war cry; all consciousness is consciousness 
of something (Husserl), or more strongly, all consciousness is 
something (Bergson)” (Deleuze 1986b: 58). Why does Deleuze 
choose the Bergsonian way? Deleuze answers: phenomenology, 
in certain respects, stops at pre-cinematographic conditions 
which gives priority to natural perception and cinematographic 
movement, and is both condemned as unfaithful to the condi-
tions of perception and also exalted as the new story capable 
of drawing close to ‘the perceived and perceiver, the world and 
perception’. Deleuze here quotes Albert Lattay’s book Logique 
du cinema, which he considers as phenomenologically inspired. 
Husserl, according to Deleuze, never mentioned cinema. Sartre 
also in making inventory analysis of all kinds of images in The 
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Imagination does not cite the cinematographic image. Merleau-
Ponty only incidentally tries to compare cinema and phenom-
enology, but Deleuze evaluates his attempts as unsuccessful not 
only for the reason that he defined the cinema as an ambigu-
ous ally, but also ‘what phenomenology sets up as a norm is 
‘natural perception’ and its conditions. Now, these conditions 
are existential co-ordinates which define an ‘anchoring’ of the 
perceiving subject in the world, a being in the world which will 
be expressed in the famous ‘all consciousness is consciousness 
of something…” (Deleuze 1986b: 59). Phenomenology is not 
suitable for cinema because it suppresses both the anchoring 
of the subject and the horizon of the world.
Sobchack does not agree. She indicates that Deleuze ne-
glects the embodied situation of the spectator and of the film, 
that by citing only a few early works, Deleuze misses the dialec-
tical and dialogical character of Merleau-Ponty’s later semiotic 
and that “rigorous phenomenological description need never 
argue that the ‘implicit knowledge’ and ‘second intentionality’ 
of the cinema necessary suppress the spectator’s embodied situ-
ation or substitute for ‘natural perception”; (Sobchack 1992: 
31). Relying on Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, 
Sobchack supposes that “a film is an act of seeing that makes 
itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, an act of 
physical and reflective movement that makes itself reflectively 
felt and understood” (Sobchack 1992: 3–4). Cinema according 
to Sobchack transposes what would otherwise be the invisible. 
It embodies into what is visible and public the experience of 
individual and intrasubjective privacy. A film simultaneously 
has sense and makes sense both for us and before us. As one of 
the main features of cinema, Sobchack indicates its possibility 
to give birth to what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘wild meaning’ – “the 
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pervasive and as yet undifferentiated significance of existence 
as it is lived rather that reflected upon” (Sobchack 1992: 11).
Deleuze, in contrast to Sobchack, prefers reflection to the 
lived experience, the concept of the body without the organs to 
the lived body, immanent to the phenomenological approach. 
He is not creating the philosophy of cinema in a phenomenologi-
cal line. But in contrast to Sobchack, Deleuze does not consider 
Bazin’s insights as naïve; in responding to them he develops 
his own reflection about cinema. In contrast to Sobschack’s 
‘lived experience’, Deleuze following Bazin indicates an out-of-
field (hors-champ) phenomenon. The out-of-field refers to what 
is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly 
present. “If we return to Bazin’s alternative of mask and frame, 
we see that sometimes the frame works like a mobile mask 
according to which it communicates, and sometimes it works 
as a pictorial frame which isolates the system and neutralises 
its environment” (Deleuze 1986b: 17). The out-of-field concept 
allows Deleuze to suggest his own solution in the question of 
meeting the matter and the spirit, avoiding phenomenology and 
to turn towards Bergson. Deleuze supposes that there are two 
out-of-field possibilities: material and spiritual. Materialist out-
of-field means that a closed system is referenced in a space to a 
set which is not seen, and which in turn can be seen, even if this 
gives rise to a new unseen set, on to infinity. “The possible divi-
sion of sets leads to multiplicity. But the Whole is undividable, it 
is like a thread which traverses sets and gives the possibility to 
every set to communicate with other sets and with the infinity. 
Thus the whole is the Open, and relates back to time or even to 
spirit rather than to content or to space” (Deleuze 1986b: 18). 
Bergson in difference to phenomenology wrote about cinema. 
But it was not the reason Deleuze had chosen his way: Bergson 
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indicated the limitations of cinema. It is Deleuze who adapted 
Bergson’s insights for cinema art.
Deleuze also finds it rather useful to invoke Bazin’s reflec-
tions of the difference between the cinema and the photogra-
phy when describing the concept of shot: “The photographer 
proceeds, via the intermediary of the lens, to a point where he 
literally takes a luminous imprint, a cast… [But] the cinema 
realises the paradox of moulding itself on the time of the object 
and of taking the imprint of its duration as well” (Deleuze 
1986b: 25). Deleuze is also reminded of Bazin’s law, or the law 
of “forbidden montage”, when there is a necessity for two terms 
to confront each other face-to-face in an irreducible simultane-
ity without the possibility of resorting to a montage. He gives 
the example of Charlie Chaplin’s The Circus, when Charlie 
really has to go into the lion’s cage, and Nanook and the seal 
must confront each other in the same short (Deleuze 1986b: 
157). Bazin has much to say to Deleuze when he talks about 
the depth of field which substitutes the scene for the shot. “We 
know,” wrote Deleuze, “that Bazin gave it a function of reality, 
since the viewer had to organise his perception himself in the 
image instead of receiving it ready-made. Mitry denied this, 
seeing in depth of field a no less restrictive organisation which 
forces the viewer to follow the diagonal or gap. Bazin’s position 
was nevertheless complex: he showed that this gain in reality 
could be achieved only through an ‘excess of theatricality’ as 
we saw in La regie du jeu” (Deleuze 1989: 108). Starting from 
Bazin, Deleuze elaborated his own version of the depth of field 
connecting it with the concept of time and especially with 
the time crystal: “But neither a function of theatricality nor 
one of reality seems to exhaust this complicated problem. We 
suggest that depth of field has many functions, and that they 
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all come together in a direct time-image. The special quality 
of depth of field would be to reverse time’s subordination to 
movement and show time for itself.” Deleuze also concludes: 
“We will be all the more hesitant to give it the role intended 
by Bazin, namely a pure function of reality. The function of 
depth is rather to constitute the image in crystal, and to absorb 
the real which thus passes as much into the virtual as into the 
actual” (Deleuze 1989: 85).
For justification of the concept of the time crystal, Deleuze 
turns to other sources from different arts. From literature he 
takes the insights of split parallel time in Jorge Luis Borges’ 
(1899–*1986) fictions and the reflections on time in Proust’s 
novel. From philosophy: Henry Bergson’s, Kant’s and Leibnitz’s 
insights. From cinema art he probably borrows part of the insight 
from Krzysztof Zanussi’s The Structure of Crystal. He quotes, as 
already mentioned, Werner Herzog. But the main inspiration for 
the second volume can be traced to Tarkovsky’s insights. 
Cinematic Inspirations for the Crystals of Time: 
Zanussi, Herzog, Tarkovsky 
Deleuze sees modern cinema as becoming an analytic of the 
image, implying the new concept of cutting operating in differ-
ent ways. Different film directors are mentioned as the creators 
of this direct image of time. Deleuze mentions Jean Luc Godard 
as a typical creator of the modern – arythmical montage. It 
is also Orson Welles (1925–1985), Alain Resnais (1922–2014), 
Yasujiro Ozu (1903–1963), Rossellini, Straubs (Jean-Marie 
Straub, b. 1933), and Danièle Huillet (1936–2006). François 
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Dosse, as an influence for Deleuze in creating the concept of 
time-crystal, also mentions French filmmaker, film theorist, lit-
erary critic, and novelist Jean Epstein (1897–1953) who insisted, 
as Deleuze did later, on the possibility of having direct access to 
time. He refers to Deleuze’s quotation, saying: “Time, for Ep-
stein, appeared in the cinema like the fourth dimension that is 
added to the other three spatial dimensions… Time, in cinema, 
seems to be in things” (Dosse 2010: 419). On the other hand, in 
some sense Deleuze borrows the concept of the crystals of time 
from the Polish director Krzysztof Zanussi (1939), who made 
the first movie The Structure of Crystals (1969). Deleuze notices 
that the success of Zanussi’s cinema stems from a principle of 
indiscernibility between a religious, metaphysical, or scientific 
content and the most everyday and trivial determination. So 
Zanussi creates the time-crystal in which “the crystal is no 
longer reducible to the external position of two mirrors face to 
face, but to the internal disposition of a seed in relation to the 
environment” (Deleuze 1989: 71). Daniela Angelucci, in her 
study Deleuze and the Concepts of Cinema discussing the con-
cept of time, mentions Kant. But as the main source for a more 
perspicuous understanding of the radical difference and of the 
continuous exchange between the present and past, actual and 
virtual in the crystal of time, returns to the third chapter of 
Bergson’s book Matter and Memory. As examples of ‘crystal-
line’ cinema, she mentions different directors also discussed by 
Deleuze: Joseph Losey (1909–1984) (The Servant, 1963), Welles 
(Citizen Kane, 1941; The Lady from Shanghai, 1947), Resnais 
(Last Year at Marienbad, 1961), Fellini (And the Ship Sails On, 
1983), Akira Kurosawa (1910–1998) (Rashomon, 1950), Mi-
chelangelo Antonioni (1912–2007) (The Night, 1961), Ophüls 
(The Earrings of Madame de…, 1953), Luis Bunuel (1900–1983) 
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(Belle de jour, 1967; The Discrete Charm of the Bourgeoisie, 1972), 
and Robbe-Grillet (Last Year at Marienbad) (Angelucci 2014: 
327–328). Tarkovsky is not on the list. 
 But Tarkovsky is included on Deleuze’s list. Our hypothesis 
is that Tarkovsky’s writings on rhythm and montage in cinema 
art have an influence on Deleuze’s conception of cinematic time 
in Cinema 2: The Time-Image. 
This identity of montage with the image itself can appear only 
in conditions of the direct time-image. In a text with important 
implications, Tarkovsky says that what is essential is the way 
time flows in the shot, its tension or rarefaction, ‘the pressure 
of time in the shot’. He appears to subscribe to the classical al-
ternative, shot or montage, and to opt strongly for the shot (‘the 
cinematographic figure only exists inside the shot’). But this is 
only a superficial appearance, because the force or pressure of 
time goes outside the limits of the shot, and montage itself works 
and lives in time, Deleuze writes (Deleuze 1989: 42).
How does it happen that montage becomes identical with 
the image? And why is Tarkovsky’s text “with important impli-
cations”, according to Deleuze? 
Deleuze refers to Tarkovsky’s insight in an article published 
in French ‘De la figure cinematographique’ in Positif (No. 249) 
in December 1981: “Time in cinema becomes the basis of bases, 
like sound in music, colour in painting… Montage is far from 
producing a new quality…” Deleuze also mentions Michel 
Chion’s comments on this text of Tarkovsky, Cahiers du cinema, 
No. 358, April 1984, p. 41: “His profound intuition about the 
essence of cinema, when he refuses to assimilate it to a lan-
guage which combines units such as shot, images, sounds, etc.” 
(Deleuze 1989: 288). In the Cinema 2 chapter “The Crystals 
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of Time” (Les cristaux de temps) Deleuze, after mentioning 
Werner Herzog’s Heart of Glass, as already mentioned in this 
book, turns towards Tarkovsky as the most perfect example of 
crystalline time movie and reflects upon three of his movies: 
Mirror, Stalker and Solaris. It seems that for the crystals of time, 
where actuality interchanges with virtuality, the movie Mirror 
is the best example of crystalline time. Deleuze writes: “Mirror 
is a turning crystal, with two sides if we relate it to the invisible 
adult character (his mother, his wife), with four sides if we relate 
it to two visible couples (his mother and the child he was, his 
wife and the child he has). And the crystal turns on itself, like 
a homing device that searches an opaque environment: what 
is Russia, what is Russia…?” (Deleuze 1989: 75). Deleuze does 
not mention three additional couples one can discern in this 
crystalline time. The first one is the mother and the wife of the 
main narrator, as if one identity, but as different facets of crystal 
turning around the main hero. The second, a very accidentally 
occurring couple of crystal – the grandmother and the boy. 
They do not recognise each other. She knocks at the door, he 
opens it, and she says: “Sorry, I missed the door.” If it is even her 
son, not the grandson; nevertheless, he is not able to recognise 
the old mother. He knows her only young. And ultimately the 
third facet of crystal: at the very end of the movie Mirror the 
mother is already old but she carries two of her children at a 
young age by hand through the field (and when they were small 
in reality she was young).
In the chapter The Crystals of Time (Les cristaux de temps), 
Deleuze deciphers Herzog’s film Heart of Glass, saying: “The 
search for the alchemical heart and secret, for the red crystal, is 
inseparable from the search for cosmic limits, as the highest ten-
sion of the spirit and the deepest level of reality. But the crystal’s 
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fire will have to connect with the whole range of manufacturing 
for the world, for its part to stop being a flat, amorphous envi-
ronment which ends at the edge of a gulf, and to reveal infinite 
crystalline potentialities in itself (‘the earth rises up from the 
waters, I see a new earth…’). In this film, Herzog has set out the 
greatest crystal-images in the history of the cinema.” For our 
research, the phrase Deleuze adds further is important: “There 
is an analogous attempt in Tarkovsky, continued from one film 
to the next, but always closed again” (Deleuze 1989: 75). What 
does it mean that Tarkovsky’s crystal of time is closed?
For much of his creative life, Tarkovsky was preoccupied 
with the idea of the end of the world, and all of his films con-
tain an element of apocalyptic crisis, either for the characters 
personally (such as Rublev’s horror at both the Tartar atroci-
ties and his own crime, and his subsequent vow of silence and 
refusal to paint), or for society as a whole (the war in Ivan’s 
Childhood, ecological collapse in Stalker or fear of nuclear war 
in The Sacrifice). Nerijus Milerius in the book The Apocalypse in 
Film: Philosophical Presuppositions discerns in Tarkovsky’s mov-
ies a repeated motif: the end of the world without end: “when 
the end somehow returns to the beginning or at least projects 
such a return as the prolonged trajectory by the spectator” 
(Milerius 2013: 190). On the other hand, Milerius notices that 
Tarkovsky’s non-chronological time becomes entangled with 
“Deleuze’s time-image, but contrary to the case of Deleuze, has 
the inoculation of belief ” (Milerius 2013: 225).
Tarkovsky in his book Sculpting in Time also reflects the 
splitting of time. He writes: “Time is said to be irreversible. 
And this is true enough in the sense that ‘you can’t bring back 
the past’, as they say. But what exactly is this ‘past’? Is it what 
has passed? And what does ‘passed’ mean for a person when 
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for each of us the past is the bearer of all that is constant in 
the reality of the present, of each current moment? In a certain 
sense the past is far more real, or at any rate more stable, more 
resilient than the present. The present slips and vanishes like 
sand between the fingers, acquiring material weight only in 
its recollection. King Solomon’s ring bore the inscription, ‘All 
will pass’; by contrast, I want to draw attention to how time 
in its moral implication is in fact turned back. Time can van-
ish without trace in our material world for it is a subjective, 
spiritual category. The time we have lived settles in our soul as 
an experience placed within time” (Tarkovsky 1987: 58). In his 
movie The House, Lithuanian film director Šarūnas Bartas sug-
gests the opposite direction of split time: only the future is real 
because in it we’ll be free from the past. “I do not understand 
the present – it reflects the voice of the main narrator beyond 
the image. It is changing so quickly. I am not sure it exists.” 
Specifically cinema, according to Tarkovsky, as opposed to 
other forms of art, has the ability to take an impression of time 
(непосредственно запечатлеть время) and to create a matrix 
for actual time (Tarkovsky 1987: 62). Tarkovsky weaves these 
split times into a continuous flash of time in his first movie 
Ivan’s Childhood (Иваново детство, 1962) (Deleuze by the 
way does not mention this film). Past time as virtual time is 
expressed in Ivan’s four dreams, in which the events happen 
besides the war, but they could had have happened before the 
war, when the world was cozy and nice, when their mother was 
alive. In the real time of present it is war time, and little orphan 
Ivan is a reconnoitrer fighting in the war. In the second dream 
he and his mother are looking at the reflection of the water in 
the well. The viewer sees them in the reflection of the mirror 
in the water of the well. The reflection shows virtual time lost 
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and already impossible, in discord with the gloomy reality of 
the war. In the present reality time when Ivan has the dream his 
mother is already dead. But in the dream she is still alive. Ivan 
descends into the well to catch the reflecting star (“How is it 
possible that it is shining – isn’t it day?” – Ivan asks). In the next 
shot, Ivan is still in the well but he hears the phrases of German 
speech and then shots. He does not see but understands what 
had happened. He screams: “Mother.” In the dream time from 
dream time Ivan is thrown back into reality time. In the next 
shot his mother is lying on the ground as the water from the 
well is pouring over her. The reflection of Ivan and his mother 
in the well water at the same time embraces three weaved times: 
the time of the dream in which war does not exist and which 
in some sense has the possibility to coincide with the possible 
past before the war. On the other hand Ivan exists in the real 
present time of the war. Mainly in this time Ivan is having the 
dream. Thirdly, the death of Ivan’s mother – regardless that it 
occurs in the dream, but in the time of reality happened in the 
past time even before the inner time of the dream as well as 
before the very time of dreaming as a real fact. All these three 
interweaved times showed in several minutes of the movie 
coexist simultaneously. The time of the dream becomes a mir-
ror to reality time exposing what is brutal and unbearable in 
reality time. There is no war in the inner time of the dream, 
but it invades into this time and returns it back to reality. The 
time of the dream and real time coexist as two inseparable sides 
of one crystal of time, as two mirrors, reinforcing each other’s 
reflections. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) described Ivan as a 
“monstrous child – the maddest one of all, for whom the whole 
world is a hallucination” (Skakov 2012: 19). Nariman Skakov 
in his analysis mentions “the fusion of realistic and fantastical 
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elements” (Skakov 2012: 40). But the Deleuzean concept of the 
crystals of time allows us to reveal in this movie the reality and 
the dream time as two independent mirrors, two forking times, 
which coexist as separate sides of the crystal, but never fuse or 
intermingle in hallucinations. Ivan does not hallucinate – in 
reality he is fighting his war as revenge for his mother’s death. 
His motives are clear and understandable, even if it is obvious 
he is too young for this war. A dream is not a hallucination 
either: just an alternative reality, expressing the other sequence 
of time. The time splits, but all split alternatives are united to 
the one crystal of time apprehended as one flash. What would 
have happened to Ivan in the future time the viewer gets to 
know only when it becomes the past time, when at the end of 
the war in the archives of soldiers shot by Germans a photo of 
Ivan is accidentally found. 
In Tarkovsky’s Mirror the present and the future are also 
focused as different sides of the one crystal when the young 
mother (played by Margarita Terechova) approached the mir-
ror and instead of her young present face reflection she sees the 
image of her future old face (played by Tarkovsky’s mother). 
Saulius Macaitis notices this ability to foresee the future in the 
moment of present and the interweaving (but not fusing) of 
several cycles of time in Mirror: “…Mother with her husband, 
both very young and nice, are sitting here in the luxurious 
vegetation. As a matter of fact she is not a mother yet – not in 
vain her beloved intimately whispers: a boy? A girl? The woman 
turns her thoughtful gaze to the distance and in a moment it 
seems she foresees the difficult burden of the future, and losses 
caused by the war and the longing for her beloved, already sees 
in reality how from their dear house of love remains only a 
weeded foundation…” (Macaitis 2007: 3).
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Michail Jampolskij (a Russian film critic living in New 
York), as if following Deleuze, also considers Tarkovsky’s 
cinema as closed to the future as well as to present. Jampolskij 
discerns two different notions of time and opposes two Rus-
sian directors, Tarkovsky and Aleksandr Sokurov (Ox, 2000, 
Russian Arch, 2002). The critic tries to show that Sokurov is 
not following Tarkovsky’s cinema school because of a differ-
ent notion of cinema time. He names Tarkovsky a master of 
conformity (when the movement of camera or the plastic of 
the world of photographic image intends to correspond to a 
certain rhythm of real time), and Sokurov, in opposition to 
Tarkovsky, as the master of disconformity. By this discon-
formity Sokurov tries to discern the inadequacy between the 
thought and the world and he has doubts of the possibility 
of representation. The materiality of the world is resistant to 
thought as some incomprehensible, dark inertia. In contrast, in 
Tarkovsky’s movies Jampolskij discerns the “facticity” which 
means the participation of matter in causal, which thus means 
in thinkable relations. “Almost all of Tarkovsky’s events are 
past events. His world – the absolute world of nostalgia, has 
no approach to present experience. The time is presented for 
us as a certain esthetic form, closed by definition”, Jampolskij 
concludes (Jampolskij 2011: 367). It is possible that Deleuze 
discerned the other source of closeness in Tarkovsky’s movies 
than what Jampolskij suggested. It seems that for Deleuze, 
Tarkovsky’s movies are lacking open space, the possibility of 
new rebirth. The crystal is frozen and suffocating. Deleuze 
notices that in Tarkovsky’s movies Solaris and Stalker: “The 
seed seems to be frozen in these sodden, washed and heavily 
translucent images, with their sometimes bluish, sometimes 
brown surfaces, while the green environment seems, in the 
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rain, to be unable to go beyond the condition of a liquid crystal 
which keeps its secret. Are we to believe that the soft planet 
Solaris gives a reply, and that it will reconcile the ocean and 
thought, the environment and the seed, at once designating 
the transparent face of the crystal (the rediscovered woman) 
and the crystallizable form of the universe (the rediscovered 
dwelling)? Solaris does not open up this optimism, and Stalker 
returns the environment to the opacity of an indeterminate 
zone, and the seed to the morbidity of something aborting, a 
closed door” (Deleuze 1989: 75). 
 Deleuze, ref lecting on Artaud’s insights, noticed that 
we do not believe in the events which happen to us, such as 
love or death. The link between man and the world is broken. 
The modern cinema, according to Deleuze, has to restore our 
belief not in a different world, but in a link between man and 
the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, 
the unthinkable, which nonetheless cannot be but thought 
(Croire, non pas à un autre monde, mais au lien de l’homme et 
du monde, à l’amour ou à la vie, y croire comme à l’ impossible, 
à l’ impensable, qui pourtant ne peut être que pensé) (Deleuze 
1985: 221). 
The paradox is that Tarkovsky considered the aim of cinema 
art and art in general as a restoration of belief as well. “Art does 
not think logically, or formulate a logic behavior; it expresses its 
own postulate of faith”, Tarkovsky writes in Sculpting in Time 
(Tarkovsky 1987: 41). But the paths of Deleuze and Tarkovsky 
separate in the understanding of hope. Deleuze emphasizes 
the new thought which has to restore belief, while Tarkovsky 
emphasizes intuition. Deleuze is speaking about the belief in 
this world as about the belief in the body; following Artaud’s 
concept of body, Tarkovsky explains the aim of art as the 
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longing for ideal. According to his view, intuition in art as well 
as in religion, is equivalent to belief and faith. The end of the 
movie Stalker which for Deleuze looks closed without a future 
hope perspective, for Tarkovsky himself does not look closed. 
Milerius would have agreed with Tarkovsky. He writes: “The 
Writer and the Scientist nevertheless do not dare to enter into 
the Zone room. When they returned and were looking at the 
wife of Stalker who came to meet him, it became clear that the 
real miracle is hidden not in the Zone; the real miracle is this 
unconditional love. At this moment it becomes clear that in 
spite of the fact that the Writer and the Scientist do not enter 
into the room, their transformation had already occurred, and 
for the reason they were able to recognize this daily miracle” 
(Milerius 2013: 289).
Despite Deleuze considering the crystal time created by 
Tarkovsky as closed and by Herzog as open (according to our 
view not a very exact conclusion, if one starts from the perspec-
tive of immanent time), in discussing the concept of crystal time 
Deleuze from time to time mentions Tarkovsky. In one of the 
interviews published in the book Pourparlers, in discussing the 
concept of the imaginary, Deleuze considers it a very complex 
concept: “The imaginary isn’t the unreal; it’s the indiscernibil-
ity of real and unreal” (Deleuze 1990b: 66). The imaginary – it 
is the crystal of time (L’imaginaire, c’est l’image-cristal). In very 
different forms it determined, according to Deleuze, modern 
cinema. In the list of creators of time crystals besides Ophuls, 
Renoir, Fellini, Visconti and Zanussi, he mentions Tarkovsky 
as well (Deleuze 1990b: 66).
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Rhythm and Time versus Cinematic Language: 
Tarkovsky and Deleuze
Tarkovsky tried to distance his own approach to cinema from 
the classics of the cinema of the Soviet empire. In his book 
Imprinted Time, he opposed his conception of rhythm and 
time to Eisenstein’s one. He wrote: “Nor can I accept the no-
tion that editing is the main formative element of a film, as 
the protagonists of ‘montage cinema’, following Kuleshov and 
Eisenstein, maintained in the twenties, as if a film was made 
on the editing table” (Tarkovsky 1987: 114). To Eisenstein’s 
emphasis on montage in cinema art Tarkovsky opposed the 
stress upon shot and frame. “The dominant, all-powerful 
factor of the film image is rhythm, expressing the course of 
time within the frame”, says Tarkovsky and Deleuze takes this 
insight very seriously. Eisenstein also emphasised rhythm, but 
rhythm as a part of the montage. Tarkovsky, as opposed to 
Eisenstein, unites the rhythm with the frame. He says that 
the editing brings together shots which are already filled with 
time, and organises the unified, living structure inherent in 
the film. So it happens that “the time that pulsates through 
the blood vessels of the film, making it alive, is of varying 
rhythmic pressure. Editing a picture correctly, competently, 
means allowing the separate scenes and shots to come to-
gether spontaneously, for in a sense they edit themselves; they 
join up according to their own intrinsic pattern” (Tarkovsky 
1987: 115). Tarkovsky is relying on spontaneity, saying that 
rhythm is not thought up, not composed on an arbitrary, 
theoretical basis, but comes into being spontaneously in a 
film, in response to the director’s innate awareness of life, his 
‘search for time’.
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Ingmar Bergman in his book The Magic Lantern also indi-
cates the role of rhythm in the process of creating cinema art. 
But, in contrast to Tarkovsky, Bergman, when considering that 
that editing occurs during filming itself, nevertheless concludes 
that the rhythm is created in the script. “I know that many 
directors hold the opposite view”, he wrote, keeping in mind 
probably also Tarkovsky. But for him the rhythm in his films 
was conceived in the script, at the desk, and only afterwards 
is given birth in front of the camera. “All forms of improvisa-
tion are alien to me. If I am ever forced into hasty decisions, I 
grow sweaty and rigid with terror. Filming for me is an illusion 
planned in detail, the reflection of a reality which the longer I 
live seems to me more and more illusory” (Bergman 1988: 73). 
He appreciates the unexpected and humorous fantasies of the 
actors, but only in the case when “they were not doing down 
their fellow-players, but respecting the whole, the rhythm” 
(Bergman 1988: 152). There is also the rhythm in the relations 
between the director and the actors during film making. “True 
freedom,” wrote Bergman, “is dependent on mutually drawn 
patterns, thoroughly penetrated rhythms. Acting is also the act 
of repetition. So every contribution must be based on voluntary 
cooperation between the parties concerned” (Bergman 1988: 
153). Bergman refers to his experience on what the maestro 
Herbert von Karajan said to him reproachingly: “I saw your 
production of A Dream Play. You direct as if you were a musi-
cian. You’ve a feeling for rhythm, the musicality, pitch. That was 
in your Magic Flute too. In parts it was charming, but I didn’t 
like it. You’d switched some scenes at the end. You can’t do that 
with Mozart. Everything is organic” (Bergman 1988: 243).
Tarkovsky was practicing music and his mother expected 
he would become an orchestra director, probably the same level 
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as Karajan. But Tarkovsky abandoned this idea. He preferred 
to be the Mozart of cinema, creatively searching for the new 
rhythm for the time to flow in the film space. In contrast to 
Bergman he defines his own style of using montage in creating 
the rhythm as spontaneous. In Sculpting in Time Tarkovsky 
describes the difficulties he experienced in the final stage of 
creating The Mirror, when different parts of the shots were so 
pervaded with the different rhythms of time that they refused 
to be harmonized into a new rhythm. At last the miracle hap-
pened and the film was created. But it seems like it just created 
itself. As if “time itself, running through the shots, had met 
and linked together”, says Tarkovsky (Tarkovsky 1987: 117). 
Deleuze said about the Mirror that it is a visible crystal of time. 
Lithuanian film critic Macaitis noticed that Tarkovsky in this 
film tried to recreate our civilization from its flaking off frag-
ments, as from shards of a mirror, and it does not matter that it 
is only a mosaic form. “Thanks to the strange and unexpected 
connections of episodes, shots, even moments, he tries philo-
sophically to reveal the continuous time link, very carefully, as 
a treasure, to uncover these usually invisible associative links 
between a secret meaning important maybe only for you of the 
gust of the wind, the squeak of the sweep, the memory of the 
fire of the wick and the destiny of the whole epoch, country, 
even mankind” (Macaitis 2007: 3).
Tarkovsky alerts that “if time is slowed down or speeded 
up artificially, and not in response to an endogenous develop-
ment, if the change of rhythm is wrong, the result will be false 
and strident”. On the other hand this experiment with joining 
segments of unequal time-value which necessarily breaks the 
rhythm may be an essential factor in the carving out of the 
right rhythmic design. “To take the various time-pressures, 
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which we could designate metaphorically as brook, spate, 
river, waterfall, ocean – joining them together engenders that 
unique rhythmic design which is the author’s sense of time, 
called into being as a newly formed entity”, Tarkovsky con-
cludes (Tarkovsky 1987: 121).
Tarkovsky used to film in long shots. For The Mirror, Tarko-
vsky created about two hundred shots – significantly less than 
usual (between five hundred and a thousand). But the assembly 
of the shots is responsible for the structure of the film, it does 
not, as is generally assumed, says Tarkovsky, create its rhythm, 
but the distinctive time running through the shots makes the 
rhythm of the picture. The length of the edited pieces also does 
not determine the rhythm of time in the shot, but ‘by the pres-
sure of the time that runs through them’. Editing can only be 
a feature of style, but it cannot determine rhythm (Tarkovsky 
gitenis umbrasas. Baptism or Washing of the Hair. 1990. Fresco. Ingrown tree.
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1987: 117). Deleuze in the second volume of Cinema follows 
Tarkovsky’s idea that neither editing nor montage dictates 
rhythm, but vice versa: time, imprinted in the frame, dictates 
the particular editing principle.
There is no particular rule for what particular rhythm has to 
be used in creating a film: rhythm in cinema is conveyed by the 
life of the object visibly recorded in the frame. Tarkovsky tries 
to distance time from the possible manipulations of the direc-
tor: time in a shot has to flow independently and with dignity. 
It means that the director should not impose his ideas on the 
spectator with haste but to leave the open space for the viewer 
to experience the going event according his own rhythm of time. 
Bergman spoke about the necessary rhythm in the relations 
between the director and the actors. Tarkovsky reflected on 
the necessary rhythm in the relations between the director and 
the viewer. The director’s sense of the rhythm of time in film 
is always prevailing. In any case the viewer can experience the 
sense of coercion. Tarkovsky defines one of his creative aims 
to create such a rhythm of time “that no-one in the audience 
will feel that his perception is being coerced, so that he may, as 
it were, allow himself to be taken prisoner voluntarily by the 
artist, as he starts to recognise the material of the film as his 
own, assimilating it, drawing it in to himself as a new, intimate 
experience” (Tarkovsky 1987: 120). Is it not a bit of a utopian 
task? And what happens when the rhythm of time of the viewer 
and the rhythm of time of the director are totally different? 
Sometimes the audience preferred not to be left on their own 
sense of time, to forget about time during film time. This type of 
viewer would reject the rhythm of Tarkovsky’s cinema. Tarko-
vsky from his own experience recalls that the viewers either fall 
into the director’s rhythm (his world) or vice versa (Tarkovsky 
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1987: 120). But the cinema event is always a matter between the 
film creator and the audience.
It seems Bresson does not oppose theatre as such an art, but 
is searching for the uniqueness of cinematography as a new art, 
noticing that “the truth of cinematography cannot be the truth 
of theatre, nor the truth of the novel, nor the truth of painting. 
What the cinematographer captures with his or her own re-
sources cannot be what the theatre, the novel, painting capture 
with theirs” (Bresson 1958: 5). The same effort – to find the 
distinctive feature of cinema art, in contrast to all other possible 
arts – would also be made by Tarkovsky in Sculpting in Time. On 
the other hand, both directors rely heavily on their experience 
from different arts. Bresson was a painter before he became a 
director; Tarkovsky also attended but did not finish arts school 
and practiced music, his mother expecting him to become an 
orchestra director. Bresson was reading Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy 
and Proust, the same as Tarkovsky. When Tarkovsky asks 
abstract questions about the sources of creativity he inevitably 
returns to literature. In search for the answer to the question, 
“Why is it that the artist seeks to destroy the stability sought 
by society?” Tarkovsky turns toward Thomas Mann’s novel The 
Magic Mountain and concludes: “The artist seeks to destroy 
the stability by which the society lives, for the sake of drawing 
closer to the ideal. Society seeks stability, the artist – infinity” 
(Tarkovsky 1989: 192). Tarkovsky remarks that as soon as one 
thinks of looking for “lost time”, one is of course reminded of 
the title of Proust’s volumes (Tarkovsky 1989: 128).
In 1970 Tarkovsky published a short story that was divided 
into several novellas(Taркoвский 1970). It was the first liter-
ary step to the film The Mirror. In his film The Mirror and his 
book Sculpting in Time he uses the verses of his father Arseny 
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Tarkovsky. The poet’s strokes from the verse can be interpreted 
as a main theme in Nostalgia: “I’m a candle burnt out at the feast. 
/ Gather my wax up at dawn, / And this page will tell you the 
secret / Of how to weep and where to be proud, / How to dis-
tribute the final third / Of delight, and make an easy death…” 
(Tarkovsky 1989: 215). Tarkovsky also includes verses of Rus-
sian poet Fyodor Tyuchev (1805–1873) and Alexander Push-
kin’s letter to Pyotr Chadaev. He acknowledges that of great 
significance to him was the literature of Dostoyevsky: “Look at 
the finale of Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot. What overwhelming truth 
in the characters and circumstances!” (Tarkovsky 1989: 25).
Bresson also compares the classics of literature with films: 
“Proust says that Dostoyevsky is original in composition above 
all. It is an extraordinary complex and close-meshed whole, 
purely inward, which currents and counter-currents like those 
of the sea, a thing that is found also in Proust (in other ways 
so different) and whose equivalent would go well with a film” 
(Bresson 1958: 63). Tarkovsky is famous for his deep focus and 
long shot. But Deleuze supposes that Tarkovsky only appears 
to subscribe to the classical alternative, shot or montage, and 
to opt strongly for the shot (“the cinematographic figure only 
exists inside the shot”). From a Deleuzean point of view, this is 
only a superficial appearance, because the force or pressure of 
time in Tarkovsky’s concept goes outside the limits of the shot, 
and the montage itself works and lives in time. In the Preface 
to Cinema 2: The Time-Image Deleuze writes: “It is not quite 
right to say that the cinematographic image is in the present. 
What is in the present is what the image ‘represents’, but not 
the image itself, which, in cinema as in painting, is never to 
be confused with what it represents. The image itself is the 
system of the relationships between its elements, that is, a set 
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of relationships of time from which the variable present only 
flows. It is in this sense, I think, that Tarkovsky challenges 
the distinction between montage and shot when he defines 
cinema by the ‘pressure of time’ in the shot. What is specific 
to the image, as soon as it is creative, is to make perceptible, to 
make visible, relationships of time which cannot be seen in the 
represented object and do not allow themselves to be reduced 
to the present” (Deleuze 1989: xii).
What does it mean that time goes outside the limits of the 
shot and even the montage is possible only inside time? Deleuze 
makes a very careful reading of some of Tarkovsky’s texts. He 
refers to Tarkovsky’s article “On the cinematographic figure”, 
‘De la figure cinematographique’ in Positif, (No. 249, December 
1981): “Time in cinema becomes the basis of bases, like sound 
in music, colour in painting… Montage is far from producing 
a new quality…” Deleuze also indicates comments on this text 
of Tarkovsky by Michel Chion in Cahiers du cinema, (No. 358, 
April 1984, p. 4), who says: “His [Tarkovsky’s] profound intui-
tion about the essence of cinema, when he refuses to assimilate 
it to a language which combines units such as shot, images, 
sounds, etc.” (Deleuze 1989: 293).
Time, not montage or shot, is the basis for modern cinema, 
according to Tarkovsky and Deleuze. This dominance of time 
over technical achievements of cinema art for Tarkovsky was 
an essential value decision for a film creator. According to him, 
“editing a picture correctly, competently, means allowing the 
separate scenes and shots to come together spontaneously, for 
in a sense they edit themselves; they join up according to their 
own intrinsic pattern. It is simply a question of recognizing and 
following this pattern while joining and cutting” (Tarkovsky 
1987: 116).
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Deleuze was interested in French cinema critic Serge 
Daney’s (1944–1992) writings on cinema and wrote him a let-
ter expressing the ideas and questions that came to his mind 
when reading Daney’s La Rampa (1983). Deleuze returned to 
his comparison of the speed of movement of American cinema 
and the slowness of the material of Soviet cinema and quoted 
Daney’s passage: “You say, in a fine passage, that ‘the Americans 
have taken very far the study of continuous motion, of speed 
and lines of flight, of a motion that empties an image of its 
weight, its materiality, of bodies in a state of weightlessness… 
while in Europe, even in the USSR, at the risk of marginal-
izing themselves to death, some people allow themselves the 
luxury of exploring the other aspect of movement, slowed and 
discontinuous. Paradjanov and Tarkovsky, like Eisenstein, 
Dovzhenko, and Barnet before them, observe matter accumu-
lating and piling up, a geology of bits and pieces of rubbish and 
treasure slowly taking shape: theirs is the cinema of the Soviet 
ramparts, of that immobile empire’” (Deleuze 1990b: 79). What 
interests Deleuze in this passage is the question “how can one 
return … to the uncontrollable slowness that preserves things, 
how teach it to slow down, as Godard ‘recommended’ to Cop-
pola?” (Deleuze 1990b: 79). Deleuze does not ask: how to speed 
the slowness, but on the contrary – how to return to slowness. 
It seems he himself is on the slowness side. Is not Daney’s con-
ceptualization about Tarkovsky too superficial? Deleuze does 
not notice, but one can ask the rhetorical question addressed to 
Sergey Daney himself: can Tarkovsky’s cinema be considered 
as cinema of the Soviet ramparts, “of that immobile empire”?
Some European filmmakers to this possible question have a 
very clear negative answer. Lars von Trier dedicated his movie 
Antichrist to Andrei Tarkovsky. Ingmar Bergman wrote: “My 
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discovery of Tarkovsky’s first film was like a miracle. Suddenly, 
I found myself standing at the door of a room, the keys of which 
had, until then, never been given to me. It was a room I had 
always wanted to enter and where he was moving freely and 
fully at ease. I felt encouraged and stimulated: someone was 
expressing what I had always wanted to say without knowing 
how. Tarkovsky is for me the greatest, the one who invented a 
new language, true to the nature of film, as it captures life as a 
reflection, life as a dream” (Sean 2005).
What was the language Tarkovsky created that Bergman 
was mentioning? It seems it could not be the usual language 
as used in literature. Tarkovsky spoke about cinema image as 
something above literature and language.
In Sculpting in Time he asks a very important question – 
what is the relationship between literature and film art? He 
discerns one similar feature – the unique freedom enjoyed by 
practitioners in both fields to take what they want of what is 
offered by the real world, and to arrange it in sequence within 
time. On the other side, beyond it he sees irreconcilable differ-
ences stemming from the essential disparity between the word 
and screened image; for the basic difference is that literature 
uses words to describe the world, whereas film does not have to 
use words: it manifests itself to us directly. Even more, accord-
ing to Tarkovsky, “For the first time in the history of the arts, in 
the history of culture, man found the means to take an impres-
sion of time. And simultaneously the possibility of reproducing 
that time on screen as often as he wanted, to repeat it and go 
back to it” (Tarkovsky 1987: 60).
Deleuze had read Christian Metz’s books Essais sur la 
signification au cinema and Psychoanalysis and the Cinema: 
the Imaginary Signifier, but was not fascinated with such a 
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semiolinguistic reading of film, in the lines of Saussurian 
linguistics. For Metz, cinema was a narrative language: the 
cinema-image was approximately the same as an utterance. 
Deleuze agrees with Metz’ analyses of the historical fact of the 
American model which was constituted as the cinema of nar-
ration and his account for the deliberate disturbances of narra-
tion in modern cinema. “The difficulty,” according to Deleuze, 
“is therefore elsewhere: it is that, for Metz, narration refers 
to one or several codes as underlying linguistic determinants 
from which it flows into the image in the shape of an evident 
given. On the contrary, it seems to us that narration is only a 
consequence of the visible [apparent] images themselves and 
their direct combinations – it is never a given” (Deleuze 1989: 
26). To Saussurian linguistics, Deleuze opposes not belonging 
to the logic of language semiotics and pragmatics of Peirce. 
Deleuze turns towards Tarkovsky as an ally in his opposition 
to the formal narrativism of Metz.
Deleuze notices and emphasises Tarkovsky’s idea, that 
cinema is not like a language working with units, even if these 
are relative and of different orders: montage is not a unit of a 
higher order which exercises power over unit-shots and which 
would thereby endow movement images with time as a new 
quality. What is important for Deleuze in Tarkovsky’s concept 
of cinema time is the very function of the sign he deciphers. 
Deleuze notices that Tarkovsky calls his text “On the cin-
ematographic figure”, because he calls the figure that which 
expresses the ‘typical’. Nevertheless, according to Deleuze, 
Tarkovsky expresses it in a pure singularity as something 
unique. “This is the sign; it is the very function of the sign” 
(Deleuze 1989: 42), as if Tarkovsky is representing Peirce’s 
idea of sign in cinema.
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As a matter of fact, Tarkovsky does not consider the movie 
director as a story teller, he compares him / her to a sculptor: 
“Just as a sculptor takes a lump of marble, and, inwardly con-
scious of the features of his finished piece, removes everything 
that is not part of it – so the film-maker, from a ‘lump of time’ 
made up of an enormous, solid cluster of living facts, cuts off 
and discards whatever he does not need, leaving only what is to 
be an element of the finished film, what will prove to be integral 
to the cinematic image” (Tarkovsky 1987: 63). On the other 
side, the sculptor is not necessarily a mute; he lives and creates 
in the world pierced through language. Could cinema be totally 
free from language invasion? In Tarkovsky’s Mirror his father 
Arseny Tarkovsky’s verses are integrated into the very essence 
of the movie. Is Tarkovsky’s cinema language absolutely free 
from poetics in the literary sense? Deleuze answers: “Enter-
ing into rivalry or heterogeneity with the visual images, the 
voice-off no longer has the power which only exceeded these 
insofar as it defined itself in relation to their limits: it has lost 
the omnipotence which characterised it in the first stage of 
the talkie” (Deleuze 1989: 250). Deleuze did not agree that a 
film image could be defined as a language. To Metz’ question 
“Under what conditions should cinema be considered as a 
language?” Deleuze opposes the question: “In what way is the 
cinema a language (the famous universal language of human-
ity)?” (Deleuze 1989: 25).
To the question – is it possible for the sign in the film to 
open itself directly onto time by avoiding language? – Deleuze 
takes Tarkovsky’s side and answers: it is. Deleuze discerns the 
constant danger to return to language in cinema image: “But, 
as long as signs find their material in the movement-image, as 
long as they form the singular expressional features, from a 
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material in movement, they are in danger of evoking another 
generality which would lead to their being confused with a 
language. The representation of time can be extracted from this 
only by association and generalisation, or as concept (hence 
Eisenstein’s bringing together of montage and concept). Such 
is the ambiguity of the sensory-motor schema, agent of abstrac-
tion. It is only when the sign opens directly on to time, when 
time provides the signaletic material itself, that the type, which 
has become temporal, coincides with the feature of singular-
ity separated from its motor associations” (Deleuze 1989: 43). 
Deleuze states that at this point Tarkovsky’s wish comes true: 
“the cinematographer succeeds in fixing time in its indices [in 
its signs] perceptible by the senses.” The fixed time in its signs 
perceptible by the senses – that is exactly what Tarkovsky’s 
concept zapechetlionoje vremia (Запечетленное время) means.
Deleuze concludes that, “in a sense, cinema had always 
done this; but, in another sense, it could only realise that it 
had in the course of its evolution, thanks to a crisis of the 
movement-image” (Deleuze 1989: 43).
Deleuze speaking about Tarkovsky avoids such epithets as 
poetics, as sacred, as having something to do with literature. 
He found another metaphor: he compared Tarkovsky with 
a painter working with a very liquid colour material – with 
aquarelle (Deleuze 1989: 75). Deleuze notices Tarkovsky’s 
wash (the woman also washes her hair against a wet wall in 
Mirror) and the rains that provide the rhythm for each film, 
and says that they are as intense as in Antonioni or Kurosawa, 
but he discerns in them different functions. Deleuze asks the 
question which for Tarkovsky would be very important: what 
burning bush, what fire, what soul, what sponge will staunch 
this earth?
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The Rhythm of Body and Thought:  
Artaud and Deleuze
Alain Badiou, reflecting on style in cinema art, is searching 
for the distinction between films with style and without style, 
rather similar to Deleuze’s distinction between bad cinema 
and good cinema (cinema that ceased to be bad). Bad cinema 
for Deleuze is mediocre cinema, cinema which takes away our 
belief in reality. Badiou suggests such a criterion for stylish and 
non-stylish cinema: he notices that “the style is what stands 
opposed to the indistinct. Linking the style to the author, the 
diacritical judgment proposes that something be salvaged from 
cinema, that cinema not be consigned to the forgetfulness of 
pleasures. That some names, some figures of the cinema, be 
noted in time” (Badiou 2005: 84).
For Badiou, as well as Deleuze, style in cinema has to do 
something with thought. “Thought and Cinema” is the chapter 
in the Cinema 2: The Time-Image, where Deleuze expressed his 
attitude towards good and bad cinema. Badiou also writes: “We 
will therefore speak of film on the basis of an unconditional 
commitment, of an artistic conviction, not in order to establish 
its status as art, but to draw out all of its consequences. We could 
say that we thereby pass from the normative judgment-whether 
indistinct (‘it’s good’) or diacritical (‘it’s superior’) – to an axi-
omatic attitude that asks what are the effects for thought of such 
and such a film” (Badiou 2005: 85). But Deleuze’s concept of 
thought in cinema art has an origin other than Badiou. It stems 
from a thought without image formulated by Antonin Artaud. 
Deleuze concludes that, contrary to Kant’s dogmatic image of 
thought, Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a 
thought without image (d’une pensée sans image) and the conquest 
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of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented. 
Whereas Kant discusses the displeasure this free play can cause, 
under the terms of “the sublime”, Artaud’s displeasure is by no 
means linked to a new belief in body and flesh. On the contrary: 
the ‘healing’ – yet gruesome – pedagogy of Artaud’s cinema (for 
Deleuze) lies entirely in the experience of a severe disappoint-
ment: namely, Artaud’s (and probably everybody’s) inability to 
link brain and screen instantly and directly together, for which 
Artaud longed so urgently in his early writings in the 20th cen-
tury. We consider that Artaud, alongside with Tarkovsky, can be 
considered as one of the most important inspirers of Deleuze’s 
insights on contemporary cinema. Tarkovsky suggested ideas 
concerning time, Artaud – concerning body.
In the philosophical discourse in Lithuania, Antonin Ar-
taud received much more attention as the creator of the theatre 
of cruelty than the inspirer of cinema. He was interpreted in the 
texts of theatre critic Rasa Vasinauskaitė (Vasinauskaitė 1999, 
2002). Kristina Karvelytė in her study Antonin Artaud’ Theatre 
of Cruelty tries to approach the phenomenon of Artaud through 
his concept of the organless body, following two studies by Ste-
phen Barber Antonin Artaud: Blows and Bombs (1993) and The 
Screaming Body (2004) (Karvelytė 2013), The former is about 
the theatre; the latter about cinema, painting and radio records. 
In both Artaud’s attempts to avoid the process of representation 
was emphasised. The overcoming of representation was one 
of the main aspects of art theory in Deleuze as well. Audronė 
Žukauskaitė included the concept of the body without organs 
into the discourse of political philosophy. In critical writings 
on Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema the figure of Artaud as 
usual is invisible. In Deleuze and Film (2012), edited by David 
Martin-Jones and Williams Brown, Artaud is not mentioned. 
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In Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema (2008) edited by 
Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormach, all the authors avoid 
Artaud with the exception of MacCormach, who in the chapter 
“An Ethics of Spectatorship: Love, Death and Cinema” which 
discusses the problem of the relationship between cinema and 
vision, quotes Artaud, who encouraged looking at the black sun 
(MacCormach 2008: 134). But Deleuze’s relationship to Artaud 
is not visible. Artaud’s name is neither mentioned in Buchanan’s 
book Deleuzism. A Metacommentary (2000). It seems Artaud’s 
name should have appeared in Deleuze and the Body edited by 
Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes (with Buchanan as editor-
in-chief). Artaud was once mentioned only in Anna Cutler and 
Iain Kenzie’s chapter “Bodies of Learning” as an inspirer for 
Deleuze’s concept of the organless body (Cutler, Kenzie 2011: 
55). André Pierre Colombat in Deleuze and Literature, edited by 
Buchanan and John Marx, in the chapter “Deleuze and Signs” 
reflects on the opposition between Artaud and Carroll from 
the perspective of Artaud: “while Artaud desperately struggled 
with intense suffering, with the monsters of the depths of the 
body, to extract an intensive language, Carroll kept on playing 
much safer word games at the still-fragile surface of language” 
(Colombat 2000: 28). The opposition “while Artaud…, Caroll 
kept…” paradoxically supposes as if both events had happened 
at the same time and that Artaud in them plays a more important 
role. The concept of life is one of the fundamental concepts in 
Deleuze’s philosophy of the modern cinema. Daniela Angelucci 
in her text Deleuze and the Concepts of Cinema, in structuring 
Deleuze’s theory of cinema using ten basic concepts, besides 
others includes the concept of life and looks for the sources 
of it in the Nietzsche’s idea of der wille zur macht. Artaud is 
mentioned alongside Nietzsche, Kafka and Lawrence as the 
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authors of pure description discerned in Critical and Clinical 
(Angelucci 2014: 370). Buchanan, justifying his distance to Ar-
taud’s influence on Deleuze, in the book Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Anti Oedipus: A Reader’s Guide (2008) notices that despite the 
fact that the term ‘the body without organs’ is borrowed from 
Artaud, it is in vain that we look to his work for an explanation 
of what Deleuze and Guattari had in mind. “Marx is a far better 
guide”, concludes Buchanan (Buchanan 2008a: 60–61).
Gregg Lambert holds the other point of view, and in his 
book The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (2002), in the chapter 
“Artaud’s Problem and Ours: Belief in the World As It Is” as 
well as in “Cinema and the Outside” in The Brain is the Screen. 
Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema, reflects on the influence 
of Artaud on the philosophy of Deleuze (Lambert 2000). But 
the main hero of the chapter at the end appears to be Eisenstein 
and his idea of the fourth dimension. Lambert writes about 
the idea of nooschock emphasised also by Deleuze in Eisen-
stein’s film theory and connects it to the Kantian conception 
of sublime and the problem of the clash between the imagi-
nation and thinking. Step by step the analyses of Eisenstein’s 
theory reaches the question of ideological aspects of cinema 
art and remembers Deleuze’s insight about the degradation of 
the cinema as mass art towards the union between Hitler and 
Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler. Lambert interprets the 
cinema of Eisenstein from the position of Eisenstein being the 
victim of Stalinists (of course he was), but keeps silent about his 
own ideological input in bolshevism. Lambert concludes that 
the problem of ideology receives its most authentic expression 
from Artaud when he cried: “my body was stolen away from 
me before birth’; ‘my brain has been used by an Other who 
thinks in my place.” Artaud experienced and gave expression 
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to this problem in its most extreme form, “as if suffering from 
the memory of a physical, mental and spiritual rape – that is, 
the cry of schizophrenic man” (Lambert 2000: 276).
We consider Deleuze’s turn towards Artaud in his book 
Logic of Sense, the same as in his Cinema volumes, happens 
beyond the ideological aspects of cinema. On the other hand, 
Deleuze mentioning Eisenstein and Artaud in one chapter 
“Thought and Cinema” nevertheless considers them as the 
mentors of a different type of cinema: Eisenstein was the crea-
tor of the classic cinema, based on movement-image and the 
rhythmicity of montage. Artaud inspired modern cinema based 
on the time-image and the destruction of senso-motor causal 
links and atonal montage. Eisenstein’s s ideas justify Deleuze’s 
reflections about the rhythm in cinema and montage, and Ar-
taud’s – the brake of sensomotory schema in modern cinema. 
According to Deleuze,
…modern cinema develops new relations with thought from 
three points of view: the obliteration of a whole or of a totaliza-
tion of images, in favour of an outside which is inserted between 
them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the film, 
in favor of a free indirect discourse and vision; the erasure of the 
unity of man and the world, in favor of a break which now leaves 
us with only a belief in this world (Deleuze 1989: 187–188).
Deleuze carefully reads Eisenstein’s Film Form, Film Sense, 
Mémoires, Au-delà des étoiles, La non-indifferente Nature, II. He 
refers to Eisenstein not only in the first chapter, when discuss-
ing the topic of dialectical montage, but also in the second 
volume in the chapter “Thought and Image”. Deleuze seems 
to refer to this notion of Eisenstein, in which he considered 
that internal monologue in the cinema goes beyond the dream, 
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which is too individual, and constitutes segments or links of 
a truly collective thought. Artaud also wrote about shock as 
a very important power in his theatre of cruelty: “To make 
metaphysics out of a spoken language is to make the language 
express what it does not ordinarily express: to make use of it 
in a new, exceptional, and unaccustomed fashion; to reveal its 
possibilities for producing physical shock” (Artaud 1958: 47). 
Deleuze compares the Eisensteinian insight of the shock, which 
annihilates the imagination and gives birth to new thought 
with a different version of the shock, namely the one expressed 
by Artaud. The “theatre of cruelty” is supposed to produce 
shock in order to revitalise the world we live in. Artaud wrote: 
“Everything that acts is a cruelty. It is upon this idea of extreme 
action, pushed beyond all limits, that theatre must be rebuilt… 
The theatre must give us everything that is in crime, love, war, 
or madness, if it wants to recover its necessity” (Artaud 1958: 
85). Artaud suggested for the new theatre to concentrate on 
famous characters, atrocious crimes, superhuman devotions, 
to return to the images and struggling forces of the old Myths. 
But this return to old Myths has nothing to do with the return 
towards imagination. Artaud proposed renouncing our empiri-
cism of imagery, in which the unconscious furnishes images at 
random, and which the poet arranges at random too, calling 
them poetic and hence hermetic images. Artaud suggested “to 
return through the theatre to an idea of the physical knowledge 
of images and the means of inducing trances” (Artaud 1958: 80).
Deleuze did not consider that linguistics or psychoanalysis 
is able to contribute a lot to cinema theory. On the contrary, the 
biology of the brain – molecular biology – offers a great deal. 
“Thought is molecular. Molecular speeds make up the slow 
beings that we are” (Deleuze 2000b: 366). Cinema, precisely 
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because it puts the image in motion, or rather endows the image 
with self-motion, never stops tracings the circuits of the brain. 
The screen can be the deficient brain of an idiot or a creative 
brain. Bad cinema travels through circuits created by the lower 
brain together with violence and sexuality. The creator of the 
theatre of cruelty, Artaud, had no possibility to go deeper into 
the problems of brain biology. But when Deleuze states that 
the brain is the screen he in some sense repeats the insights 
of Artaud (Deleuze 2000b). Artaud expected from theatre 
the power to influence the aspect and formation of things and 
spoke about art and life as of two nervous magnetisms. “We 
use our body like a screen through which pass the will and the 
relaxation of will”, Artaud writes in The Theatre and Its Double 
(Artaud 1958: 138). “We are not copying Artaud, but Artaud 
lived and said something about the brain that concerns all of 
us: that ‘its antennae turned towards the invisible’, that it has 
a capacity to ‘resume a resurrection from death’. We no longer 
believe in a whole as interiority of thought – even an open one; 
we believe in a force from the outside which hollows itself out, 
grabs us and attracts the inside”, Deleuze writes in the second 
volume of Cinema (Deleuze 1989: 2012).
In Artaud’s concept of body it is possible to discern two 
aspects. First of all, Artaud reflected the gestus of the body 
in his conception of the theatre of cruelty before his ‘schizo-
phrenia period’. This body has a lot to do with Bertold Brecht’s 
concept of gestus and the new conception of theater suggested 
by Artaud. On the other hand, Artaud described the personal 
schizophrenic experience of the body without organs. Deleuze 
relies on both conceptions of the body created by Artaud, but 
starts from the second one. First of all, Deleuze notices this 
particular description of the body in the book The Logic of 
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Sense in the chapter “Schizophrenic and the Little Girl”. Here 
he refers to Artaud’s ‘body without organs’ description, elabo-
rated further as a philosophical concept in the works together 
with Guattari. In schizophrenia the meaning of the words are 
destroyed by transforming the painful passion of the body 
Jūratė stauskaitė. Movement 1. 1989. Drawing, watercolour.
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into a triumphant action: obedience into command. It hap-
pens in the depth beneath the surface. Phonetic elements are 
wounding articulated or disarticulated parts of the body. The 
schizophrenic reaches the triumph only through the creation 
of breath-words and howl-words. It is the new language of the 
schizophrenic body: not written language of the body without 
organs. This schizophrenic body in particular is a body without 
organs (corps sans organes) invented by Artaud, according to 
Deleuze. Deleuze quotes Artaud’s notes of the new body signs: 
“No mouth No tongue No teeth No larynx No esophagus No 
stomach No intestine Nu anus I shall reconstruct the man 
that I am” (The body without organs is fashioned of bone and 
blood alone) (Deleuze 1990b: 342). The concept of the body 
without organs is broadly discussed by Deleuze and Guattari in 
the book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia in 
the chapter “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a 
Body Without Organs”. Why is this particular date mentioned? 
It is the day when Artaud declared war on the organs: “for you 
can tie me up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than 
an organ” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 150). Also: “The body is the 
body. Alone it stands. And in no need of the organs. Organism 
it never is. Organisms are the enemies of the body” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 158). Deleuze and Guattari noticed that Artaud 
declared a war not on organs but on organism and discerned 
different possible types of bodies without organs: a hypochon-
driac body, a paranoid body, a schizo body, a drugged body, a 
masochist body, a sucked-dry, catatonized, vitrified, sewn-up 
body. It is possible to have one or several bodies without organs. 
It is the body-experiment. “The body is now nothing more than 
a set of valves, locks, floodgates, bowls, or communicating ves-
sels”, declared Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
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153). The body without organs – it is the tantric egg. It is not 
a concept, but real practices. It is not possible to reach your 
own body without organs but the constant movement towards 
it as to some limit is taking place. We are sleeping with this 
body, making love, fighting, searching for our place. As if the 
experiment is continuing: not only radiotelephonic, but also 
biological and political. It involves censorship and repression. 
At that place when psychoanalysis says: “Stop, find yourself 
again”, Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis on the contrary 
encourages: “Let’s go further still, we haven’t found our BwO 
yet, we haven’t sufficiently dismantled our self ” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1987: 151). Deleuze and Guattari suppose that the great 
book of the body without organs is Spinoza’s Ethics in which 
the attributes are types or genuses of body without organs and 
substances, powers, and zero intensities are the matrices of 
production (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 153).
How does it happen that, according to Deleuze, Artaud is 
a forerunner of modern cinema? In his philosophy of cinema 
elaborated in both Cinema volumes, Deleuze relies not so 
much on this concept of the body without organs but more on 
the concept of the gestus of the body in his conception of the 
theatre of cruelty before his ’schizophrenia period’. Artaud was 
not satisfied with the old theater of esthetic pleasure based on 
the discourse and suggested the new type of theatre concep-
tion, the theatre which can disturb the whole existence of the 
spectator, the tone which can touch his / her body and make 
him / her scream. “No one in Europe knows how to scream 
any more, and particularly actors in trance no longer know how 
to cry out.” The actors have forgotten that they have a body 
and are doing nothing but talking, Artaud concludes (Artaud 
1958: 141). In opposition to this old talkative theatre, Artaud 
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suggested the idea of the Theatre of Cruelty in order to restore 
to the theatre a passionate and convulsive concept of life, and 
it is in this sense of violent rigour and extreme condensation of 
scenic elements that the cruelty on which it is based must be 
understood. “This cruelty, which will be bloody when necessary 
but not systematically so, can thus be identified with a kind of 
severe moral purity which is not afraid to pay life the price it 
must be paid” (Artaud 1958: 66). Evil is a permanent part of 
life and there is in life’s flame, life’s appetite, life’s irrational 
impulsion, a kind of initial perversity: the desire characteristic 
of Eros is cruelty since it feeds upon contingencies; death is 
cruelty, resurrection is cruelty, transfiguration is cruelty, since 
nowhere in a circular and closed world.
Artaud considered that creation and life itself are defined 
only by a kind of rigor, hence a fundamental cruelty, which 
leads things to their ineluctable end at whatever cost. “Effort 
is a cruelty, existence through effort is a cruelty. Rising from 
his repose and extending himself into being” (Artaud 1958: 
103). As usual it is taken for granted that the thought passed 
into words and expresses itself through words. The original-
ity of Artaud’s insight is the idea that it is possible to change 
the intentionality of thought and to direct it not towards the 
language, but towards the body. The gesture substitutes the 
utterance. The language of the gestures has its own rhythm. 
Artaud was inspired by Baleneese theatre. He noticed that the 
gestures of the dancers “fall so accurately upon this rhythm 
of the hollow drums, accent it, and seize it in flight with such 
sureness and at such climactic moments that it seems the very 
abyss of their hollow limbs which the music is going to scan” 
(Artaud 1958: 66). Desribing the spectacle Artaud notices the 
suspended rhythm and reveals how at least it is completed: 
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Repeatedly they seem to accomplish a kind of recovery with 
measured steps. Just when they appear to be lost in the middle 
of an inextricable labyrinth of measures or about to overturn in 
the confusion, they have their own way of recovering equilib-
rium, a particular buttressing of the body, of the twisted legs, 
which gives the impression of a sopping rag being wrung out in 
tempo;-and on three final steps, which lead them ineluctably to 
the middle of the. stage, the suspended rhythm is completed, the 
measure made clear (Artaud 1958: 58).
The rhythm is one of the concepts Artaud uses for describ-
ing the peculiarities of his vision of the new theatre. Artaud 
supposes that we can give an arbitrary rhythm to our breathing 
(can speed up our respiration or retard) and similarly accelerate 
or retard the rhythm of our thinking: regulate the unconscious 
play of the mind. He speaks about the ‘scenic rhythm’, which is 
different depending on the creators and the different epochs. 
He also includes silence and rhythm into the scenic movement. 
According to Artaud in the spectacle there will be no lost move-
ments, all movements will obey a rhythm; and each character 
being merely a type, his gesticulation, physiognomy, and 
costume will appear like so many rays of light (Artaud 1958: 
98). Describing the essence of the spectacle Artaud discerns 
the physical rhythm of movements whose crescendo and de-
crescendo will accord exactly with the pulsation of movements 
familiar to everyone. These movements are “cries, groans, ap-
paritions, surprises, theatricalities of all kinds, magic beauty 
of costumes taken from certain ritual models; resplendent 
lighting, incantational beauty of voices, the charms of harmony, 
rare notes of music, colors of objects” (Artaud 1958: 93). The 
influence of the spectacle upon the spectator also depends on 
the rhythm. The rhythm involves the spectator into the action 
152
on the stage: “In order to reforge the chain, the chain of a 
rhythm in which the spectator used to see his own reality in 
the spectacle, the spectator must be allowed to identify himself 
with the spectacle, breath by breath and beat by beat” (Artaud 
1958: 140). The effect of the spectacle should be like the color 
and rhythm of artificially produced breath. 
Our universal schizophrenia, writes Deleuze in the second 
volume of cinema, bears the need for the belief in this world. 
But this belief no longer means the belief into the other world 
or into a transformed world. It means the belief in the body. 
This belief requires a return to the discourse about the body as 
understood by Artaud. It is necessary to return to bodies before 
the names of the things: it is necessary to believe in the flesh 
saying “I am a man who has lost his life and is searching by all 
means possible to make it regain its place” (Deleuze 1989: 173). 
The turn towards the body is according to Deleuze the whole 
formula of the philosophical revolution. The body is no longer 
the obstacle for the thought, as it was in the idealism of Plato, 
and the thought is no long opposed to the body as it was in the 
dualism of Descartes. On the contrary, the thought has to dip 
into the body in order to achieve something which is impossible 
to think about; this means, a life itself, Deleuze writes in the 
eighth chapter of Cinema 2 “Cinema, Body and Brain, Thought” 
(Cinéma, corps et cerveau, pensée).
Artaud wrote that words have to disappear beyond ges-
tures. The body is an author of a gesture. It is possible to think 
and to scream by the body. The soul melted in the body – such 
is the basis of Artaud’s conception of the theatre. Deleuze in 
his philosophy of cinema was developing further Artaud’s 
metaphysics of gesture. Deleuze does not say that the body is 
thinking, but being obstinate and stubborn it forces us to think 
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what is concealed from thought, from life, and because of it will 
be thrown into the categories of life parallel to the categories 
of language. To think is to learn what a non-thinking body is 
capable of. To think is to know a body’s capacity, its postures. 
Deleuze notices that body is never in the present, it contains 
the before and after, tiredness and waiting. “Tiredness and 
waiting, even despair are the attitudes of the body”, Deleuze 
notices (Deleuze 1989: 189).
Time becomes visible through the tiredness and waiting 
of the body. Deleuze notices a direct connection between 
the body and time, emphasising the false continuity of the 
modern cinema in which “the images are no longer linked 
by rational cuts and continuity, but are relinked by means of 
false continuity and irrational cuts. Even the body is no longer 
exactly what moves; subject of movement or the instrument of 
action, it becomes rather the developer [revelateur] of time, it 
shows time through its tirednesses and waitings (Antonioni)” 
(Deleuze 1989: xi). It was Italian director Antonioni’s unique 
way in cinema art: to open the way for time to enter cinema 
through the tiredness and waiting of the body. In The Outcry 
(Il grido) there are different signs of the bodies: the tired body 
of the woman escaping the man, the aggressive body of the 
man, trying to prevent her escape. The clash of two bodies: 
the man beating the woman. There is also the lonely body 
of the man wandering in the empty landscapes. There is the 
prolongation of the woman’s body as a sign of her distance and 
her betrayal – the newborn child. There is the climbing body 
of the man approaching his own death. The film ends with 
the screaming body of the woman observing the man’s fall. 
Deleuze repeats Maurice Blanchot’s insight, saying that what 
Antonioni shows is “not the drama of communication, but the 
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immense tiredness of the body, the tiredness there is beneath, 
and which suggests to thought ‘something to incommunicate’, 
the ‘unthought’, life” (Deleuze 1989: 189). But mainly this 
impossibility to think life itself gives birth to the new type of 
thought. Antonioni revealed the cinema-body-thought link 
through the everyday body.
On the other hand, Deleuze discerns the other possibility 
of the meeting between the body and thought: when body is 
involved in ceremony, crystal or masquerade. The ceremonial 
body expressing itself through ceremony and through it giving 
lessons in spirituality is the aim of the theatre of cruelty created 
by Artaud. Artaud was fascinated by Balinese theatre based 
on the secrets of using gestures, intonations, and harmonies in 
relation to the senses which open ‘the free exercise of thought’. 
The body experiencing the trance on the stage is emanating 
the magical trance to the spectator. The body speaks its magi-
cal language, of which verbal theatre is unaware and expresses 
something immeasurable. “This spectacle,” writes Artaud, 
“offers us a marvellous complex of pure stage images, for the 
comprehension of which a whole new language seems to have 
been invented: the actors with their costumes constitute veri-
table living, moving hieroglyphs. And these three-dimensional 
hieroglyphs are in turn brocaded with a certain number of 
gestures-mysterious signs which correspond to some unknown, 
fabulous, and obscure reality which we here in the Occident 
have completely repressed” (Artaud 1958: 61).
But these trances have nothing to do with a dream. Artaud 
wrote that a dream as it appears in the European cinema inspired 
by surrealism is too easy a solution to the “problem” of thought. 
Artaud believes more in the appropriateness between cinema 
and automatic writing, considering that automatic writing is not 
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the absence of composition, but a higher control which brings 
together critical and conscious thought and the unconscious in 
thought. It is the structure of spiritual automaton. Deleuze, fol-
lowing Artaud, noticed that it is mainly in cinema that thought 
is brought face-to-face with its own impossibility, but draws 
from this a higher power of birth. In this concept, thought no 
longer confronts repression, the unconscious, dream, sexuality 
Jūratė stauskaitė. Jumping. 1997. Drawing, pastel.
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or death, “as in expressionism (and also in surrealism), it is 
all these determinations which confront thought as a higher 
‘problem’, or which enter into relation with the indeterminable, 
the unrefferable” (Deleuze 1989: 161).
“It is true”, concludes Deleuze, “that a bad cinema (and 
sometimes good) limits itself to a dream state induced in the 
viewer, or – as has been the subject of frequent analysis – to an 
imaginary participation. But the essence of the cinema – which 
is not the majority of films – has thought as its higher purpose, 
nothing but thought and its functioning” (Deleuze 1989: 163).
Deleuze ref lected on which of the contemporary film 
directors was the closest to Artaud’s insights and made the 
conclusion that it was the Italian actor, screenwriter and 
director Bene. Deleuze refers to his movies Salome (Salomè, 
1972), Notre-Dame des Turcs (Nostra Signora dei Turchi, 1968), 
Don Juan, Un Hamlet de moins, and Capricci, (1969). He cre-
ated the grotesque body, but also brought out a gracious and 
glorious body and at last achieved the disappearance of the 
visible body. Artaud and Bene experienced a similar ‘adven-
ture’ with cinema: a belief that cinema would have to give a 
body, the disappointment of cinema, and the final turn turned 
towards theatre.
After discerning two possible relations between the body 
and the thought in cinema, everyday body and ceremonial body, 
Deleuze reflects upon the invisible trespassing from the one 
to the other as a transposing from postures and habits to gest 
(gestus). This concept was created not by Artaud, but by Bertold 
Brecht who made from it the essence of the theatre irreducible 
to intrigue or plot. “What we call gest in general in the link or 
knot of attitudes between themselves, their co-ordination with 
each other, insofar as they do not depend on a previous story, a 
157
pre-existing plot or an action-image. On the contrary, the gest 
is the development of attitudes themselves, and, as such, car-
ries out a direct theatricallization of bodies, often very discreet, 
because it takes place independently of any role” (Deleuze 
1989: 192). In cinema Deleuze considers the greatest creator of 
such type of gest the founder of the New York cinema school, 
John Cassavetes (1929–1989). Deleuze cites his films Shadows, 
(1959), Faces (1968), A Woman Under the Influence (1974), Gloria 
(1980), and Love Streams, (1984). Deleuze wrote:
The greatness of Cassavetes’s work is to have undone the story, 
plot, or action, but also space, in order to get to attitudes as 
to categories which put time into the body, as well as thought 
into life. When Cassavetes says that characters must not come 
from a story or plot, but that the story should be secreted by the 
characters, he sums up the requirement of the cinema of bodies: 
the character is reduced to his own bodily attitudes, and what 
ought to result is the gest, that is, a ‘spectacle’, a theatricalization 
or dramatization which is valid for all plots (Deleuze 1989: 192).
Artaud was involved in cinema art as an actor and screen-
writer. Having appeared in more than twenty films between 
1924 and 1935, Artaud as film actor performed in Abel Gance’s 
Napoléon (1926), Carl Th. Dreyer’s La Passion de Jeanne d’Arc 
(The Passion of Joan of Arc, 1927), and Fritz Lang’s Liliom (1933). 
Artaud is the author of fifteen scripts, but only one was ever 
produced. When Germaine Dulac directed The Seashell and 
The Clergyman in 1927, Artaud insisted on his participation in 
the filming and editing of his own text, but Dulac, taking into 
account Artaud’s notoriously difficult personality, did her best 
to exclude Artaud from any possible collaboration. Afterwards, 
Artaud openly disagreed with the interpretation of his script. 
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When asked in 1924, “What sort of films would you like to 
make?”, he replied: “So I demand phantasmagorical films … 
the cinema is an amazing stimulant. It acts directly on the grey 
matter of the brain. When the savour of art has been sufficiently 
combined with the psychic ingredient which it contains it will 
go way beyond the theatre which we will relegate to a shelf of 
memories” (Artaud 1972: 166–167). When Artaud believed in 
cinema he suggested some of its achievement as an example for 
theatre. In Theatre and Its Double he wrote:
In a Marx Brothers’ film a man thinks he is going to take a 
woman in his arms but instead gets a cow, which moos. And 
through a conjunction of circumstances which it would take too 
long to analyse here, that moo, at just that moment, assumes 
an intellectual dignity equal to any woman’s cry. Such a situ-
ation, possible in the cinema, is no less possible in the theater 
as it exists: it would take very little – for instance, replace the 
cow with an animated manikin, a kind of monster endowed with 
speech, or a man disguised as an animal-to rediscover the secret 
of an objective poetry at the root of humor, which the theater 
has renounced and abandoned to the Music Hall, and which the 
Cinema later adopted (Artaud 1958: 43).
When Deleuze pronounces that “the Brain is the screen”, 
(Deleuze 2000: 365) he does so as if following Artaud’s insight. 
But, as Jamieson notices, Artaud’s film theory was tragically nev-
er fully realised and remains historically lost. Despite pursuing 
a number of avenues to raise funds, Artaud’s polemic remained 
purely theoretical (Jamieson 2007). Nevertheless, Deleuze 
discerns in Artaud’s ideas the turn towards modern cinema. 
Deleuze notices that as long as Artaud believes in the cinema he 
credits it not with the power of returning to images and linking 
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them according to the demands of an internal monologue and 
the rhythm of metaphors, but of ‘un-linking’ them, according 
to multiple-voices, internal-dialogues, always a voice in another 
voice. “In short”, Deleuze writes, “it is the totality of cinema-
thought relations that Artaud overturns: on the one hand there 
is no longer a whole thinkable through montage, on the other 
hand, there is no longer an internal monologue utterable through 
image” (Deleuze 1989: 167). Deleuze studies unrealised film 
scripts written by Artaud (32, La révolte du boucher, Dix-huit 
secondes) and identifies the powerlessness of thought as the main 
topic in them. Deleuze concludes that Artaud believes in cinema 
as long as he considers that cinema is essentially suited to reveal 
this powerlessness to think at the heart of thought. He ceases 
to believe in the film when he begins to believe that the movie 
‘may create only abstract, figurative dreams. Deleuze warns that 
we are in danger of misconstruing Artaud’s originality: “it is no 
longer thought which confronts repression, the unconscious, 
dream, sexuality or death, as in expressionism (and also in sur-
realism), it is all these determinations which confront thought 
as higher ‘problem’, or which enter into relation with the unde-
terminable, the unreferrable” (Deleuze 1989: 161).
Deleuze was not interested in Artaud’s experience as an 
actor – he did not usually analyse the actor’s input in the film 
creation. Deleuze was more interested in Artaud’s disappoint-
ment in cinema as an art. He refers to Artaud’s reflections in 
the text La vieillesse précoce du cinéma (Old age of the cinema): 
“The imbecile world of images caught as if by glue in millions 
of retinas will never perfect the image that has been made of it. 
The poetry which can emerge from it all is only a possible poetry, 
the poetry of what might be, and it is not from cinema that we 
should expect…” (Deleuze 1989: 165). Artaud’s disappointment 
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is the basic argument Deleuze uses to discuss the problem of 
the unity of man and the world in modern cinema. To a certain 
extent, Deleuze shares the disappointment in modern cinema 
with Artaud when he writes, “Cinema is dying, then, from its 
quantitative mediocrity” (Deleuze 1989: 164). Artaud warned 
that cinema must avoid two pitfalls: abstract experimental cin-
ema, which was developing at the time, and commercial figura-
tive cinema, which Hollywood was imposing. Deleuze considers 
that in some sense Artaud’s predictions have come true: “What 
becomes of Hitchcock’s suspense, Eisenstein’s shock and 
Gance’s sublimity when they are taken up by mediocre authors?” 
On the other hand, Deleuze considers that cinema as a mass-art 
has degenerated “into state propaganda and manipulation, into 
a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, 
Hollywood and Hitler. The spiritual automaton became fascist 
man” (Deleuze 1989: 159). This type of a cinema is not the one 
Artaud was dreaming about. It is neither the type of cinema 
Deleuze is interested in. Deleuze concentrates on the other type 
of cinema, according to his words “when it stops being bad” 
(Deleuze 1989: 166) (quand il cesse d’être mauvais) (Deleuze 
1985: 223). This type of movie does not constitute the majority 
of film production, but is enough for Deleuze: he mentions more 
than one hundred film directors in the first volume Cinema 1:, 
The Movement-Image and adds an additional forty in the second 
volume Cinema 2: The Time-Image. He further cites about four 
hundred movies in both volumes of Cinema.
On the other hand, as already discussed, Deleuze relies on 
Artaud’s texts that are not related to cinema – he discerns from 
Artaud’s reflections on the inability of thought, the attempt to 
break the causally related patterns of the movement-image, the 
so-called ‘sensory-motor schemata’, along with a turn towards 
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pure visual situations in modern cinema. Among the main film di-
rectors who made this sensory-motor break towards the modern 
cinema of the seer in pure visual situations, Deleuze mentions 
the Danish film director Carl T. Dreyer (1889–1968) (Vampyr, 
Gertrud, Ordet), the Italian film director Roberto Rossellini 
(1906–1977) (Stromboli, Europe 51), and the French-Swiss film 
director Jean-Luc Godard (1930) (Pierrot le fou, Une femme est une 
femme, Bande à part, Le mépris, Weekend, Lettre à Freddy Buache, 
Les carabiniers, La Chinoise, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle).
Deleuze even noticed the spiritual crisis Dreyer experienced 
and posed the rhetorical question: “Was Dreyer an Artaud to 
whom reason would have been ‘restored’, once again by vir-
tue of the absurd?” (Deleuze 1989: 165). In Dreyer’s movies 
Deleuze points out the new relationship between cinema and 
thought, the grasping of the intolerable even in the every day 
and insignificant. In 1983, during a conversation with Pascal 
Bonitzer and Jean Narboni, Deleuze, when asked about the 
crisis of the movement-image, mentions these two Rossellini 
movies once more, indicating that in them the situations are too 
powerful or too painful or too beautiful, and because of that 
the old sensory-motor links are broken. The main characters in 
Stromboli and Europe 51 found themselves in situations which 
are too intense, so they do not know how to react. Instead 
of reacting by action, they have gained an ability to see and 
to hear. In this visionary cinema, new types of signs, such as 
chronosigns, lectosigns, and noosigns, are created. Artaud’s 
“cinema of cruelty”, as Deleuze renames it, does not tell a story 
but develops a sequence of spiritual states which are deduced 
from one another as thought is deduced from thought. This has, 
according to him, something in common with Paolo Pasolini’s 
movies (Theorem, Salo). In them, the image is carried to the 
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point where it becomes deductive and automatic and creates 
the thought of the image and the thought in the image (pensée 
de l’image, la pensée dans l’image) (Deleuze 1989: 227). Bene, 
an Italian actor, poet, film director and screenwriter, wrote 
the essay Superpositions in 1979 in collaboration with Deleuze. 
In the chapter “Cinema, Body and Brain, Thought” (Cinema 
2: The Time-Image) Deleuze concludes that “Carmelo Bene 
must be the director closest to Artaud” (Deleuze 1989: 184). 
Deleuze explains: Bene has the same experience as Artaud: he 
“believes” in cinema, he believes that cinema can bring about a 
more profound theatricalization than theatre itself, but he only 
believes this for a short time. The most important aspect which 
unites Artaud’s concept with Bene’s is their common belief in 
the capacity that cinema would have to give a body, to bring 
about its birth and disappearance in a ceremony, in a liturgy. 
In Bene’s movies (Capricci, 1969, Don Giovanni, 1971, Salomè, 
1972, One Hamlet Less, 1973) one can discern the metaphysics 
Artaud wrote about. According to Artaud:
to make metaphysics out of language, gestures, attitudes, sets, 
and music from a theatrical point of view is, it seems to me, to 
consider them in relation to all the ways they can have of making 
contact with time and with movement (Artaud 1958: 46).
Derrida argues that this “impouvoir” indicated by Artaud 
is not a lack of inspiration, the sterility of having nothing to 
say, but, on the contrary, is the inspiration itself insofar as it 
is antecedent and another voice coming from ‘nowhere’ (Der-
rida 1990). Adrian Morfee in his book Antonin Artaud’s Writing 
Bodies opposes Derrida by arguing that Artaud is quite simply 
not as meditative, reflective, and philosophical as Derrida’s bril-
liance makes him appear, nor do his texts carry the penetrating 
163
insights he lends them. Artaud’s way of thinking is not unidi-
rectional and incisive, but fragmented, messy, and repetitive. 
For this reason, Morfee suggests that the greater danger with 
this approach is that it assumes Artaud may be treated syntheti-
cally. But Artaud is not that sort of writer. His ideas evolve and 
mutate over time, and, to make matters more complicated, he 
proceeds by developing pairs of conflicting accounts. In his 
final poetry, two mythic narrative systems are created, one to 
trace the genealogy of his alienation, the other to trace out a 
future genealogy that would end it (Morfee 2005: 8–9). The 
same critique could be addressed to Deleuze as well – that is, 
one can say that he treats Artaud synthetically.
On the other hand, Morfee claims that Artaud does not 
build theories but theorises – his work is directed not towards 
creating objects, either aesthetic or theoretical, but towards the 
activities of thinking and writing. The annihilation of imagina-
tion in the Deleuzian aesthetics of cinema is based mainly on 
the activities of thinking. Thought does not become visible in 
cinema, but it turns towards what is impossible to think in the 
thought and towards what it is impossible to see in the image. 
Thought in cinema clashes with its own impossibility, but it is 
precisely from this clash that its power and rebirth becomes 
possible. Discussing the problem of the thought’s own impos-
sibility as the source of cinema art, Deleuze returns to other, 
different theoretical sources. He mentions Martin Heidegger 
who discovered the thought’s universal form and Maurice Blan-
chot, who expressed an idea similar to Artaud’s in literature. 
What Blanchot diagnoses everywhere in literature, Deleuze 
considers as particularly clear in cinema: “on the one hand the 
presence of an unthinkable in thought, which would be both its 
source and barrier; on the other hand the presence to infinity of 
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another thinker in the thinker, who shatters every monologue of 
a thinking self ” (Deleuze 1989: 162). On a similar note, Deleuze 
also cites Jean-Louis Schefer’s book L’homme ordinaire du cinéma 
(Scheffer 1980: 113–123), noticing Schefer’s attempt to reply to 
the question: in what respect and how is cinema concerned with 
a thought whose essential character is not yet to be? Deleuze 
concludes that Schefer is close to Artaud (Deleuze 1989: 163).
Mainly, cinema art reveals that thought, when it approaches 
the world, meets with something unbearable and something 
unthinkable. These contradictions stop its functioning. Be-
cause this world is intolerable it can no longer think a world or 
think itself. The intolerable (l’intolérable), supposes Deleuze, 
is not some injustice, but the permanent state of a daily banal-
ity. Man is not himself a world other than the one in which 
he experiences the intolerable and feels himself trapped. The 
aim of cinema, says Deleuze, as if trying to restore Artaud’s 
faith in cinema, is to create a new link between man and the 
world, and this link is possible only if a new belief were cre-
ated. For Artaud this belief in reality is closely linked with the 
belief in body. In this place Deleuze unexpectedly expresses 
his own personal attitude towards cinema. He considers the 
aim of cinema to function as an artificial link between man and 
world, an art form that paradoxically allows us to believe in our 
world (and us relating in meaningful way to it). According to 
Deleuze, it is possible to believe in this only as in the impossible, 
the unthinkable, which nonetheless cannot be but thought… 
(Deleuze 1989: 163).
Artaud’s film theory was not implemented. However, 
Deleuze revived Artaud’s lost film theory and re-created it in 
his experimental cinematic thinking, making it one of the most 
influential sources in his cinematic investigations.
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In the book What is Philosophy? (Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 
1991), Deleuze and Guattari described philosophy, science and 
art as equal creative activities that do not acquire any superior-
ity over each other, as each one confronts the same plane of 
chaos by its own appropriate means: philosophers create con-
cepts, scientists create functions, and artists create sensations. 
For that reason, philosophy, science and art are autonomous 
and in no way replaceable activities. But at the same time com-
munication is taking place between them: usually the points 
of intersection reveal themselves in the level of the results (the 
concept of the function, the function of the concept, the sensa-
tion of the concept, etc.) and sometimes, in the case of the rela-
tion between philosophy and art, even the convergence of the 
planes (the plane of composition and the plane of immanence) 
is possible. The same can be said about different forms of art: 
there are no strict limits between music (audible level) and 
painting (visual level) as much as we can see that the musicians 
are able to make the colour or image be audible and the painters 
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are able to make the sound be visible. But certainly what music 
and painting have in common is Rhythm – the “milieu’s answer 
to chaos” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 313). Although the nature 
of these arts is different, both can capture the invisible cosmic 
forces. Rhythm is primarily a musical and audible category, 
but Deleuze makes it a philosophical concept applicable to the 
other types of artistic creation. In the book Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation (Francis Bacon – Logique de la sensation, 1981), 
Deleuze points out that the consistency and suggestibility of 
sensation depend on the rhythm – an unliveable vital power 
that exceeds every domain of painting and traverses them all 
(Deleuze 2003b: 42). It concerns not only the single painting, 
but also the famous triptychs of Bacon – the relationship be-
tween the three canvases is constituted not through the figural 
or narrative traits, but through the rhythm, which precisely 
determines the consistency of the triptych. He indicates that 
“rhythm runs through a painting just as it runs through a piece 
of music. It is diastole-systole” (Deleuze 2003b: 42). But at the 
same time, rhythm is much more profound than vision or hear-
ing: “Rhythm appears as music when it invests the auditory 
level, and as painting when it invests the visual level” (Deleuze 
2003b: 42). Rhythm escapes any representation, but it gives 
consistency to the piece of art instead. However, in A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
give priority to the sonorous refrain, as its force of deterrito-
rialization is the strongest. According to them, sounds reign 
over colours as they have a “piloting role and induce colours 
that are superposed upon the colours we see, lending them a 
properly sonorous rhythm and movement” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 347–348). Sounds are more autonomous and deterritori-
alizing, while the colours bind more to territoriality. Thus the 
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colour is not as suggestible as the sound: “sound invades us, 
impels us, drags us, transpierces us” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
348). Deleuze and Guattari point out that this moment also 
involves the risk of reterritorialization: it can affect hypnosis 
or ecstasy. “Maybe that is why many people prefer painting, 
or why aesthetics took painting as its privileged model: there 
is no question that it “scares” people less” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 303). The connection of painting with territory as well 
with the represented object somehow promises stability and 
security when the deterritorializing or reterritorializing charac-
ter of music can open up the ways either to the universe or to a 
“black hole”. But there is no doubt that the present endeavour to 
express musical rhythm through the means of painting makes 
painting itself more abstract.
Synesthesia: Klee and Čiurlionis
Investing music into the plane of painting was inherent to 
many abstract painters. Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944), 
Piet Mondrian (1872–1944), Robert Delauney (1885–1941), 
Frantisek Kupka (1871–1957), Lyonel Feininger (1871–1956), 
August Mack (1887–1914), Franz Marc (1880–1916) and Paul 
Klee (1879–1940) treated music as higher, spiritual, cosmic 
compared with terrestrial, more representational painting. 
According to them, the liberation of colour and line from the 
represented object could make a musical rhythm be audible and 
would open up a pure spiritual world of sounds. The problem 
of musical rhythm in painting was also determined by the 
problem of time or duration (taken from the philosophies of 
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Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche that was tied to the 
process of painting. The temporal aspect is inherent to both 
music and painting. As a musical rhythm is temporal in general, 
the process of painting also appears as the play with paintbrush: 
“the process of creating an image, the expressive strokes of the 
brush, the genesis of the final effect” (Düchting 2012: 10). Even 
more, representational painting constituted a static eternal 
plane of composition, such as in Diego Velázquez’s canvas. 
Abstract painting, in the opposite, tried to open up the plane 
of movement of time. Such a kind of intensive movement is in 
place (duration). As Deleuze and Guattari insist in the book 
What is Philosophy? the artist built ‘houses’ – finite composi-
tions that open up the infinity. A piece of art has frames, but it 
still always remains open to the flow of cosmic forces that could 
change the present composition. “It is like the passage from the 
finite to the infinite, but also from territory to deterritorializa-
tion” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 181). Thus painting like music 
reveals the plane of becoming, the event, and not the stable 
given like in classical painting.
Swiss-German painter Paul Klee (1879–1940) was one of 
these rare geniuses able to move in-between different creative 
territories: painting and music. “There is hardly a twentieth-
century painter and draughtsman who dealt so intensively 
with music as did Paul Klee, making explicit reference to it in 
both his art and his writings” (Düchting 2012: 7). It is not so 
surprising, as Klee was born in a family of musicians and was 
foremost preparing himself to become a violinist. Even then, 
when he decided to devote himself to painting, he was missing 
music all the time, writing in his diary that painting to him 
was like a wife, who he had chosen and to whom he is faithful, 
but that music remained his secret lover, and he was constantly 
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dreaming about her. Nonetheless, Klee was still surrounded 
by music all his life, as his wife Lily Stumpf was a pianist and 
in his close circle of friends Klee sometimes played the violin. 
Klee did not like the composers of his time, such as Wilhelm 
Richard Wagner, Anton Bruckner and Gustav Mahler, treating 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Johann Sebastian Bach as the 
most powerful musicians. He most liked to play the pieces from 
these composers. Living in such a double space of arts, Klee 
gave many considerations concerning the relationship between 
music and painting. “More and more parallels between music 
and graphic art force themselves upon my consciousness. Yet 
no analysis is successful. Certainly both arts are temporal; this 
could be proved easily” (Klee, Klee 1968: 177). Klee himself 
proved it in his painting rich with musical references.
Klee, with his attitude towards the problem of the transi-
tion between arts of different nature, was very close to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of philosophy, science and art as three 
great mind forms, as well as of the plastic and transitory limits 
between different art forms: painting, music, literature, and 
cinema. Klee echoed all these trends, but invoking his own 
experience as a musician as well as a painter, he tried to find 
his unique way of painting music. In his earlier compositions 
the connection between linear and musical rhythms was ex-
pressed by including the symbolic language of music (notes or 
the contours of musical instruments) and through motifs taken 
from nature. According to Klee, nature itself, its landscapes and 
objects, has rhythmic character. We can see this in Klee’s paint-
ings Camel [in a Rhythmic Landscape of Trees] (1920), Cosmically 
Penetrated Landscape (1917), Sunken Landscape (1918), Dogmatic 
Composition (1918), Full Moon (1919), Small Rhythmic Landscape 
(1920), Motif from Hammamet (1914) and many other paintings 
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from the Tunisian period. But it was exactly the trip to Tunisia12 
that strongly influenced Klee’s painting, as he found there what 
he was still missing – colour. Klee’s paintings became more 
abstract: the motifs of Tunisian landscapes emerged through 
the bright and rhythmic use of colour patches (rectangles) 
made with watercolours. To Düchting’s mind, Klee’s turn to 
colourism and abstraction came through the strong impact 
made by the impression of Delaunay’s painting. “The liberation 
from subject-matter, the autonomy of colours and the possi-
bility of expressing time and movement in bright contrasting 
colours were all aspects of Delaunay’s art that appealed to 
Klee” (Düchting 2012: 22). Nonetheless, despite the fact that 
Klee progressively applied his use of independent colour in 
his abstract compositions, in many of his paintings there still 
remained even some allusion to reality that was treated by Klee 
himself “as the most important prerequisite for abstraction and 
for the creation of something new. … Klee sought a synthesis 
of an autonomous pictorial architecture and representation in 
painting” (Düchting 2012: 25). It became a distinctive feature 
of Klee’s painting. In his mature period, especially while teach-
ing at Bauhaus, Klee experimented variously with colours and 
their abstract compositions, trying to convey musical rhythm 
visually. He even prepared lectures for students where he tried 
to explain the essential moments of painting musical rhythm. 
12 Klee’s trip to Tunis took place in April 1914. He travelled with his 
friends and painters August Mack and Louis Moilliet. They visited 
the Tunisian towns of Hammamet and Kairouan. Klee was impressed 
by the local landscapes, bright colours and light. His watercolours he 
painted after and through the trip became abstract and very suggestive 
with colour compositions. His breakthrough with colour he expressed 
in his diary: “Colour and I are one. I am a painter.”
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Invoking Bach’s Sonata No. 6, Klee taught that there are two ba-
sic rhythms: ‘structural’ or ‘dividual’ and ‘individual’. Dividual 
rhythm is quantitative or measured, it produces the regular and 
repeatable structure of the piece. The elements of such musical 
composition are divisible in the smaller ones and their rep-
etition is without variation. Individual rhythm is qualitative: 
the components of such a rhythm are dynamic, independent, 
irregular and thus unrepeatable. Different melodic lines are 
obtained when we fuse these two rhythms (see Klee 1961: 107). 
This fusion or combination of different rhythms is expressed 
using intersecting horizontal and vertical lines, a grid system. 
In Klee’s abstract paintings, such as Pastorale [Rhythms] (1927), 
Monument in the Fertile Country (1929), Highway and By-ways 
Paul Klee. Ad Parnassum. 1932. oil on canvas.
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(1929), Fire in the Evening (1929), Flowering (1934), Ancient 
Harmony (1925), etc., the effect of musical rhythm is obtained 
through different variations of structural and individual linear 
rhythms, where we can notice that the melodic individual line 
comes from the vertical linear plane of composition. But the use 
of line does not explain the essence of such a rhythmicity of a 
painting. Namely, the colour provides the painting with a sug-
gestive power, intensity and the effect of the rise and fall of the 
rhythm. Compared with a line that is more or less quantifiable, 
colour has something mysterious and irrational, even cosmic. 
Klee called it the most individual and expressive component 
of a picture. 
When the line and the shadowing (from light to dark) al-
low one to convey the scale, the pitch and duration of note, 
the colour expresses the qualitative element of the sound: its 
timbre, its tone. In the pictures Fire in the Evening and Flow-
ering, we can see how the colour becomes an individual and 
expressive element in differentiated structural rhythms. Even 
in such regular scales as in Harmony in Blue-Orange (1923) or 
in New Harmony (1936), the individual melodic line is detected 
through the colour and its irregular repetition. Klee’s interest in 
the tonality of colours allowed him to express different nuances 
of sound as well as its temporality. For example, his watercolour 
The Fugue in Red (1921) presents floating abstracted recognis-
able forms overlapping in many layers in colour shades from 
intense red to all varieties of its faded tones. It creates a strong 
impression of floating sound that temporally spreads in many 
various layers and tones. This kind of painting technique he 
repeated in his other abstract paintings – Growth of Plants 
(1921) and Crystal Gradation (1921), and the more represen-
tational pictures – Nocturne for Horn (1921), Connected to the 
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Stars (1923), and Genii [Figures from a Ballet] (1922). Thus, the 
illustrated figures and objects made an allusion to a vibrating, 
evolving, always developing organism. As Bergson insisted, the 
inner difference is most important: how the same thing differs 
from itself in time. Klee’s paintings made the reality of the in-
ner difference visible, as well as the co-existence of different 
times or durations. It is best seen in his polyphonic paintings 
White Framed Polyphonically (1930), Light-broadening I (1928), 
Swinging, Polyphonic [And in Complementary Repetition] (1931), 
and Fool in Trance (1929), where overlapping transparent colour 
forms present a simultaneity of sounds as in polyphonic music. 
Polyphonic painting was refined to the pointillistic technique 
that gave depth and transparency to the picture: the overlap-
ping layers of colours were made through the very subtle use 
of dense dots, such as in Ad Parnassum (1932), Cliffs by the Sea 
(1931), Polyphony (1932), and Castle Garden (1931). It differs 
quite a lot from Klee’s later works where the problem of visualis-
ing musical rhythm was transformed by using contrasts of very 
bright colours and various graphic symbols that were usually 
painted in black, such as Park near Lu., (1938), Insula Dulcamara 
(1938), and Rich Harbour (1938), and made a very strong impact 
on rhythm.
Klee’s ability, through the language of painting to express 
the musical rhythm as much as to show the unity of colour and 
sound in his painter compositions, shows his affinity to the 
Messiaen’s synesthesia project. Noticing the deep relation in 
sensing the colours while hearing musical sounds, Messiaen 
also paid a lot of attention to bird songs and integrated that 
into his musical compositions. To Messiaen’s mind, it is not 
only the human being, but all of nature and the universe is full 
of musical refrains, and this made a strong impact on Deleuze 
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and Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal, becoming-cosmic. 
“The same thing that leads a musician to discover the birds also 
leads him to discover the elementary and the cosmic. Both 
combine to form a block, a universe fibre, a diagonal or complex 
space. Music dispatches molecular flows” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 309). This idea also was realized in the works of Lithu-
anian artist Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis13 (1875–1911), 
a contemporary of Klee, to whom Messiaen himself responded 
as to “a remarkable composer of music and paintings,” noting 
an unusual and deep linkage between his works of music and 
art (Landsbergis 1986: 218)14. 
13 Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis (1875–1911) was the composer and 
the modern painter from Lithuania. During the 36 years of his life 
he created about 200 pieces of music (the most popular being In the 
Forest, 1900–1901 and The Sea, 1907) and 300 paintings. Čiurlionis 
first became known for his paintings while his musical works were 
never played when he was alive. The painter developed a very original 
style that discerned him from many his contemporaries. Čiurlionis’ 
paintings were displayed in art exhibitions in Japan, Germany, Spain, 
France, Ukraine, and Poland. The 2005 art exhibition ‘Visual Music’ 
which was organized by the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA) in 
Los Angeles and Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, Smithsonian 
Institution, in Washington, D.C., presented Čiurlionis’ works as equal 
with his other contemporaries: Kandinsky, Kupka, Klee, James 
McNeill Whistler and others. The importance of Čiurlionis’ creation 
can be testified by the attention he attained from Igor Stravinsky, 
Olivier Messiaen and Umberto Eco, who put a reproduction of Sonata 
of the Stars. Allegro (1908) in his book Endless List (La Vertigine della 
Lista, 2009) together with Giorgio de Cirico, Hans Memling, and 
Raoul Dufy. In the last years of his life, Čiurlionis was suffering from 
a very deep depression. He died in 1911 in a psychiatric hospital from 
pneumonia.
14 Trans. Šarūnas Nakas
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Despite the fact that Klee and Čiurlionis differ in style and 
art trends, as the latter represents romanticism, symbolism 
and Art Nouveau that was subsequently replaced with mod-
ernism, they have many similarities. They were both inspired 
by nature, the cosmos and music. Čiurlionis graduated from 
Warsaw Conservatory and Leipzig Conservatory, preparing 
Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis. Allegro. From cycle Sonata VI 
(Sonata of the Stars). 1908. Tempera on paper.
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himself to be a composer although painting also appeared 
tentatively. His earlier paintings were made under a strong 
influence of romanticism: psychologically illustrative, rich 
with various cosmic symbols, celestial bodies, nature motifs 
and references to Lithuanian pagan mythology and legends. 
But in his mature period, after a 1906 trip to the art centres of 
Central Europe, Čiurlionis became more open to experimenta-
tion and in the search of new matters of artistic expression. 
His paintings became more abstract and plastically expres-
sive. This turned into some kind of abstraction first and can be 
seen in his paintings from the cycles The Sparks (1906), Winter 
(1907) and in the triptych My Way (1907). The same is with 
his musical paintings that were usually untitled like the pieces 
of music: prelude, sonata, fugue. No doubt Čiurlionis echoed 
the recent problematics of the synesthesia of art propagated 
by Wagner and his idea of Gesamthkunwerk. But at the same 
time his painterly sonatas appear as a totally original solution 
of the art synthesis problem. Seven of Čiurlionis’ sonatas are 
numbered in the same manner as musicians Wolfgang Ama-
deus Mozart and Ludwig van Beethoven did and entitled in 
consideration to the subject-matter they express: Sonata Nr. 1 
(Sonata of the Sun, 1907), Sonata Nr. 2 (Sonata of the Spring, 
1907), Sonata Nr. 3 (Sonata of the Serpent, 1908), Sonata Nr. 4 
(Sonata of the Summer, 1908), Sonata Nr. 5 (Sonata of the Sea, 
1908), Sonata Nr. 6 (Sonata of the Stars, 1908) and Sonata Nr. 7 
(Sonata of the Pyramids, 1909). Čiurlionis usually painted in 
cycles that referred to reality and symbolic images but these 
sonata cycles were based on different rhythmic dynamics: Al-
legro, Andante, Scherzo, Finale. As a composer, Čiurlionis was 
able to imagine visible forms not only as static in space but 
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also as evolving in time. The musical effect in his paintings is 
strengthened through the continuous change of graphic forms 
in space and its rhythmic repetition in the horizontal plane. 
Čiurlionis applied to painting structural rhythms inherent to 
the piece of music expressed through the rhythms of lines and 
planes, plastic waved forms, and overlapping layers of several 
landscapes. The note was expressed through the intensity of 
colours and lines, and the tempo was identical to a plastic-linear 
rhythm. Čiurlionis created symphonic music and respectively 
the parts of different cycle repeated throughout the structure 
of the symphony. For example, his work Sonata of the Stars. 
Allegro presents an almost abstracted composition of the stars 
and other celestial bodies that is based on the quite intensive 
rhythm of the harmonious repetition of horizontal and vertical 
lines and overlapping layers. This painting is reminiscent of 
Klee’s temporal and polyphonic paintings. Rhythmic repeti-
tion of such motifs as the stars, moon, pyramids, trees, and 
mills in other sonatas seems very similar to Klee’s rhythmic 
repetitions of plants, trees, fishes, birds and celestial bodies.
Čiurlionis perfectly developed the linear rhythm that 
provided his paintings with dynamics and tension but he was 
missing colour that Klee was lucky to discover. The colours in 
Čiurlionis are more organic, subtle and muted compared with 
the bright colourism inherent to modern painters. Klee was 
using very different colouration, from very intense and bright 
to brownish or sepia tones, but he was able to create musical 
composition only through the use of colour independent from 
any subject-matter, like in Klee’s Monument in Fertile Country. 
Even though Čiurlionis developed the principle of abstract 
composition and was treated by some art critics as the first 
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abstract painter15 (prior to Kandinsky), his painting never re-
ally became abstract. The subject matter, the idea of cycle and 
concrete details taken from reality remained very important 
to Čiurlionis’ paintings. He died in 1911, at the time when 
Klee was still in the search for his unique style and en route to 
abstractionism and colourism.
The transitory nature of different arts can be proved even in 
a reversible way. The paintings of Klee invoked numerous musi-
cal interpretations from classical orchestral to abstract or jazz 
improvisations. Klee differed in his taste for modern painting 
and classical music, so it is not surprising that his works, which 
contain dissonant features, appeal to modern improvisational 
music. The relationship between Čiurlionis’ symphonic music 
and his musical paintings appears more integral. However, 
Čiurlionis could appear as a much more modern composer – 
one of his pieces for fortepiano with a very precise nightingale 
song accompanied with a mysterious and continuously repeat-
able slip of bass can make him very close to Messiaen’s project.
15 Kandinsky is treated as the pioneer of abstract painting. But this 
priority is sometimes debated. Kupka and Čiurlionis are treated as 
prior to Kandinsky (Düchting 2000: 101). Düchting mentions that 
Kandinsky was influenced by “the discovery of Mikolai Ciurlionis, … 
who had already tried to transpose music in his semi-abstract painting 
at the turn of the century” (Düchting 2000: 57). The same opinion is 
given by William Everdell treating Čiurlionis as one of the first modern 
painters (Everdell 1997: 314). Lithuanian art critic Rasa Andriušytė-
Žukienė maintains that “Čiurlionis’ creative method lies in a judicious 
transformation, fusion and synthesis and motifs taken from nature as 
well as in the introduction of the principle of the musical composition 
into the picture cycle. In contrast, Kandinsky’s and Kupka’s course 
lie not only through the analysis and, as it were, ‘breakdown’ of the 
motif, but also through the deconstruction of form and creation of a 
fundamentally new artistic reality” (Andriušytė-Žukienė 2004: 13).
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Deterritorialization as Cosmic Escape
Deleuze, or Deleuze and Guattari, mentions Klee in the books 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation), The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque, What is Philosophy?, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (L’Anti-Oedipe. Capitalisme et Schizophrénie: 1, 
1972), and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, but the most compre-
hensive analysis is made in the chapter 1837: Of the Refrain in 
the book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Here, employing concepts of territory and deterritorialization, 
Deleuze and Guattari describe the “history” of perception – be-
coming, excluding three art epochs or ages: classicism, roman-
ticism and modernism. Epochs are divided according to the 
problems faced by artists, which, in turn, determine the nature 
and goals of the created art as well as the means of creation. 
Though the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari’s territory and 
deterritorialization allow them to talk about the becoming and 
the principle of transversality, which specifies different aspects 
of creation observed in the creation of all times rather than of 
linear evolving or progressing becoming, the changes defined 
by them allow them to state that modern art is the supreme 
phase of creation and opened an absolutely different plane of 
new quality.
The epoch of classical art determines the primary phase of 
creation. A classical artist encounters raw and untamed matter 
and chaotic forces that destroy any definiteness. Therefore, the 
main assignment for him is the coding of milieus, the creation 
and determination of forms. According to Deleuze and Guat-
tari, a classical artist is a creator, and the task of the classical 
artist is God’s own, that of organising chaos and subordinating 
raw matter to a form. It is an Aristotelian situation: the case 
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of matter and form. It should be remembered that a classical 
artist only starts; therefore, there is no point in discussing any 
novelty in his works. To start and to create acquire a synonymic 
meaning in this context. A sculptor discovers marble and clas-
sical proportions of the body, and a painter finds out about 
the canvas, colours and primal objects he wants to represent. 
Everything is different in the epoch of romanticism, which is 
marked by territorializing refrains, the search for various styles 
and inventions. Deleuze and Guattari state that romanticism 
is “the continuous variation of matter and the continuous de-
velopment of form” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 340). Firstly, an 
artist from the epoch of romanticism territorializes creating 
and mastering individual styles, which may be identified and 
repeated. However, in the epoch of romanticisms, it is already 
possible to talk about the real creation to the extent to which 
an artist creates new, unexpected and manifold assemblages 
of territorial formations, or performs a movement of deterri-
torialization departing familiar territory. For example, certain 
formations are chosen from a territorialized style created by 
other authors, they are transformed and adapted in another 
style and thus become creative material for the new one. Such 
deterritorialization is a creative becoming, where the encounter 
of two in the transitional plane gives birth to a third something, 
which is absolutely new and unexpected. Deleuze and Guattari 
call this kind of deterritorialization a movement from territory 
towards the Earth, which “has become that close embrace of all 
forces, those of earth as well as of other substances…” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 339). Artists break links with a certain territory 
and with a sedentary manner, flowing into the spaces of the 
Earth. The pathos of romanticism is determined by the figures 
of Faust or the Flying Dutchman: an immense wish to know 
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the world, to conquer the earth and to penetrate into its depths, 
to try out all the possible styles, themes and forms. The main 
problem encountered by an artist of romanticism is the problem 
of foundation and its establishment. This situation is equal to 
Kantian synthesis. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari insist 
that “romantic philosophy still appealed to a formal synthetic 
identity ensuring a continuous intelligibility of matter (a priori 
synthesis)” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 342). An artist of romanti-
cism wants to determine his own status of a creator and the 
originality of his own individual style. However, forces that 
Paul Klee. Redgreen and Violet-Yellow Rhythms. 1920. 
oil and ink on cardboard.
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have to be conquered are gravitation forces that do not allow 
anything to escape out of the circle of repeated refrains and to 
avoid the danger of representation.
Everything becomes radically different when we enter the 
age of Cosmos. This is not one of the deterritorializations among 
others. It is absolute deterritorialization, when one surmounts 
gravitation forces and goes adrift and opens up to infinite, ex-
traterrestrial and non-human Cosmos. This deterritorialization 
is a cosmic escape, an entering of an absolutely new plane. An 
artist encounters particularly molecularized matter, which is 
decomposed into small particles and the flow of cosmic forces 
that must be harnessed, and the matter that must be consolidat-
ed. The artist fails in closed territories, he fails what may be en-
countered here, on Earth. The modern age reveals the “Cosmos 
philosophy, after the manner of Nietzsche” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 342). “Let us recall Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return 
as a little ditty, a refrain, but which captures the mute and un-
thinkable forces of the Cosmos” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 343). 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the works created by Klee 
and his theoretical writings vividly reveal the essence of cosmic 
escape. They employ Kee’s quote: “One tries convulsively to 
fly from the earth”, and that one “rises above it … powered by 
centrifugal forces that triumph over gravity” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1987: 337). Deleuze and Guattari insist that, according to 
Klee, “the artist begins by looking around him or herself, into 
all the milieus, but does so in order to grasp the trace of crea-
tion in the created, of naturing nature in natured nature; then, 
adopting “an earthbound position”, the artist turns his or her 
attention to the microscopic, to crystals, molecules, atoms, and 
particles, not for scientific conformity, but for movement, for 
nothing but immanent movement; the artist tells him or herself 
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that this world has had different aspects, will have still others, 
and that there are already others on other planets; finally, the 
artist opens up to the Cosmos in order to harness forces in a 
“work” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 337). Thus, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy, the Cosmos appears not as a principle 
of world order or an antonym to chaos, not as an astronomic 
term, which defines the space beyond the atmosphere of the 
Earth, but as an infinite plane of immanence, a virtual space of 
pure possibilities, change, flows of energy, an immense “body 
without organs” of the universe. The concept of Cosmos ap-
pears very close to the concept of chaos, which was discussed 
in the book What is Philosophy? by Deleuze and Guattari and 
which is determined as an infinite speed and intensity. Chaos 
is not approachable through empiric experience in any way; it 
is not representable but may only be captured by employing 
specific means and thus becoming chaosmos. Klee himself in 
his well-known Notebooks. Volume I: The Thinking Eye (1956) 
indicated the difference between the chaotich and kosmich (and 
two intermediate phases of the cosmic) (see Klee 1961: 2), at the 
same time emphasising a deep relationship between these two 
opposite concepts. “Chaos as an antithesis is not complete and 
utter chaos, but a locally determined concept of cosmos. … If 
we express it in terms of the perceptible (as though drawing up 
a balance sheet of chaos) we arrive at the concept grey, at the 
fateful point between coming-into-being and passing away: the 
grey point. The point is grey because it is neither white nor black 
or because it is white and black at the same time…” (Klee 1961: 
3). The grey point refers to the state of the virtual or, as Klee 
says, to a cosmogenesis. Cosmogenesis explains all the stages 
of artwork coming-into-being. According to Klee, it is incor-
rect to think that the work consists of the form – even before 
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the first line is drawn, there occurs an interruptible process of 
thinking, which gives stimulus to the artist’s hand. The point, 
which joins the movement and becomes the line, according to 
Klee, is a primordial cosmic element. The transition is made 
from the point which transforms into the line and then from 
line to form. To Klee’s mind, things on earth are obstructed in 
their movement, so they require an impetus that comes from 
the plane of Cosmos. Therefore, it can be stated that both Klee 
and Deleuze and Guattari refer to the same issue – cosmos for 
them is a virtual plane of pure possibilities, which summons 
and actualizes forms.
Deleuze and Guattari state that the cosmos is deterritorial-
izing rather than deterritorialized, because: “The earth is now 
at its most deterritorialized: not only a point in a galaxy, but 
one galaxy among others” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 345). This 
is an opening of infinite cosmic space. Deleuze and Guattari 
maintain that the specifics of art lie not only in the movement 
from the grey point to the form, but also in its ability to create 
the finite that restores the infinite through the plane of compo-
sition. This moment can be seen in Klee’s picture Equals Infinity 
(1932), which, to Hubert Damisch’s mind, is not an allegory 
“but the act of painting that appears as a painting. It seems to 
us that the brown blobs dancing in the margin and crossing the 
canvas are the infinite passage of chaos; the sowing of points on 
the canvas, divided by rods, is the finite composite sensation, 
but opening onto the plane of composition that restores the 
infinite to us, = ∞” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 197). The plane 
of cosmos also indicates infinite becoming as it appears on 
the canvas as the “tension between flesh and the area of plain 
uniform colour surging forth” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 181). 
It is like a passage from the finite territory towards the cosmos. 
187
The modern work of art needs a “vast plane of composition that 
carries out a kind of deframing following lines of flight that pass 
through the territory only in order to open it onto the universe, 
that go from house-territory to town-cosmos” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1994: 187). Deleuze and Guattari indicate that this tension 
or passage appears in the planes of composition of such painters 
as Vincent van Gogh, Paul Gauguin, Francis Bacon, Paul Klee 
Paul Klee. Twittering Machine. 1922.  
Watercolour, pen, ink oil transfer on paper.
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and others. In Klee it is best seen in such works as Nude on a 
Swing (1906), Red Bridge (1928), Landscape with Yellow Birds 
(1923), Twittering Machine (1922) and many others, where 
it does not matter whether the figure is made of rectangular 
shapes or swirled lines – it is always open to the infinite plane 
of cosmos.
To use the concept of cosmos in the context of artistic crea-
tion, it is a strong characteristic not only for Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s project, but also for the phenomenological view towards 
art. Algis Mickūnas16 with his co-author Rekha Menon in their 
book Cosmic Passion for the Aesthetics (Contemporary Cultural 
Studies) (2014) explore cosmos as the infinite invisible plane, 
but which provides all the things of the world with visibility, 
beauty and passion. Perceiving and capturing an infinite and 
all-embracing plane of cosmos is possible only under the condi-
tions of rejection of all metaphysical categories of movement, 
time and being. And primarily in the sphere of art the cosmos 
is discovered and expressed. Authors insist that the term “cos-
mic” should not be “mislead by various mysticisms of cosmic 
“panpsychisms” and astronomical expositions. … “Cosmos” in 
art is coextensive, primarily in the West, with space, time and 
movement, constituting the way figures, images, music, dances, 
are framed” (Mickūnas, Menon 2014: 1). The most important 
features of the plane of cosmos are its infinity and rhythmicity. 
Mickūnas and Menon describe cosmos as the rhythm and this 
16 Algis Mickūnas (b. 1933) is an American philosopher of Lithuanian 
origin, professor of Ohio university, a phenomenologist, and author 
of numerous books and articles in English and Lithuanian, such as 
Permanence and Flux (2007), Summa Erotica (2010), Aesthetics: Art 
and Experience of the World (2011), From Phenomenology Towards Zen 
Buddhism (2012), and others.
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makes this analysis appear as very close to that of Deleuze and 
Guattari. The cosmos appears as the infinite and rhythmic play 
of cosmic forces. But the model of such a cosmic rhythm in 
Mickūnas and Menon’s investigation becomes not the music, 
not the plastic arts, but precisely the dance, and this dance is 
usually related to the dance of Zarathustra and the Dionysian 
wisdom in Nietzsche’s concept of the Eternal Return. “Dance 
is a metaphor for all arts that are depicted rhythmicly and in 
such a way that rhythmic movement composes music, painting, 
architecture and sculpture” (Mickūnas, Menon 2014: 12). But, 
despite these similarities between one and the other cosmic 
concept, the approach of Mickūnas and Menon is phenomeno-
logical, in which the cosmic coincides with the worldly, and 
the expressive, and is experienced from the perspective of the 
lived body, while in Deleuze and Guattari’s approach the cos-
mic means the universe, but such a universe which is infinitely 
molecularized matter and plane of invisible cosmic forces and 
can be captured only from the perspective of a decentralised 
subject. Such a perspective is reached by the modern artist.
The Sobriety of Assemblage and Becoming-Child
Looking at the works of not only Klee but also of many other 
coryphaei of the modern epoch (van Gogh, Cézanne, Bacon, 
Miro and others), Deleuze and Guattari conclude that novelty 
in creation is possible only under the conditions of cosmic 
escape. Painters find a way to paint invisible cosmic forces pro-
viding consistency to particularly fragmented / molecularized 
matter. The essence of such creation may be revealed through 
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the ability to compose sensations. According to Deleuze, a 
sensation cannot be identified with force but it mainly allows 
for making the invisible side of the universe perceptible and 
visible. A sensation is what vibrates on the threshold of per-
ception before the rational perception and reflection of what is 
visible becomes possible. Shortly speaking, a sensation func-
tions in a very immediate way and all the suggestibility of the 
work of art depends on it. A sensation directly addresses the 
subconsciousness, instinct, and nerve system of an individual. 
However, before the moment the sensation is constructed, the 
artist immediately involves himself in the cosmic plane, merges 
with the cosmos and becomes together with it. He perceives the 
cosmic forces and is able to convey them through sensations. In 
his book about Bacon’s painting The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze 
wrote: “In art, and in painting as in music, it is not a matter of re-
producing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces. For this 
reason, no art is figurative. Paul Klee’s famous formula – “Not 
to render the visible, but to render visible” – means nothing 
else. The task of painting is defined as the attempt to render 
visible forces that are not themselves visible” (Deleuze 2003b: 
56). What are these invisible and directly inexperienced cosmic 
forces? Deleuze and Guattari point to the painter Jean-Francois 
Millet, who used to say that “what counts in painting is not, 
for example, what a peasant is carrying, whether it is a sacred 
object or a sack of potatoes, but it is exact weight. This is a 
postromantic turning point: the essential thing is no longer 
forms and matters, or themes, but forces, densities, intensities” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 343). Deleuze and Guattari make ref-
erences to the forces of pull, vortex, pushing, spasm, intensity, 
temperature, duration, explosion, time and other forces. Or 
how non-appreciable elements of art may be involved in other 
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artistic givens: how is it possible to paint a sound, e. g., scream, 
or on the contrary, how can you make a colour audible?
Cosmic escape, except for the perspectives it offers, entails 
a certain danger, too. Deleuze and Guattari argue that a mod-
ern artist never starts with an empty sheet of paper. In fact, 
the modern “painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and 
neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or 
canvas is already so covered with preexisting, preestablished 
clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even 
to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings 
us the vision” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 204). In other contexts 
Deleuze and Guattari called this moment of painting a diagram, 
catastrophe, the primal and necessary phase of painting which 
is freeing him or herself from the clichés and simultaneously 
the germ of the new order or rhythm. However, confronting 
the chaos causes what Klee called the vanishing “grey point”, 
Cézanne’ “the abyss”, or “catastrophe”. Deleuze and Guattari 
insist that it is a very risky pictorial experience, which makes 
the greatest danger both for the painter’s work and for his or 
her psychic life. This pictorial experience manifests as an in-
capability of seeing something, as foundering, the collapse of 
visual coordinates. But at the same time this moment is the real 
chance to discover pictorial order or what Deleuze and Guattari 
called a rhythm, consistency or the plane of composition. In the 
cosmic age the problem of consistency or consolidation is the 
main task of the creator. Making something consistent indi-
cates that the invisible cosmic force becomes visible. According 
to Deleuze and Guattari, consistency indicates the “holding 
together” of heterogeneous elements in a rhizomatic and not 
in a structural, hierarchical way. In the works of the majority of 
modern artists, including Klee, it can be seen that even though 
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at first sight the chaotically composed, joined, combined and 
extended elements, squares, lines, dots or spots, and various 
deterritorialized symbols (numbers, hieroglyphs, letters) do 
not create a homogeneous aggregate or a certain rhythmic 
character, the composition may be noticed and it allows for 
preserving the being of sensation.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, Klee had a perfect 
understanding of the principle of the sobriety of assemblages. 
Making attempts to capture invisible cosmic forces, one should 
observe the principle of sobriety or taste and not overdo it with 
lines or a variety of material. A real artist employs simplified, 
limited and carefully selected material in a capable way. Oth-
erwise, the cosmic escape does not occur, cosmic trends are 
blocked and the return to the same “statistical heap” occurs, 
from where attempts are made to escape. Deleuze and Guattari 
see “valorisation of children’s drawings, texts by the mad, and 
concerts of noise” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 343) as examples 
of unsuccessful deterritorialization in the sphere of art. Not 
everything that looks rather distant from the canons of classi-
cally refined forms may be considered modern art. A real crea-
tor has a sense of taste; therefore, what may be understood as 
rude, chaotic, weird or even irritating in the creation is still very 
well-made. Klee insisted that what is needed in order to capture 
invisible cosmic forces is “a pure and simple line accompanied 
by the idea of an object, and nothing more: if you multiply the 
lines and take the whole object, you get nothing but a scram-
ble…” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 344). It also becomes necessary 
to establish a relationship between things of first importance 
and those which are subsidiary. Otherwise, the primitivism, 
inherent to children’s drawings, remains. In this context, the 
childishness typical of Klee’s paintings should be discussed. 
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Childlessness, simplicity and naivety make up some of the most 
characteristic features of Klee’s painting style. Some art critics 
notice that this painting style could have been predetermined 
by a very close relationship of Klee with his son. It is known 
that Klee was involved in raising a son from the very infancy, 
as he observed and described his first childish drawing cases 
in a diary. However, here it is more appropriate to talk about 
the becoming-child of Klee as a case of highly successful deter-
ritorialization rather than as that of reterritorialization. After a 
particularly challenging and long search and without identifica-
tion with his contemporaries, Klee discovered a unique style 
which combines at first sight nonbinding childish fingerprint 
and technical base, which was particularly “well-purified” 
during numerous experiments17. Philosopher Alphonso Lin-
gis in his text Metaphysical Habitats, invoking the concept of 
psychiatrist and art historian Dr. Hans Prinzhorn who inves-
tigated the cases of outsider art or art brut (the term created 
by French artist Jean Dubuffet), encountered it not only in the 
canvas of some modern painters, but firstly in the drawings of 
children, the mentally ill or primitives people, coming to the 
17 Painter Marcel Duchamp commented on Paul Klee: “The first reaction 
in front of a Klee painting is the very pleasant discovery that every 
one of us could or could have done it, to try drawing like this in our 
childhood. Most of his compositions show at the first glance a plain, 
naive expression, found in children’s drawings. … At a second analysis 
one can discover a technique which takes as a basis a large maturity in 
thinking. A deep understanding of dealing with watercolours to paint a 
personal method in oil, structured in decorative shapes, lets Klee stand 
out in the contemporary art and make him incomparable” (https://
en.wik ipedia.org/wik i/Paul_K lee#cite_note-Herbert376-88). 
Reference from Robert L. Herbert, Eleanor S. Apter, Elise K. Kenny. 
The Société Anonyme and the Dreier Bequest at Yale University. 
A Catalogue Raisonné. New Haven / London 1984, p. 376).
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conclusion that such a creation comes from the very authentic 
view towards a world that allows one distance from the canons 
of classical painting and social requirements and to free all 
the “resources and energies that high culture weakened and 
repressed” (Lingis 2011: 23). But, seeking to find the conditions 
of such a creation, Prinzhorn found that many modern painters 
intended to put themselves in the special conditions (mental or 
environmental) of a madman or child without becoming insane 
or infantile in their life. “Klee’s work was especially close to the 
art of children, but he recognised that he worked with dexterity, 
skills, and experience with media that children do not have. It 
was through a savant procedure of identifying and eliminat-
ing features canonised by the cultured taste that he worked” 
(Lingis 2011: 25). Klee was also blamed by Nazi propaganda 
as a degenerate artist. 102 works by Klee were included and 
exhibited together with works of other modern painters in the 
propagandistic exhibition Degenerate Art (Entartete Kunst) that 
was organised by the National Socialists in Germany in July 
193718 (Friedewald 2011: 172). Klee’s works, such as The Angler 
(1921) or The Saint of the Inner Light (1921), were exhibited right 
next to a work by a schizophrenic and the latter was treated as 
more humane than that by Klee. Several psychiatrists described 
Klee and his art as sick with a “schizophrenic disposition” 
(Friedewald 2011: 99). All these characteristics, despite how 
wrong some of them were, describes Klee as a very original art-
ist who was able to trespass the limits of the common world and 
open up the traits to the cosmos, combining a very authentic 
18 In 1942 some works by Klee as well as by Pablo Picasso, Marc Chagall, 
Salvador Dalí, Joan Miró and others were burned by the Nazis in Paris 
as part of a propaganda rally.
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vision and the higher means of expression, and for this his art 
cannot be simply equated with the drawings of children or the 
insane.
Klee’s innovativeness manifests itself not only through his 
ability to interpret modern art trends in a new manner but also 
through the discovery of painting methods and techniques. 
Klee combined many different media (oil paint, watercolour, 
pastel, ink, etching and other) in one and the same artwork, 
used various surfaces (canvas, burlap, muslin, linen, gauze, 
Paul Klee. Monument in Fertile Country. 1929. 
Watercolour.
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cardboard, metal foils, fabric, wallpaper, and newsprint), em-
ployed spray paint, knife application, stamping, glazing, and 
impasto, and used a great variety of colour palettes from nearly 
monochromatic to highly polychromatic, and this reveals Klee 
as the cosmic artisan. In the cosmic age, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, the issue of technique acquires utmost impor-
tance because a traditional pair of raw materials and the refined 
form was replaced by another combination of composite mate-
rial and invisible forces. If a musician wants to make inaudible 
sounds of the universe audible, he uses a technical discovery, 
i. e., synthesiser, a film director uses cinematography, a painter 
may employ the newest inventions and materials.
Klee was called a philosophising artist. In his diary Diaries 
of Paul Klee, 1898–1918 (1968) and Notebooks19, he often em-
phasised the significance of the artist’s unique worldview that 
should be expressed. In the beginning of his course he main-
tained that “we should not forget that before the formal begin-
ning, or to put it more simply, before the first line is drawn, 
there lies a whole prehistory: not only man’s longing, his desire 
to express himself, his outward need, but also a general state of 
mind (whose direction we call philosophy), which drives him 
from inside to manifest his spirit in one place or another” (Klee 
1961: 99–100). In this aspect, Deleuze and Guattari also did 
not make a separation between philosophy and art. According 
to them, philosophers create no less than artists and artists 
think no less than philosophers. The main difference is that 
philosophers think through concepts when artists, in this case 
painters, think through images and colours.
19 Klee’s two-volume work that collects his lectures at the Bauhaus 
school and his other main essays on modern art.
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In the book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, Deleuze and Guattari treated Klee as a cosmic arti-
san whereas in the book The Fold: Leibniz and Baroque, Klee 
emerges as a true Baroque painter. Baroque is not only a cul-
tural epoch; rather, it is a way of thinking that relates thinkers 
and creators from many different epochs: Giordano Bruno, 
El Greco, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Jorge Luis 
Borges, James Joyce, Witold Gombrowicz, Stephane Mallarme, 
Henri Michaux, Paul Klee, Simon Hantaï, Claude Debussy, 
Pierre Boulez and others. Baroque is inseparable from the 
figure of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), who in his 
philosophy developed the principle of multiplicity. Leibniz’s 
philosophy reveals how the multiplicity can exist under the 
conditions of the most perfected unity or harmony. Baroque 
is mannered, excessive, gorgeous, proliferating. Architecture, 
painting, mathematics, clothing, decoration of inner spaces 
(rooms), music and dance expressed the streaming of the fold 
to the infinity. “The Baroque fold unfurls all the way to infin-
ity” (Deleuze 1993b: 3). Thus, Baroque appears as a continuous 
process of folding, unfolding, refolding (Deleuze 1993b: 137). 
Texture yields over structure: the world appears as textured and 
not structured anymore; or rather, it becomes clear that the 
form or structure emerges through the basis of infinite textures. 
What affinity exists between the age of Cosmos and the epoch 
of Baroque?
Of course, it is not a case of epoch but of a certain percep-
tion. As Deleuze and Guattari insist, at the age of Cosmos the 
matter becomes at its utmost deterritorialized and it is equal 
to saying that the texture of the world becomes apparent: the 
unfurling of the fold to infinity. “Baroque is abstract art par 
excellence: on the lower floor, flush with the ground, within 
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reach, the art comprehends the textures of matter (the great 
modern Baroque painters, from Paul Klee to Fautrier, Dubuf-
fet, Bettencourt…). But abstraction is not a negation of form: 
it posits form as folded, existing only as a “mental landscape” 
in the soul or in the mind, in upper altitudes; hence it also 
includes immaterial folds. Material matter makes up the bot-
tom, but folded forms are styles or manners. We go from matter 
to manner; from earth and ground to habitats and salons, from 
the Texturologie to the Logologie. … Matter that reveals its tex-
ture becomes raw material, just as form that reveals its folds 
becomes force. In the Baroque the coupling of material-force 
is what replaces matter and form (the primal forces being those 
of the soul)” (Deleuze 1993b: 35). We see that the problem 
is the same as in the age of Cosmos – the task for an artist is 
to capture invisible forces and to give the consistency to the 
infinitely molecularized matter. Even more, deterritorializa-
tion as a Cosmic escape and the Fold have the same issue – the 
problem of the indiscernibility or territory in-between. There 
are no strict limits between material folds and immaterial folds 
as there are no clear limits between different milieus or territo-
ries. It is impossible to discern exteriority and interiority, the 
beginning and end (actually it does not exist), because each 
fold or milieu is in perpetual flow and transition, becoming 
and periodic repetition. “The notion of the milieu is not uni-
tary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one 
milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they 
are essentially communicating. The milieus are open to chaos 
which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 313).
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Klee and Kandinsky:  
Mannerism against Essentialism
In analysing baroque architecture, Deleuze points to the sig-
nificance of inflexion that is “the ideal genetic element of the 
variable curve or fold. Inflexion is the authentic atom, elastic 
point” (Deleuze 1993b: 14). To Deleuze’s mind, Klee’s instruc-
tion about the non-dimensional point and active spontaneous 
line, given in his Notebooks. Volume 1. The Thinking Eye, shows 
his affinity to Leibniz and Baroque, to mannerism, and opposes 
him to essentialism, inherent to the paintings of Kandinsky, a 
Cartesianist. In one of his first lectures, Klee puts in question 
the work of art trying to show that it does not consist only of a 
form. Rather, it is worth talking about its genesis or the stages 
of its coming-into-being. The primary stage is from point to 
line. According to Klee, “The point is not dimensionless but an 
infinitely small planar element, an agent carrying out zero mo-
tion, i. e., resting. … The point is cosmic, a primordial element. 
Things on earth are obstructed in their movement; they require 
an impetus. The primordial movement, the agent, is a point that 
sets itself in motion (genesis of form). A line comes into being” 
(Klee 1961: 105). Such kind of a point, described by Klee as 
primordial, for Deleuze appears as a point-fold which moves 
along an inflexion or it “is the point of inflexion itself where the 
tangent crosses the curve” (Deleuze 1993b: 14). Klee discerns 
active, middle and passive lines as well as planes, but the most 
important in painting is the active line. An active line goes very 
freely, like a relaxing walk without definite aim or purpose: the 
more free and spontaneous, the more authentic. Klee gives 13 
examples of single lines and its variations with secondary and 
intersecting active lines (see Klee 1961: 105–107), but Deleuze 
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refers to three of them [1, 3, 5]. “The first draws an inflexion. 
The second shows that no exact and unmixed figure can exist20. 
… The third makes the convex side with shadow, and thus 
disengages the concavity and the axis of its curve, that now 
and again changes sides from the point of inflexion” (Deleuze 
1993b: 14). The circumscribed line that becomes a geometric 
plane is called a middle line, whereas the total plane, filled with 
colour is the passive line. The planar elements can lie side by 
side, for example, like in a grid system of straight or diagonal 
lines, or make composite forms. The genesis of composite 
forms can be explained when the forms overlap. “The nature 
of such structure is characterised by the word interpenetration. 
One part penetrates the other, or the two parts penetrate each 
other” (Klee 1961: 117). The linear interpenetration displays 
with circular forms and planar interpenetration – with squares 
and triangular forms. The active spontaneous line which goes 
to infinity making inflexions and curves can especially be no-
ticed in such Klee paintings as Angelus Novus (1920), Twittering 
Machine (1922), Crashing Bird (1919), The God of Northern Forest 
(1922), The Plant and its Enemy (1926), Magic Garden (1926), 
Tendril (1932), Hoffmanesque Fairy-tale Scene (1921), Landscape 
with Yellow Birds (1923), etc. Interpenetrating composite forms 
prevail in Crashing Bird (1919), Connected to the Stars (1923), 
Botanical Theatre (1924 / 1934), Ships in the Dark (1927) and in 
his polyphonic paintings Light-broadening I (1929), Polyphonic 
Setting for White (1930), Wall Plant (1922), and Polyphonic 
20 Deleuze cites Leibniz: “As Leibniz stated, there can never be “a straight 
line without curves intermingled”, nor any curve of a certain finite 
nature unmixed with some other, and in small parts as well as large”, 
such that one “will never be able to fix upon a certain precise surface 
in a body as one might if there were atoms” (Deleuze 1993b: 14).
201
Architecture (1930). Everything in Klee is intermingled, folded 
into each other. Even straight lines undergo a slight deviation, 
rendering irregular incomplete forms. And everything differs 
in manners or nuances. All this testifies that Klee is a Baroque 
artist who understands the world as the continuous process of 
folding, unfolding, refolding, with no beginning or end.
In this respect, Klee differs from the other very famous 
abstract painter Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944) who, accord-
ing to Deleuze, was an essentialist and Cartesianist (Deleuze 
1993b: 14). Being a pioneer of abstract painting, Kandinsky was 
also a theoretical substantiator of it. In his book Concerning the 
Spiritual in Art (Du Spirituel dans l’art, 1912), Kandinsky wrote 
about the significance of an inner beauty depending only on in-
dependent colours and forms that make abstract compositions. 
The physical and psychological satisfaction we feel seeing the 
Paul Klee. Crashing Bird. 1919. Ink, watercolour on paper. 
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beauty of abstract painting is not sufficient – the most important 
thing is the spiritual effect: the painting should touch our soul. 
Thus the main task of the artist is to guide humankind from the 
material world to the spiritual one. Every composition that is 
painted by the abstract painter is not sufficient – it should come 
from the inner need as the artist expresses his inner emotions, 
his soul freed from materiality. According to Kandinsky, the 
effect of the painting depends on the forms which can be organic 
or abstract, or to be the mixtures of the latter’s, and the combina-
tions of colours in the painter compositions. Every colour and 
their contrasts achieve appropriate significance. For example, 
yellow to Kandinsky is a typically earthy – intensive and aggres-
sive – colour while blue is a typical heavenly colour evoking deep 
rest. Using forms and various colours, the painter can create 
three types of paintings: impressions, improvisations and composi-
tions. Impressions are mostly dependent on the external reality; 
improvisations emerge from the unconscious as the spontaneous 
expression while the composition is “an expression of a slowly 
formed inner feeling, which comes to utterance only after long 
maturing. … In this, reason, consciousness, purpose, play an 
overwhelming part” (Kandinsky 1977: 55–56). The works called 
Compositions belong to his mature and more purified period of 
painting and they especially express the point of Deleuze’s at-
titude towards Kandinsky’s essentialism. Following Deleuze, we 
can see that the lines in Kandinsky’s canvas are strict, acting in 
binarities, the angles are firm and the points stable. The forms 
are restricted, one form is closed in another. The binarism that 
is prescribed to Kandinsky can be extracted not only from the 
analysis of colours in the book Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 
where the effect of colours is based on putting together the con-
trasting – earthly and heavenly, active and passive, aggressive 
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and calming, emptiness as death (black) and emptiness as birth 
(white), indicating horizontal and vertical, etc. – but also from 
the Point and Line to Plane (Punkt und Linie zu Fläche, 1925), 
in which Kandinsky analyzed the basic geometrical elements, 
point and line, that make up every painting. At first sight, it could 
appear that Kandinsky’s instruction is very similar to that of 
Klee but the latter’s teaching about the non-dimensional point as 
the primordial cosmic element greatly differs from the concept 
of the point as “the innermost concise form” (Kandinsky 2011: 
32). Kandinsky describes a point as an extension, a form and 
colour, and the point can become a square, a triangle, or achieve 
another more complex form, but still it remains stable in every 
painter’s composition, for example in Points (1920) or in Com-
position VIII (1923). The line is described as a product of a force: 
“the variation in lines depends on the number of these forces and 
upon their combinations” (Kandinsky 2011: 57). The lines can 
be straight, angular and curved as well as horizontal, vertical 
or diagonal. Depending on the tensions between the different 
kinds of lines and colours that impose directions (horizontal-
black, vertical-white, diagonal-red or green) and contrasting 
two primary planes – triangular and circular – a dramatic or 
lyrical effect of a painting can be obtained. Looking at the larger 
number of Kandinsky’s compositions (most created in 1923), 
Composition II, Composition VII, On White II, Transverse Line, 
Black and Violet, Yellow-Red-Blue, we can notice the tendency 
of binarism, the principle of contrasting opposite given terms, 
the hard and strict character of the lines, purified geometrical 
forms closed in each other – the expressive composition, which 
rather testifies to Kandinsky’s affinity to the rationalism and 
essentialism and contrasts him with Klee – the great painter of 
Baroque and Cosmos.
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Sensation in Painting: Cézanne and Bacon
The main intrigue of the book Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sen-
sation lies in Bacon’s phrase, which Deleuze takes on its own 
to discuss: “It’s a very, very close and difficult thing to know 
why some paint comes across directly onto the nervous system 
and other paint tells you the story in a long diatribe through 
the brain” (Sylvester 1987: 18). Touching the problem of sug-
gestibility, Bacon reaches the problem of sensation, which is 
part of a much wider logic of sensation, that makes the core of 
Deleuze’s immanent philosophy. 
In Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze developed the 
program of transcendental empiricism, which was based on 
a modification of Immanuel Kant’s transcendentalism. The 
envisaged duality in Kant’s concept of aesthetics (aesthetics as 
the conditions of possible experience in the first Critique and 
the aesthetics as the reflection of the work of art as a real ex-
perience in the third Critique)21 gave inspiration for Deleuze to 
elaborate on the opposition between the encountered sign and 
recognized object (1) and in this a way to reunite two differ-
ent notions of aesthetics (2). Whereas the recognised object is 
always dependent on the a priori forms of the subject and never 
disturbs our everyday experience, the encountered sign, on the 
contrary, forces us to overstep the limits of possible experience 
as it is never given as a certain quality that could be represented. 
It can only be sensed or felt. “It is not a sensible being but the 
being of the sensible” (Deleuze 1994: 140). Nevertheless, this 
21 It is best seen in the Kantian elaboration of distinction between the 
Beautiful and the Sublime. See Kant, Immanuel (2000). The Critique 
of Judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–160.
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primordial sensibility is exactly the level of genesis or genetic 
conditions: “it is not the given but that by which the given is 
given” (Deleuze 1994: 140). We could even discern two faces 
of the sensation, the subjective and objective, whereas the first 
one would imply the impact on the spectator (the nervous 
system, instinct, temperament), and the second, the object 
of the paint (the “fact”, the place, the event); really, it is more 
correct to speak about sensation as the unity of the sensing and 
the sensed: “As a spectator, I experience the sensation only by 
entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and 
the sensed” (Deleuze 2003b: 35). Thus, sensation does not ex-
ist somewhere as an object that could be represented, it is not 
somewhere in the air; on the contrary, it gets its being only 
through the body that is capable to sustain it. Hence, the body 
that is painted in such an art is in no way a represented body, 
but the body that is “experienced as sustaining this sensation” 
(Deleuze 2003b: 35).
It does not matter how different postimpressionist Paul 
Cézanne and Bacon would appear, Deleuze still sees Cézanne 
as Bacon’s precursor. In comparison with Bacon, Cézanne 
looks much more classical, brighter, more innocent. Cézanne’s 
painting has nothing in common with the flesh and meat in 
Bacon and with the body’s violent deformations, but neverthe-
less he gave to sensation his special status; that is, he withdrew 
it from the cliché, from the ready-made image, and from any 
“sensational” (Deleuze 2003b: 35). As Deleuze insists, his in-
novation in painting compared with the impressionists was 
the notion of the sensation tied with the body, and not on the 
contrary, as the sensation in the “free”, the disembodied play 
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of light and colours as in the impressionist22: “on the contrary, 
it is in the body, even the body of an apple” (Deleuze 2003b: 
35). How much the worlds of Cézanne and Bacon differ – the 
world of Nature (landscapes and still lives) in Cézanne and the 
world of artefact (sitting figures in empty rooms, interior, fur-
niture, etc.) of Bacon – they both understood the importance 
of the Figure as having to sustain sensation. They both also 
described sensation through its suggestibility that is depend-
ent on its very directional transmission, the very immediate 
effect on the nervous system and instinct without any story 
to be told. Both Bacon and Cézanne were focused most on 
solid things: what Bacon called “the Fact”, was the “motif ” for 
Cézanne. Whatever it would be – the appleyness of the apple 
(Lawrence’s words on Cézanne) or the screaming head of the 
Pope – we have the same case of a sustained sensation and its 
direct appeal to the involuntary, pre-rational, pre-conscious 
order. Even more, Bacon adds one very specific feature of the 
sensation – that of its dynamics as it always moves from one 
order to the other, from one level to another, never remaining 
in the same order or level, but at the same time attaining some 
consistency or synthesis. It can especially be seen from the mo-
ment of series or of repetition inherent to Bacon’s painting (the 
series of crucifixions, popes, screaming mouths, self-portraits, 
22 Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his study Cézanne’s Doubt (1945) also 
talks about Cézanne’s way: breaking with classical representation and 
contrary to what impressionists used to do, focusing on the material 
solidity of things rather than on the ephemeral vibration of light and 
air and patches of colour. “The object is no longer covered by reflections 
and lost in their relationships to the atmosphere and to the other 
objects. It seems subtly illuminated from within, light emanates from 
it, and the result is the impression of solidity and material substance” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2003: 276).
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etc.), but we can also talk about the series of apples (red, green, 
yellow) or the pots-series in Cézanne. It could appear that 
there are different orders and levels corresponding with differ-
ent sensations, but really we should talk about different orders 
and levels of one and the same sensation. “It is the nature of 
sensation to envelop a constitutive difference of level, a plural-
ity of constituting domains. Every sensation, and every Figure, 
is already an “accumulated” or “coagulated” sensation, as in a 
limestone figure” (Deleuze 2003b: 37). But what is the source 
of this synthesis that makes up the material unity of the sensing 
and sensed that lets the sensation emerge and thus guarantees 
the entire suggestibility of it?
Deleuze discusses several hypotheses forestalling the false 
responses. First of all is figural. It can be thought that the mate-
rial synthetic unity of sensation is made up by a represented 
object or a figured thing. However, it is impossible, since Figure 
is opposed to figuration. If there is still some figuration given, 
it is the second figuration that is based on the neutralisation of 
all the primary figuration. For example, the screaming Pope 
in Bacon is made after Velázquez’s portrait of Pope Innocent X. 
The first neutralisation lies in the scream and the second one 
that this scream is not ‘sensational’. There is no horror in it. 
“The violence of sensation is opposed to the violence of the 
represented (the sensational, the cliché)” (Deleuze 2003b: 39). 
Second is psychoanalytical. It can be also said that synthetic 
unity of sensation depends on the ambivalence of sensation 
(love and hatred at one and the same time) that makes up ten-
sion and thus could explain the different orders of sensation. For 
example, someone could say that Bacon’s desire to paint popes 
(Pope means Grand Papa) lies in his childish experience, since 
he hated his father and was afraid of him and simultaneously 
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felt sexual attraction towards him. This interpretation should 
also be strictly rejected since ambivalence in Figure would 
refer to feelings that the Figure would experience in relation 
to represented things, and in such a way it would presuppose 
the narrated story. “But there are no feelings in Bacon: there 
are nothing but affects; that is, ‘sensations’ and ‘instincts’” 
(Deleuze 2003b: 39). 
The third is motor hypothesis. It would treat the levels of 
sensation as the snapshots of motion that recompose the move-
ment. It is a partly reasonable explanation since Bacon used 
the decompositions of pictures (that of Eadweard Muybridge) 
or made very intense movements in his paintings. But “move-
ment does not explain sensation; on the contrary, it is explained 
by the elasticity of the sensation, its vis elastica”, says Deleuze 
(Deleuze 2003b: 41). Really, it is the levels of sensation that 
explains the movement, and not vice versa. It does not represent 
movement as such. Even though there are very intense and 
powerful movements taking place on the canvas, these move-
ments are really immobile, movements “in-place”, “the action of 
invisible forces on the body” (Deleuze 2003b: 41). In summary, it 
can be said that it is not the movement that explains the levels of 
sensation, but the sensation itself that gives movement instead, 
which should be related with the body experiencing the invis-
ible force acting upon it. 
The fourth hypothesis is phenomenological. Maybe the 
levels of sensation would be the domains of sensation that 
refer to different sense organs, but each domain would have a 
way of referring to other domains or levels, independently of 
the represented object they have in common. There emerges 
a communication between a colour, a taste, a smell, a touch, a 
sound, or maybe some synesthetic experience that constitutes, 
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as Deleuze says, “a ‘pathic’ (non-representative) moment of 
the sensation” (in Bacon’s Bullfights we can hear the noise of 
the beast’s hooves, or the smell and soft texture of meat in 
Crucifixions). “The painter would thus make visible a kind of 
original unity of the senses, and would make a multisensible 
Figure appear visually” (Deleuze 2003b: 42). This hypothesis 
could be most convincing, as it reveals the unity of the senses 
and thus the involvement of us into the painting, without any 
relation with the represented object. 
However, to Deleuze’s mind, to even make such operation 
as to let the multisensible Figure appear visually, the sensa-
tion of a particular domain should be in “direct contact with 
a vital power that exceeds every domain and traverses them 
all” (Deleuze 2003b: 42). Deleuze calls this vital power the 
Rhythm. The Rhythm is something non-representable at all, 
which is more profound than any senses such as vision, hear-
ing, touch, smell, etc. The Rhythm is insensible if we use the 
ordinary notion of sensing, but at the same time it can only be 
sensed as an unknowable power that makes visual sensations 
appear. The Rhythm cannot be captured by any rational and 
perceptual way but instead it gives order and consistency to 
all sensations. In his book on Bacon, Deleuze discerns three 
rhythms: “active” with an increasing variation or amplification; 
“passive” – of decreasing variation or elimination, and an “at-
tendant” rhythm (Deleuze 2003b: 71). Namely, the existence 
of these rhythms constitutes the Figure. “Rhythm would cease 
to be attached to and dependent on a Figure: it is rhythm itself 
that would become the Figure, that would constitute the Figure” 
(Deleuze 2003b: 71).
Rhythm is firstly a musical category and Deleuze charac-
terises it as that which “runs through a painting just as it runs 
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through a piece of music” (Deleuze 2003: 42). The big influence 
really can be ascribed to such composers as Messiaen or Boulez 
and to their concept of rhythm, which Deleuze invoked in 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. One of the 
first sources can be the Proustian concept of rhythm elaborated 
in the book Proust and Signs (Deleuze 1964), but beside the 
other sources that can be detected in the field of music, cinema 
and literature, Deleuze also refers to the concept of rhythm 
taken from the French phenomenologist of art Henri Maldiney 
(1912–2013) who, similar to Erwin Strauss or Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, paid most attention to Cézanne’s painting. According to 
Maldiney, Cézanne’s painting reveals all the “logic of senses”, 
our immediate participation in the world, that of being in the 
world, the Rhythm. “It is diastole-systole: the world that seizes 
me by closing in around me, the self that opens to the world 
and opens the world itself ” – Deleuze says, reciting Maldiney 
(Deleuze 2003b: 41–42). Very similar to Deleuze, making a 
distinction between the model of recognition and the model of 
encounter that belongs to the logic of sensation that always ap-
peals to something pre-rational, Maldiney in his turn opposes 
sensation to perception. Maldiney describes sensation as non-
intentional, as not intending any object, whereas perception is 
intentional and constitutes some intellectual, epistemic mo-
ment that cuts off the aesthesis (Escoubas 2010: 193). According 
to Maldiney, the main function of an image is not of imitating 
the world, but of appearing. Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception (Phénoménologie de la perception, 1945) uses the 
concept of perception, but which is understood as a primary, 
pre-objective and pre-conscious experience (Merleau-Ponty 
2005: 242) that indicates our primordial involvement into the 
world. According to Merleau-Ponty, the art especially becomes 
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the practice that more than any intellectual activity can express 
this moment of appearing, the emergence of the world before 
our eyes. Cézanne for him is the genius who was capable of ren-
dering that vision in the most intense way: “Cézanne wanted 
to depict matter as it takes on form, the birth of order through 
spontaneous organisation” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 277). Even 
though structurally the positions of phenomenology of art and 
of Deleuze on the analysis of sensation and its relation with 
the rhythm mostly coincide, we need to not forget Deleuze’s 
negative attitude that rejects the notions of the lived body 
and the life world. “But the lived body is still a paltry thing in 
comparison with a more profound and almost unlivable Power 
[Puissance]” – says Deleuze (Deleuze 2003b: 44). It does not 
allow reaching a much more profound level of genesis and mat-
ter. Deleuze intends to descend beneath the lived and existent, 
as he accentuates the body without organs (the decentralised 
subject) in Bacon and the encounter with the vital, unliveable 
and inorganic power without any qualities. So he talks about 
Cosmic becoming and not about being in the World. In Deleuze 
it is possible to talk not about openness to the world but about 
openness to the Cosmic forces. The concept of “force” can ap-
pear as having a relationship with what Merleau-Ponty calls the 
“vibration of appearance”, but for phenomenologists, this really 
has a phenomenal meaning, whereas Deleuze talks about the 
vibration of matter that gives rise to the primordial sensibility. 
“Deleuze links ‘rhythm’ to the body without organs, insofar as 
it is the ‘vibration’ which animates that body, and makes the 
sensation pass from one level to another through the Figure. 
Rhythm unites the different orders” (Crowhter 2012: 34). The 
force has strong relation with rhythm and sensation, as “for a 
sensation to exist, a force must be exerted on a body, on a point 
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of the wave. But if force is the condition of sensation, it is none-
theless not the force that is sensed, since the sensation “gives” 
something completely different from the forces that condition 
it” (Deleuze 2003b: 56). The problem is that the force itself is not 
sensed in any way: invisible and nonsonorous at all. But it does 
not mean that it is not real. It is not accessible to our natural 
perception, so the main problem of modern art becomes how 
to make these invisible, nonsonorous forces visible or sonorous. 
Deleuze liked very much to repeat Paul Klee’s famous formula 
that became the formula of modern art in general: “Not to ren-
der the visible, but to render visible” that means nothing else 
than: “The task of painting is defined as the attempt to render 
visible forces that are not themselves visible” (Deleuze 2003b: 
56). How can the painter make visible the force of weight, of 
time, of pressure, of a scream? Deleuze gives an example of 
painter Jean-François Millet, who tried to render visible the 
weight of a sack of potatoes carried by peasants instead of just 
painting peasants carrying the sack of potatoes as critics used 
to think. 
To Deleuze’s mind, the main task of Cézanne was to render 
visible the folding force of mountains, the germinative force of 
a seed, the thermic force of a landscape, the ripening or rotting 
force of an apple (see his painting on the motif of Still life with 
Apples and Mont Sainte-Victoire). Vincent van Gogh invented 
the “unheard-of force” of a sunflower seed (famous Sunflowers 
series), made visible the vapouring field from the heat (Midday 
Rest (after Millet), 1890, or The Sower, 1888), the temperature 
of daytime heat (Sun over Olive Grove, 1889), or the pulsatile 
force of the stars in the night sky (Starry Night over the Rhone, 
1888). Of course, Bacon tried to render quite different forces 
not yet invented by Cézanne or van Gogh. Bacon’s Figures 
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render the forces of spasm, the scream, the flattening force of 
sleep. In Bacon there is no I who acts: screams, vomits, etc., 
but it is exactly the force which forces me to scream. Deleuze 
recites other invisible forces that are rendered visible in Bacon: 
isolation, deformation, dissipation (through the smile), cou-
pling, the mysterious force in triptychs (uniting and separat-
ing at one and the same time), the force of changing time, the 
force of eternal time / the eternity of time. “To render time 
sensible in itself is a task common to the painter, the musician, 
and sometimes the writer” (Deleuze 2003b: 64). The genius in 
this field, no doubt, was Proust. What other forces could be 
rendered visible – it is the question for the future artists. But 
what is most important here, is that modern painting, contrary 
to classical painting that was always oriented towards stable 
Paul Cézanne. Still Life with Apples. 1893–1894. oil on canvas. 
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givens and essences, is able to convey the vision of a dynamic 
and always changeable reality – the Cosmic becoming, which 
is invisible, but through the sensation sustained by the Figure, 
it can become visible. The logic of sensation expresses the main 
thesis of Deleuze’s ontology of becoming and for that reason it 
should be related with painting not objects but forces instead. 
Capturing the forces that are invisible themselves results as 
the very immediate effect of a sensation, because vibrating on 
the threshold of perception it attacks not our intellect but our 
nervous system, intuition, and instinct. 
Why does Deleuze, following Bacon’s attitude, privilege the 
way of Figure, and not the abstract forms or abstract scribble 
of abstract expressionism? Abstract art like that of Mondrian 
or Kandinsky is not sufficient for Deleuze because it lacks 
sensation, it is addressed to the head and “acts through the 
intermediary of the brain, which is closer to the bone” (Deleuze 
2003b: 34), and thus is incapable of avoiding representation. 
First, abstract painters are concerned most about an aesthetic 
vision that consists of the composition of colours or forms. Ab-
stract painting requires aesthetic comprehension and its nature 
is more rational than sensible. It is deficient of the Rhythm as it 
always remains in one and the same level instead of rather mov-
ing the sensation from one level to another. So, conversely to a 
sensation that always attacks our nervous system, to our pre-
conscious, stable abstract forms attack only our intellect. And, 
as we saw before, intellect and rationality for Deleuze always 
coincide with representation. On the other hand, abstract ex-
pressionism like that of Pollock is too chaotic and messy, so the 
emergence of sensation becomes impossible as painting should 
“make the sensation clear and precise” (Deleuze 2003b: 110). 
There is no Figure, the body which could sustain sensation, and 
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there are no levels through which sensation could pass. Accord-
ing to Deleuze, Bacon moves in the middle path between these 
two extremes, by his deformed figures being able to extract and 
sustain sensations.
Diagram-Chance: From Chaos to Rhythm
How do the principles of the logic of sensation constitute the 
principles of composition of the work of art? It is the question 
concerning the process of painting itself that determines the 
emergence of a sensation. Deleuze formulates this question in 
the following way: how to pass from the pre-pictorial phase to 
the pictorial one so that the painting process would succeed? 
This moment is crucial.
The pre-pictorial phase in modern art differs quite a lot 
from that in classical art. The main task for the modern painter 
is not to begin, not to impose the form on a matter. The task for 
the classical artist was to start, to represent what he sees around 
him, to try all variations of figuration, whereas the modern art-
ist encounters too many figurative givens, what Deleuze calls 
clichés. “The painter has many things in his head, or around 
him, or in his studio. Now everything he has in his head or 
around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more 
or less actually, before he begins his work. They are all present 
in the canvas as so many images, actual or virtual, so that the 
painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but rather would 
have to empty it out, clear it, clean it” (Deleuze 2003b: 86). 
Many attempts, if they do not succeed, can result in returning 
to the cliché or worse, to making a parody.
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Trying to describe the way or method through which mod-
ern painters, and especially Bacon and Cézanne, try to escape 
representation or clichés, Deleuze uses the concept taken from 
semiotics of the pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce23 – the 
graph or diagram that is treated as the genetic agent, enabling 
artists to create something new. Deleuze describes the diagram 
as consisting of three concepts: catastrophe, chance and 
rhythm, or expressed by the formula: from catastrophe through 
chance to rhythm. The diagram is precisely what ends the pre-
pictorial phase and allows for moving to the pictorial. Applied 
to the pictorial plane, the concept of diagram strongly correlates 
with the principle of difference, the attempt to disrupt identity, 
inherent to Deleuze’s philosophy, what is really inseparable 
from the Deleuzian concept of chaos. In the book What is 
Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari wrote that in opposition to 
those who are content with living in the milieu of clichés, only 
23 It can be discussed from whom – Charles Sanders Peirce or Michel 
Foucault – was taken the concept of the diagram. In the book Francis 
Bacon: The Logic of Sensation Deleuze refers to Peirce’s semiological 
theory and the concept of diagram elaborated in the book Peirce on 
Signs: Writings of Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce (1991). “Peirce first 
defined icons by similitude and symbols by a conventional rule. But 
he acknowledged that conventional symbols are composed of icons 
(by virtue of phenomena of isomorphism), and that pure icons range 
far beyond qualitative similitude, and consist of “diagrams” (Deleuze 
2003b: 116). Later, in the book Foucault Deleuze refers to the concept 
of diagram that was applied by Foucault in the analysis of social 
structures: “The diagram is no longer auditory or visual archive but 
a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. 
It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and 
matter and in terms of form makes no distinction between content and 
expression, a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is 
a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others 
see and speak” (Deleuze 2006a: 34).
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the artists, philosophers and scientists are not afraid to confront 
the chaos. Being the ripper of every identical system or order, 
chaos at the same time is the germ of every order or form. Crea-
tors know that only through the rupture of former identity or 
form is it possible to create something really new. Of course, it 
is a very threatening and risky experience, the collapse of all 
visual coordinates, the invasion of manifold painful sensibili-
ties, where it is impossible to discern them. As Deleuze insists, 
it is not a psychological but certainly pictorial experience, 
Paul Cézanne. Montagne Sainte Victoire. 1904–1906. oil on canvas. 
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although it can respond to a painter’s psychic life. The fact that 
many great modern painters were using the diagram is shown 
by the names they gave to that pictorial experience: Cézanne’s 
“catastrophe”, or “abyss”, Paul Klee’s “chaos”, the vanishing 
“grey point”. But how this catastrophe or chaos is taken on 
canvas? The painter makes involuntary, irrational, accidental, 
free, random marks. It can be made even in a blind way, without 
our will or sight, as “if the hand assumed an independence and 
began to be guided by other forces” (Deleuze 2003b: 100). And 
it is enough for another world to intrude into a visual world of 
figuration and its optical organization. These marks made by 
hand, and for this reason called manual marks or traits, are 
non-representative, non-illustrative, non-narrative, but sensa-
tional. They do not have significance and do not signify any-
thing. For this reason Deleuze calls them a-signifying traits. 
“The diagram is thus the operative set of asignifying and non-
representative lines and zones, line-strokes and colour-patches. 
And the operation of the diagram, its function, is to be “sugges-
tive” (Deleuze 2003b: 101). If we look at how Bacon realized the 
diagram, we will see that he used various things in order to 
make these random marks. “Bacon applied the paint with a 
variety of brushes, and sometimes with his bare hands, or with 
such other brush substitutes as rags, sponges, combs, and even 
cashmere pullovers – whatever seemed to recommend itself at 
the time … in the triptych Three Studies of Figures on Beds Bacon 
even used a dustbin lid to trace the swirling lines that surround 
two figures wrestling on a bed” (Schmied 2006: 81). He also 
practiced a method of painting where he first covered the can-
vas with watercolour or with acrylic that made a neutral, flat 
background, but the figures were painted with oil for the reason 
that the time the oil was taking to dry was much longer, so he 
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could make changes and deformations of the figures. Scrubbing 
and deformations were the ways Bacon was trying to escape 
clichés. For example, van Gogh’s diagram “was the set of 
straight and curved hatch marks that raise and lower the 
ground, twist the trees, make the sky palpitate…” (Deleuze 
2003b: 102). So the function of the diagram was, as Bacon said, 
“to unlock the valves of feeling” (Sylvester 1987: 17) and this 
can happen only through a catastrophe taking place on the 
canvas. However, being such an important and crucial moment 
of painting, the diagram nevertheless just ends the preparatory 
work of an artist, opening up a way for painting itself, so it can 
work as a means, but in no way can it be a purpose of a painting. 
It is a first step, but not a result. Being a catastrophe itself, the 
diagram cannot become a catastrophe or create a catastrophe. 
In order for the diagram to be successful, it should be utilized, 
which indicates passing “from the possibility of fact to the Fact, 
from the diagram to the painting” (Deleuze 2003b: 119). As 
much as the chaos is a germ of every order or rhythm, the dia-
gram gives a possibility, a chance to create something new. But 
there arises the question: how is the artist able to take advantage 
of this chance for some Figure sustaining the sensation to 
emerge from the catastrophe, for the rhythm to come? The 
concept of a chance is strongly related with one of the attitudes 
of modern art, where the role of the painter in the process of 
creation is understood as being a particular medium. Bacon 
characterized himself in such a way: “I always think of myself 
not so much as a painter but as a medium for accident and 
chance. … But I don’t think I’m gifted. I just think I’m recep-
tive. … I think I’m energetic in myself and I think I’m very re-
ceptive to energy. … I think that I have this peculiar kind of 
sensibility as a painter, where things are handed to me and I just 
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use them” (Sylvester 1987: 140–141). But really the pretext for 
this principle to emerge may have been given by Cézanne. He 
maintained that: “Not a ‘minute of the world passes’, says 
Cézanne, that we will preserve if we do not ‘become that min-
ute’” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 169), thus indicating the re-
quirement of a very close and immediate relationship between 
a man and the world, which can be reached during the process 
of creation. This strongly resonates with Deleuze’s concept of 
becoming. Cézanne’s phrase indicates that in the process of 
creation we should distance ourselves from the conscious Self 
and be completely open for another experience to invade us. 
This is a condition for experiencing invisible forces and for 
creating sensations. When the painter is making random, 
spontaneous, involuntary marks, he is making it with a hand, 
which becomes independent from his will and sight. Painting 
based on chance should be a spontaneous process, freed from 
the control of reason and supported only by an accident (as in 
Bacon’s painting Man and Umbrella, where the man becomes 
an umbrella). This spontaneity and openness of a painter for 
the result, which will happen, that are inherent to Bacon and 
other modern artists can be shown by the fact that they have 
not used any sketches, without which a classical painting, re-
quiring a very good optical organization, would be almost 
impossible. Painting without sketches indicates that the painter 
does not have a preconceived idea or plan of how his canvas 
should appear exactly. But this moment is very slippery and 
complicated, threatening with great misunderstandings. 
Chance for Bacon, first, should not be understood as “the set 
of probabilistic, pre-pictorial givens, which are not the part of 
the act of painting” as it were in the work of Duchamp, “who 
let three threads fall on the painted canvas, and fixed them 
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exactly where they fell” (Deleuze 2003b: 95). So chance should 
not be confused with probabilities; chance should be integrated 
in the act of painting itself. The second misunderstanding that 
should be removed can be demonstrated through the example 
given by Bacon himself with a cleaning woman. Would she be 
capable of making random marks or not? For many of us it 
would appear that she can easily make these random marks. 
But Bacon’s remark is that she would be incapable, “because 
she would not know how to utilize this chance or how to ma-
nipulate it” (Deleuze 2003b: 95). Involuntarily made random 
marks should be integrated into the visual whole, and this 
means that there is no chance except for “manipulated” chance, 
and no accident except a “utilized” accident. Chance does not 
mean that the painter does not know what he wants to do, that 
he does not have any preconceived idea. Indeed he has. But this 
idea does not work as the beginning of painting; it is displayed 
through the process of painting, always including changes. “I 
know what I want to do but I don’t know how to bring it about. 
And that’s what I’m hoping accidents or chance or whatever 
you like to call it will bring about for me” (Sylvester 1987: 102). 
Only in the end can the painter decide whether the result cor-
responds to this primary idea or not. If the chance was manipu-
lated and utilised well, the result can be even better than he 
supposed. So the diagram and the chance help the painter to 
escape figurative and probabilistic givens. “A probable visual 
whole (first figuration) has been disorganized and deformed 
by free manual traits which, by being reinjected into the whole, 
will produce the improbable visual Figure (second figuration). 
The act of painting is the unity of these free manual traits and 
their effect upon and reinjection into the visual whole” 
(Deleuze 2003b: 97–98).
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Methods of the diagram and chance determine what 
kind of pictorial space is created, which in turn determines 
the emergence of the sensation. As we have seen before, the 
diagram and the chance include an intervention of a hand that 
becomes independent from the will and sight. It presupposes 
something involuntary and irrational. In classical painting, 
conversely, a hand is totally subordinated to an eye as a painter 
works with figurative and probabilistic givens and tries to 
manifest it in an optical organisation that is primary. So we 
can see that the eye indicates reason, will, control, and calcula-
tion, as opposed to a hand, which indicates involuntariness, 
instinct, temperament, spontaneity, etc. Abstract art, such as 
that of Mondrian, creates an especially pure optical space, as 
the hand in the process of painting is totally subordinate to the 
eye. This kind of pictorial space loses its tactile sensibility and 
in result lacks suggestibility. It appeals only to our intellect but 
does not reach a more profound logic of sensation. That kind of 
optical space, to Deleuze’s mind, can be seen in Byzantine art. 
Thus, abstract painting is much more optical and less tactile 
than classical representation. Even more, it reaches this pure 
effect by replacing the diagram with the code, which is digital 
as it works with units that visually group together the terms 
in opposition (vertical-white-activity, horizontal-black-inertia, 
etc.). This digitality is so abstract that it “reduces the abyss 
or chaos (as well as the manual) to a minimum: it offers us 
an asceticism, a spiritual salvation” (Deleuze 2003b: 84). It is 
an attempt to escape chaos that is always related with violent 
sensibility.
Abstract expressionism (Pollock’s line, Morris Louis’s 
stain) follows a completely different way of engaging the 
diagram. Deleuze characterises it as “the optical catastrophe 
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and the manual rhythm” (Deleuze 2003b: 106). Through the 
subordination of the eye to the hand, abstract expressionism 
creates a manual space where it is impossible to see any visual 
coordinates. The specific feature of this art is the line or the 
patch of colour, which does not form any contour, “that de-
limits nothing, neither inside nor outside, neither concave nor 
convex” (Deleuze 2003b: 105). For this reason, the eye can 
hardly follow it. Deleuze compares this line with a “frenetic 
dance” or “Gothic line”24 (the term Gothic art was taken from 
Wilhelm Worringer, the German art historian), which moves 
not from one point to another but between points instead, 
continually changing direction, becoming inseparable from 
the surface. Compared with this line, abstract painting ap-
pears very representative, as its line still delimits an outline. 
To Deleuze’s mind, this is another extremity, as the diagram 
24 One of Pollock’s famous canvases is entitled Gothic, 1944.
Francis Bacon. Three Studies for a  Crucifixion. 1962. oil and pastel.  
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. DACs, london / lATgA, Vilnius, 2016.
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works not as a means, but becomes a purpose itself. Whereas 
abstract art left chaos away invoking just the transformation 
of the form, abstract expressionism stayed in chaos engaging 
with the decomposition of the matter. This chaotic sloppiness, 
as Bacon himself insisted, does not allow for the Figure that 
sustains the sensation to emerge. “Save the contour – nothing 
is more important for Bacon than this” (Deleuze 2003b: 110).
Now we can see why Deleuze treats Bacon’s painting as 
the middle path, the case between two extremities. Painting in 
Bacon is based on a very good balance between the interference 
of the hand when the clichés should be destroyed and of the 
eye, when the manual traits should be reinjected into the visual 
whole. Chaos works there as a germ of the rhythm, and manual 
traits form what Deleuze later called chaosmos. The result of 
this interaction is what Deleuze determines haptic space or 
haptic vision (gr. Haptein – to touch, to cuddle). This term 
(in original – haptisch) was taken from Aloïs Riegl, a famous 
Austrian art historian25. Hapticity refers to the vision that is 
captured through sensations, that raises sensible-tactile senses. 
It strongly differs from the way we experience an optical space, 
because the illusion of vision or movement is related not with 
the appearance, but with something we could call the vibration 
of the matter. Thus, in a tactile space of a painting, where on the 
flat surface by means of colours and forms an effect of volume 
is created, the haptic function of the eye awakes as it captures 
the image instead of plunging into an optical vision; it enfolds 
25 Aloïs Riegl explored the problem of hapticity, opposing haptic-close 
vision to optical vision in his book Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie 
nach den Funden in Österreich-Ungarn (1901). But he actually used the 
term “taktische”, which, responding to criticisms, was later replaced 
with “haptisch”.
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the space of a painting and unifies the vision and touch (this 
was especially developed in Egyptian art, where Egyptians in 
their bas-reliefs used the lines of contour in a very haptic way). 
Thus, haptic vision opens up the ways for the sensation to be 
“captured”. We can talk about hapticity, “when sight discovers 
in itself a specific function of touch that is uniquely its own, 
distinct from its optical function”, Deleuze says, citing Riegl 
(Deleuze 2003b: 155). Such is the “modern” eye – “painters 
paint with their eyes, but only insofar as they touch with their 
eyes” (Deleuze 2003b: 155). The creation of such a haptic vision 
is inseparable from the specific sense of colours, or colourism, 
inherent to Bacon’s painting. Line and colour are the most 
important elements of painting, but in the case of Bacon, there 
is no subordination of the line and colour in the regimes of one 
and another. In classical painting the line delimits contour, and 
the colour fills the supposed form; in abstract painting, the line 
is the most important as it strictly outlines the contour. It is like 
the bone structure, not the flesh. Colours are pure, cold and 
homogenous. Abstract expressionism created the line which, 
conversely, delimited nothing – there is no contour that could 
be saved. The singularity of Bacon occurs as he is able to create 
a contour only through the means of colours. The diagram then 
works as a modulator, consisting not “only of relations of warm 
and cool, of expansion and contraction, which vary in accord-
ance with the colours considered. It also consists of regimes 
of colours and of relations of these regimes, and the harmony 
between pure tones and broken tones” (Deleuze 2003b: 152). 
And the three most important pictorial elements in Bacon – 
armature, Figure and contour – “communicate and converge in 
colour” (Deleuze 2003b: 152). The Figure appears through the 
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different regimes of colours and its relations26. The modulating 
character of the diagram creates the effect of movement from 
one level of sensation to the other – the rhythm. Tom Conley 
in his Afterword compares modulating with Deleuze’s other 
concept, Fold, explored in the book The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque, where baroque was understood as the world of the 
continuous process of folding, unfolding, and refolding (Con-
ley 2003: 147). Folding also could be understood as the same 
modulation or rhythm: expansion-contraction-expansion. 
Thus, the modulation of colours expresses the pulsatile force, 
the vibration of the matter, but at the same time it lets some 
consistent form emerge. In this way, the diagram works as “an 
abstract machine that composes matter and force in a painting” 
(Zepke 2005: 187). Deleuze makes a conclusion that colour-
ists, such as Cézanne, van Gogh and Bacon, use an analogical 
language of painting which also works as a modulator. Where 
exactly is the point in which the resemblance, which was the 
main task, and comprehensible language for classical painters 
differ from analogy? It is really an important question, as Fig-
ures always resemble something. But this resemblance is in no 
way a baseline. Rather, Bacon or Cézanne raised the question: 
how can one produce a resemblance with no resembling means? 
Trying to destroy the cliché, the painter starts from the diagram, 
lets the chaos in and then through the chance and utilisation 
26 Merleau-Ponty addressed to the type of modulation in Cézanne’s 
painting and his choice to use green for the background rather than a 
grey as it was in classical painting. The result is “that when the over-all 
composition of the picture is seen globally, perspectival distortions are 
no longer visible in their own right but rather contribute, as they do in 
natural vision, to the impression of an emerging order, of the object 
in then out of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes” (Merleau-
Ponty 2003: 278).
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of it he gets a Figure that resembles nothing, but nevertheless 
is analogous to something: a human’s body, a pig’s head, an 
umbrella, etc. “Roughly speaking, the law of the diagram, ac-
cording to Bacon, is this: one starts with a figurative form, a 
diagram intervenes and scrambles it, and a form of a completely 
different nature emerges from the diagram, which is called the 
Figure” (Deleuze 2003b: 156). For example, in the painting Man 
and Umbrella (1946), Bacon wanted to make a bird alighting 
on a field, but the result became totally different. To Deleuze’s 
mind, in such a way representation is overcomed most and 
the sensation extracted most, because a relation with chaos is 
not lost, as the genesis of the form always remains nearby. The 
creation of the form or some consistency appears as created 
not through a pre-given vision, but through the interplay of 
differences. For this reason, an analogical language includes 
deformation that is completely different from a transformation 
of form inherent to abstract painting. Transformation that is 
tied with digital language and code is incapable of overcoming 
representation, as there is a passage from one form to another 
only, without plunging into chaos, without reaching a much 
more profound level of sensation.
 





gitenis umbrasas. Iron She-Wolf. 1992. Crome-plated brass. Photo Aleksandras Šiekštelė.
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Refrain in Nature and Art:  
Territorial Transcodance and Faciality
Deleuze and Guattari in the chapter “1837: Of the Refrain” 
from A Thousand Plateaus: Schizophrenia and Capitalism 
continue to analyse the concepts of refrain, territorialization 
and deterritorialization, which were in use already in previous 
texts. They describe how creation in nature and art is possible 
through the process of moving from territorialization towards 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. First of all, they 
work with the concepts of territory, and for that they use the 
musical concept of refrain (ritournelle). These concepts are also 
related to reproduction in nature, the behaviour of different 
species and especially birds that mark their territory by singing. 
The idea of birds and animals marking territory was borrowed 
from biologist Jakob von Uexküll (A Stroll Through the Worlds of 
Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds, 1992), who 
explained an animal’s relationship to their environment and 
their actions in their surroundings according to the informa-
tion which is available to organism through its senses. Among 
nature’s other creations, he reasoned the birds’ ability to 
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recognise territorial borders. Being close to existentialism and 
semiotic philosophy in his scientific works, von Uexküll used 
the ideas from philosophy and other sciences to analyse the 
signing systems in biology and to understand how the relation-
ship between different segments of the environment appears. 
Another big influence on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in 
relation to the closeness of art to nature is attributed to Mes-
siaen’s theory of music and his experiments with the rhythm 
and pitch of birdsongs, which he transferred into compositions 
(especially Catalogue d’Oiseaux). Messiaen’s novelty in music 
brought a trend of exploring the non-retrogradable rhythm, 
which means the same order of values in both directions – back 
and forward (Messiaen 1994: 74), which in Deleuzoguattarian 
philosophy means repeating the central beat and returning to 
the same point in the cycle. Messiaen’s rhythm, as well as the 
diagonal linkage of vertical and horizontal or harmony and 
melody first discovered by Boulez, Messiaen’s student, lay in 
the core of Deleuzoguattarian music philosophy. As Deleuze’s 
investigator and critic Catherine Pickstock states: “Messiaen 
does not really subordinate the harmonic to the melodic, taken 
as primarily rhythm, which he defines as ‘continuous variation’. 
In the end, as later in the case of Boulez, he is concerned with 
the mysterious ‘diagonal’ that one hears between the horizon-
tal and vertical coordinates” (Pickstock 2008: 181). Both von 
Uexküll and Messiaen are mentioned in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
books to outline the idea of refrain in a birds’ life and especially 
their singing for territorial purposes. Thus, the refrain can be 
found in nature, music and all other arts, though originally it 
is the closest to music, which according to the philosophers 
surrenders less to the representation. In order to understand 
the refrain in a broad Deleuzoguattarian sense, one can use the 
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concept of habits and other interpretations of the refrain such as 
caring about home and safety, preventing troubles, death, and 
reproduction purposes (Holland 2008, Bogue 2003a, Buchanan 
2004). Deleuze in Difference and Repetition gives such a defini-
tion: “The refrain is the eternal return as cycle or circulation, 
as being-similar and being-equal – in short, as natural animal 
certitude and as sensible law of nature” (Deleuze 1994: 6). Later 
with Guattari he gave the classification of the refrain in relation 
to territory, which became an encyclopaedia for all interpreters.
“Refrain could accordingly be classified as follows: (1) territorial 
refrains that seek, mark, assemble a territory; (2) territorial-
ized function refrains that assume a special function in the 
assemblage…; (3) the same, when they mark new assemblages, 
pass into new assemblages by means of deterritorialization-
reterritorialization…; (4) refrain that collect or gather forces, 
either at the heart of the territory, or in order to go outside it…” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 326–327).
Despite classification in four types, Deleuze and Guattari 
distinguish three aspects of the refrain: marking the safe home 
territory, which is closed to outside forces; functional refrain, 
which can be deterritorialized in the same closed territory 
through regrouping the assemblage’s elements; and finally 
opening the territory to forces from the outside, which in Bu-
chanan’s words are defined as “a block of sound that is at once a 
way home, the very source of home, and the home in our hearts” 
(Buchanan 1997). There is a permanent tension between miss-
ing home and leaving it. Refrain deals not only with a block 
of content, but also forms of expression, or in other words 
becoming. This means moving from one territorial assemblage 
to another or within one through a variation and interaction of 
234
different elements, fluctuation and tension between stability 
and movement, safety and danger, life and death.
Territory is transcoded, it is in permanent movement 
towards the production of new; thus, it is in the process of 
territorialized, deterritorialized and reterritorialized, and this 
process depends on the distance between the assemblage char-
acters. “The territory is first of all the critical distance between 
two beings of the same species: Mark your distance. What is 
mine is first of all my distance; I possess only distances. Don’t 
anybody touch me, I growl if anyone enters my territory, I put 
up placards. Critical distance is a relation based on matters of 
expression. It is a question of keeping at a distance the forces of 
chaos knocking at the door” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 320–321). 
Change in the distance means change within territorial assem-
blage, or change of its borders.
In music philosophy, refrain is described like “Bird songs: 
the bird sings to mark its territory” and as “a musical “nome”, 
“a little tune, a melodic formula” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
312). It is both a musical content and its prevention. Marcel 
Swiboda, describing the relationship between form of content 
and form of expression in Deleuzoguattarian music philosophy, 
and Buchanan outlined the double and paradoxical process of 
refrain’s function. The refrain is closed, preventing a block of 
content, but at the same time it can be opened to forces from 
the outside – forces of chaos. Swiboda, following Genosko’s 
analysis of Guattari’s solo works, especially Ritornellos and 
Existential Affects (1996), finds a more precise description of 
refrain in the sense of presenting sources for its explanation, 
such as the ideas of Louis Hjelmslev and Mikhail Bakhtin: “this 
is where Guattari’s innovation comes in: he realizes the poten-
tial in Hjelmslev’s schema that makes the relation between the 
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planes reversible so that the matter that is articulated in the 
formation of content in a given more-or-less concrete instance 
is from another perspective constitutive of a formation of 
expression and vice versa” (Swiboda 2002: 81). He finds how 
important for Guattari it was to use the new concept of ritour-
nelle and analyse it as content and expression emphasizing its 
relation to enunciation in every specific case, which in practice 
comes through the affects: “One can proceed by means of the 
ritornello of a given intersection of content / expression rela-
tions, the production of a refrain constituting in part sensory 
affect and the accompanying array of potential enunciations” 
(Swiboda 2002: 104). Affects are not affectations and do not 
depend on humans. They have no order; they are products of 
the abstract machine and work for expressing events through 
joining cosmic forces. On the other hand, ritournelle is always 
expressed with a repetition and eternal return, staying in itself 
and leaving. In Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: 
Schizophrenia and Capitalism, it is said: “In a general sense, we 
call a refrain any aggregate of matters of expression that draws 
a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes 
(there are optical, gestural, motor, etc., refrains). In the narrow 
sense, we speak of a refrain when an assemblage is sonorous or 
“dominated” by sound – but why do we assign this apparent 
privilege to sound? (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 323). In order to 
answer the last question, philosophers mention the capability 
of sound to be “more refined”, “specialised and autonomous” 
and take “leave of the earth”.
Melody and rhythm are of biggest importance in order to 
mark the territory in music as well as leaving it. Rhythm marks 
territory by distinction of one-type elements from the other and 
keeping them at a distance, while melody shows the position of 
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different sounds or motif in a moment. That lays in the composi-
tion. As Eugene Holland emphasises, following Jacque Attali 
and Deleuze, for musical (not the number of sounds) appear-
ance, a com-position is needed (Holland 2008: 203). That can 
happen in various ways, though one of the most effective is 
improvisation or a kind of experimentation with music, when 
all needed elements unpredictably appear in a concrete position 
and interrelation. Deleuze and Guattari, following Boulez, who 
invented “a kind of diagonal running between the harmonic 
vertical and the melodic horizon” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
296), tries to give examples of compositions with the passage 
of deterritorialization interpreting this “kind of diagonal”, 
how it unpredictably appears in an art machine. Diagonals are 
“connectors between points of different levels” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1987: 295). In the Deleuzoguattarian interpretation, it is 
directed onto a freeing and line of flight. So while melody and 
rhythm are of great importance for the territorialization and 
prevention of the refrain, they are no less working in the deter-
ritorialization process. The artist, in the French philosophers’ 
view, like a bird makes a mark, puts a signature and creates a 
style. The artist constitutes the territorial motif and through 
deterritorialization lets him float in one or another rhythm, to 
live his life in the art machine and stand up on his own.
For the visualisation and understanding of the Deleu-
zoguattarian concept of refrain, we take the example of art, 
which was not described by these philosophers; nevertheless, 
it seems to be eloquent and applicable for the understanding 
of refrain and its move in assemblages. The visual art piece is 
based on documentary shoots.
Werner Herzog in the documentary film Herdsmen of the 
Sun (1989) presents his view on the ritual life of the African tribe 
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Wodaabe. The tribes’ men, taking part in music and dance festi-
val, are reminiscent of birds mating; they work for many hours 
on their appearance in order to attract women and to be chosen 
for the night. That is a simple visualisation of what is narrated by 
Deleuze and Guattari about territories in the life of nature. De-
spite the nomadic life outside, when the tribe changes its living 
space, deterritorialization periodically happens inside the tribe: 
“Between the two, at the boundaries, an oscillational constant 
is established: an active rhythm, a passively endured rhythm, 
and a witness rhythm? Or else the animal opens its territory 
a crack for a partner of the opposite sex: a complex rhythmic 
character forms through duets, antiphonal or alternating sing-
ing, as in the case of African shrikes” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
320). The highest moment in the process of deterritorialization 
within assemblage of performance in Herdsmen of the Sun is 
the ritual dancing of men, as well as the special ritual noise of 
crowd, when it is increasing until a loud zenith, presenting the 
manifestation of the new couple regrouped for the night. One 
of the interesting artistic ideas in this film is the presentation of 
the compound of different rhythms in sounding and moving: 
the crowd sounding in a continual manner when every man 
expresses sound in a different rhythm and pitch, which has a 
purpose to seduce the woman and to be chosen as the most ap-
pealing man, as well as a common move in dance and individual 
mimicry. The mouths of men, who are reminiscent of birds, are 
moving and change their faces in the flirting process. Guattari 
in The Machinic Unconscious: Essays on Schizoanalysis, com-
paring the human and animal world raises “a hypothesis that 
assemblages of faciality necessarily “precede” the existence of 
animal mouths and human faces” (Guattari 1989: 129). The face 
in marking territory is as important as refrain in constructing 
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assemblages. It works for identification.27 The mimicry and 
variation of different sounds during the performance of men 
in Herzog’s film, when coming to common rhythms, presents 
how it determines the rearrangement of assemblage within ter-
ritory and in Guattari’s more general description of faciality as 
“formed substantions” related to the new couple. Though in A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and 
Guattari claim that “if we consider primitive societies, we see 
that there is very little that operates through the face”, “posses-
sion expresses a direct relation between Voices and the body 
rather than a relation to the face” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 175, 
176) and that is because the face “is the typical European”. Mak-
ing a distinction between the archaic and nowadays, Deleuze 
and Guattari emphasise the change of the face’s meaning, when 
nowadays it expresses politics and an assemblage of power with 
a stress on inhumanities while in the past it was displaced by the 
head and soul, which constituted the relationship within tribes. 
Deleuze and Guattari attempted to show how significantly dif-
ferent the faciality of inhumanity became in our days, opening 
many ways for new polyvocalities, a new strange becoming and 
rhizomatic movement in deterritorialization, while Herzog’s 
film presented deterritorialization and reterritorialization in 
a tribe as weak facialization, based on the imitation of a birds’ 
movement and especially its mouth, letting sounds go, trans-
forming the dancer into becoming spiritual / becoming animal.
27 In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia there is another, 
more precise description of face, which refer to apersonalization: 
“faces are not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or 
probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions 
or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 168).
239
Artistic Refrain: From Singing Everyday  
to Becoming Music, Becoming Cosmic
The other two examples are important for a broader investiga-
tion of the specificity of deterritorialization in artistic expres-
sion, especially the role and (im)possibility to distinguish the 
small refrain and great refrain, first type refrain and second type 
refrain, natal and cosmic; in other words, Deleuzoguattarian 
contraposition, which at the same time overlap.
Music and film about music extracts were chosen: it is the 
old man’s singing in Gavin Bryars’ composition “Jesus’ blood 
never failed me yet” (1971, recorded with Tom Waits in 1990) 
and in Herzog’s extract from the film The Transformation of the 
World into Music (1994). In both pieces of art, the focus is put on 
the old man’s non-professional singing. In Bryar’s composition, 
it was a homeless old man’s accidently overheard refrain, which 
later was developed by a composer and orchestra, whereas in 
Herzog’s film the old fireman humming a tune from Wagner’s 
opera Parsifal, does that backstage. Both pieces are dealing 
with the content of Christian values, though when choosing 
these particular pieces of art for analysis this was not taken 
into account.
The hypothesis is that two different diagrams are presented 
in both cases of music, while using the similar idea of com-
pounding the professional and nonprofessional. The old man’s 
voice, which is a little trembling, a bit creaking, a bit scratch-
ing while singing the melody as a small refrain, makes two 
directional influences on the creation and perception of audio 
composition (territorializing and deterritorializing). Whether 
the threshold of lifting from the small to great refrain is heard 
or not heard is a matter for a very precise listener and observer, 
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as well as the perfection of the actualization of the artist’s idea. 
That is the empirical plane while Deleuze and Guattari pay 
bigger attention to the virtual and abstract plane, the role of 
thinker describing thresholds among multiplicities as ambigu-
ity, and as barriers, which can be easily crossed and overcome 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987; Deleuze 1993b). That in our case 
means working in the perspective of Deleuzean transcendental 
empiricism, emphasising this creational process between the 
actual and virtual by using already done concepts.
How is the assemblage of refrain deterritorialized in music 
of these two chosen examples? When does it become artistic? 
What does the first type of refrain and second type of refrain, 
as well as little and great refrain, mean in music? The first 
question needs special attention and the effort to answer it 
is presented in the following subchapters. The two last ques-
tions have been discussed by Deleuzoguattarian investigators 
already, coming to the conclusion that Deleuzean music phi-
losophy is misleading and confronting within itself in many 
aspects, especially when it describes music’s ability to harness 
chaos forces and to use non-sonorous or non-musically com-
pound sounds for it, which has the autonomy of expression 
and helps to reach the final end of music, its standing up by 
own, also jumping from the metaphysic onto the aesthetical 
plane (Vernon 2014, Gallope 2010). Despite the critique of 
Deleuzean aesthetic and music philosophy (Bidima, 2004) 
and specially the term “final end of music” (Gallope 2010) 
and other statements outlining “great” or “large refrain”, 
their philosophy gives stimulus once again to rethink music 
through these concepts, especially when one keeps in mind 
Deleuzean and, and, and, various possibilities to combine 
what is incompatible, what appears in-between lines.
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The curiosity to do that arises, while one wants to under-
stand not a frontier between the functional refrain and artistic-
aesthetical refrain, but the transformation of one refrain into 
another. Bogue does not separate the functional and aesthetic 
refrain because “they are part of the same machine” (Bogue 
2003: 72). Indeed in What is hilosophy? Deleuze and Guat-
tari describe Australian birds and their behaviour, singing and 
other sounds created by them around the “complete artist” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 184). Discussing the aesthetic plane 
of composition and its only partial dependence on technique, 
they outline that “composite sensation is reterritorialized 
on the plane of composition”, “at the same time the plane of 
composition involves sensation in a higher deterritorialization, 
making it pass through a sort of deframing which opens it up 
and breaks it open onto an infinitive cosmos” (Deleuze 1994: 
197). This deterritorializing function of the music refrain is a 
special feature “to gather forces” in order “to go outside it” and 
is different from other functions of refrain, related to territori-
alisation like “Lullaby” refrain, “Lover’s Refrain”, “Professional 
Refrain” and “Merchant Refrain” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
327)28. Michael Gallope (2010), a bit differently, in accordance 
with Deleuzoguattarian classification, distinguishes the meta-
physical logic refrain and ethic-aesthetic logic refrain, when the 
second is deterritorializing and deterritorialized in order to be 
improved. The first one is home marking and functional, the 
second artistic, which is deterritorializing by improvisation and 
line of flight. If Gallope strictly classifies refrain as functional 
28 Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus note that “The child’s 
refrain, which is not music, forms a block with the becoming-child of music”, 
letting readers to separate refrain from musical refrain (1987: 300).
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and aesthetic, Swiboda emphasizes that they are only aspects 
of the same refrain. Despite this soft differentiation, he finds 
the possibility to distinguish them in naming, especially for 
outlining stronger deterritorialization by using outside forces. 
He says: “This – in terms of the refrain – is its relative deterri-
torialization and its absolute deterritorialization (Refrain), the 
move away from the well-worn phrases of a circumscribed and 
largely territorialized use of the refrain, towards the recogni-
tion in such phrases (musical, poetic, prosodic, etc.) that they 
bear affective and enunciative possibilities that enable not only 
an ethical or ethic-aesthetic transformation, but also a political 
one” (Swiboda 2002: 104). Probably influenced by Guattari, 
Swiboda outlines political assemblage not less than ethic-aes-
thetic. While agreeing with his position and at least the relative 
separation of functional and aesthetic refrain, we also use other 
Deleuzoguattarian words for refrain such as the first type refrain 
and second, small and great, though their separation is also quite 
tricky. However, Deleuzoguattarian use of the word type is more 
distinctive in comparison with an aspect for the description of 
the refrain, but it is not necessarily functional and aesthetic that 
corresponds to small and great; their interconnection depends 
on the contexts. Such a parallel is taken to rethink music ability 
to borrow, bear and harness inside and outside forces as well as 
stand by its own. Deleuze in Negotiations 1972–1990 describes 
his and Guattari’s common concepts used in A Thousand Pla-
teaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia and states that they wanted 
to make the ritornello one of their “main concepts, relating 
it to territory and Earth, the little and the great ritornello” 
(Deleuze 1995: 137), when “the ritornello thus expresses the 
tension between a territory and something deeper, the Earth” 
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(Deleuze 1995: 146). In Preface to Italian edition of A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (included in Two Regimes 
of Madness; Texts and Interviews 1975–1995; Deux régimes de fous. 
Textes et entretiens 1975–1995, 2003) Deleuze narrates their idea 
and, describing different assemblages of ritournelle, separates 
three: “little territorial songs, or the songs that birds sing; the 
great song of the earth, then the earth cries out; the powerful 
harmony of the spheres or the voice of the cosmos…” (Deleuze 
2006b: 311), letting us think that greatly differs from cosmic.
Meanwhile Guattari in Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Par-
adigm (1995) describes the new aesthetic paradigm which uses 
deterritorialization and creates the abstract or war machine, 
working similarly to the autopoietic machine. It brings, ren-
ders and harnesses outside forces and finally aestheticizes the 
cosmos, though his cosmos has “ethico-political implication”. 
Great refrain is cosmic and aestheticizing, as well as political.
In their common philosophy, earth forces is a feature of 
Romanticism, while cosmos forces belong to Modern time. 
That is why in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia we find that “The assemblage no longer confronts the 
forces of chaos, it no longer uses the forces of the earth or the 
people to deepen itself but instead opens onto the forces of the 
Cosmos” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 342), outlining that cosmos 
itself is refrain, so “the second type is the little phrase of the 
Cosmos” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 350). The main purpose of 
art is the transformation of matter-form relation, going behind 
and bringing “pure forces attributable only to the Cosmos”. The 
separation between territorial and earth, or territorial and cos-
mic is ambiguous and thin, because Earth is part of the cosmos 
as well as the cosmos is part of Earth, moreover because artistic 
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refrain is in a moving process, nevertheless related to territory, 
in permanent fluctuation: territorialisation / deterritorializa-
tion / reterritorialization. If the Earth forces are deepening 
or if refrain is opening to the Cosmic forces “is a question of 
perceptions, or thresholds of discernibility belonging to given 
assemblages” as Deleuze and Guattari state (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 346). So the thought about small and great refrain could 
be understood by only having in mind the pulsation of space-
time, when small refrain and mark of territory is a starting point 
(whether a child or bird singing, rain sounding or any other 
phrase coming to sensations), but only in comparison with its 
further step in the process, its development in any direction 
(artistic performance, social or cultural event), not as a fixed 
beginning in nature and a move toward a fixed end in culture. 
“We are always in the middle of this process of de- and reterrito-
rialization, because any ‘motif ’ is detached from another refrain 
that composes it”, Zepke notices perceptively (Zepke 2005: 
157). In our view, Deleuzean and Guattari’s separation in their 
use of common concepts depends on their vision of the role of 
the art and their access to means of art and their distributions 
as well as their access to philosophy: Deleuzean transcendental 
empiricism and Guattarian practical philosophy. Deleuzoguat-
tarian or Deleuzean solo interpretations of art examples and 
especially of music don’t overstep compositional frames, letting 
sensations fall into the abstract machine, to break and open 
compositional frames for novelty, but still remaining tied to 
the composition, created on “a cosmic earth – that is the wish 
of the artisan-artist, here, there, locally”, while “the earth must 
be like the vectors of a cosmos”, and “then the cosmos itself will 
be art” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 346). Despite their common 
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philosophy, we can recognise that whereas Deleuze tended to 
remain on the immanent and conceptual, Guattari focused on 
the practical plane while working with the same concepts of 
Cosmos and great refrain. Deleuze in his interview about the 
invention of concepts and their slightly different meanings in 
different texts agrees that “twin impression of a single plane of 
immanence, and concepts on the other hand that are always 
local, is quite right” (Deleuze 1995: 147). His attention is oc-
cupied by the plane of immanence, which is the plane of mul-
tiplicities. Guattari more easily erases compositional frames, 
letting artistic refrain get into cultural, social, political and 
other types of the abstract or war machine.
Probably in The Fold: Leibnitz and the Baroque Deleuze 
broadens his vision of refrain in relation to the concepts of fold 
and harmony for the sounding Cosmos, but still more on the 
conceptual level, allowing for philosophy to produce harmony.
Is becoming music or becoming art necessary for getting 
into a great refrain? In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia one can find a description of the becomings of 
man such as becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-
animal and many other becomings, such as becoming-color, 
becoming-sound, becoming-sonorous, becoming-impercepti-
ble. “A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the 
two; it is the in-between, the border or line of flight or descent 
running perpendicular to both” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 293). 
It is a block, which constitutes a zone of indiscernibility, a “no-
man’s-land”. In the subdivision becoming-music, Deleuze and 
Guattari try to define Western music and give the example of 
Debussy’s music, stating that “the becoming-child and the be-
coming-woman in his works are intense but are now inseparable 
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from a molecularization of the motif ” and additionally note 
that “The molecular has the capacity to make the elementary 
communicate with the cosmic” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 308). 
No doubt that in the Deleuzoguattarian perspective the pro-
cess of becoming-music in transition from the small refrain to 
great (or cosmic) refrain is necessary and unquestionable, it 
happens through percepts and affects, the coexistence of major 
and minor variables. Meanwhile, Guattari uses art and music 
for the sake of the aesthetic paradigm and aestheticizing world 
while it finally puts them off, and transfers the continuation of 
the aestheticizing to the abstract machine, based on becomings 
and producing becomings as existential experiences. Aesthetic 
assemblage “start to exist in you, in spite of you”, and one can 
say “That’s Debussy, that’s jazz, that’s Van Gogh” (Guattari 
1995: 93) and later is released of that. Nevertheless, similar to 
the autopoietic reproductive capacity, proposed by Humberto 
Maturana and Francesco Varela, Guattari outlines two-faced 
machinic entities and two types of ontological consistency 
(first and second autopoietic folding), when one is creative, the 
other is destructive, and both are in tension. That is why the 
creative practice as becoming is so important as an input of the 
artist to the machinic phylum, oriented toward the Universe. 
Evidently, for both philosophers – Deleuze and Guattari – the 
move of refrain means creation, being in transition, line of flight 
and becoming.
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The Small and Great Refrain: Bryars’ Diagram
In the composition “Jesus’ Blood Never Failed Me Yet” by 
Bryars, one of the most well-known minimalists and experi-
mentalists29, the intrigue is the motif of authentic singing by 
the old man. This singing has been noticed by the composer, 
who borrowed it and used it for compounding with orchestra-
tion. This motif of the homeless man was natal, meaning the 
deep relationship with his living territory and expressing his 
feeling of being safe within everyday life, while living without 
a home. It is the narration of a personal story in one state, 
“Jesus’ blood never failed me yet, it’s one thing I know, that 
he loves me so”, which marks territory by the simple motif 
and slightly strange rhythm. Life’s protection is expected 
to be ensured by love and confession, expressed by silently 
murmuring the words and melody. The state of being of this 
man can be understood according to the analogy given by von 
Uexküll in A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A 
Picture Book of Invisible Worlds on the birds’ relationship with 
the environment. Recognition of the animal’s home territories 
depends on the relationship composition within group and 
environmental signs, not an exact place, especially the birds’ 
recognition of their territories for staying there during migra-
tion without having been there before. It is something mystical 
or hyper sensual in recognition of the territory, which can be 
called natal. Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia claim that the ambiguity and 
29 See more in Griffiths, Paul (1985). New Sounds, New Personalities. 
London, Boston: Faber Music Ltd. 
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patterns of territory and deterritorialization of refrain is a mat-
ter of ambiguity of Natal, exemplified exactly with the birds’ 
life and marking of their territory. In Bryars’ case, that is an 
old man-child, who naively marks his territory by a song and 
within a song. The refrain is territorializing and functional – to 
serve God, and at the same time natal, when natal is not de-
fined by any precise place or rituals (just living in a sinful and 
temporal Earth), and it can be somewhere outside his state. 
Despite Deleuze and Guattari separating these functional 
and natal types of refrain, the possibility to link them appears 
in opposition to the artistic refrain. In the face of orchestra, 
this functional refrain inspires deterritorialization and later 
on produces novelty despite its territorializing intention: “A 
territory is always en route to an at least potential deterrito-
rialization, even though the new assemblage may operate a 
reterritorialization (something that “has-the-value-of ” home)” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 326). Deleuze and Guattari use the 
words subtle deterritorialization, so the threshold between one 
assemblage (functional) and another (artistic) is vague and not 
easily separated.
Coming back to the Bryars example, it is obvious that the 
composer valued the homeless man’s everyday song, which 
is functional, expressed in a naïve and naturally scratching 
way, directed onto the goal of surviving, but at the same time 
sounding artistic. Bryars mixes the nonprofessional authentic 
voice and professional playing / singing, and allows it to carry 
on the new forces, coming through the encountering of the 
natural and professionally created, noisy and pure, rhythmicly 
composed and not. Such a simple, but unusual singing of the old 
man provoked Bryars, who in the beginning of the composing 
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work said: “I noticed, too, that the first section of the song – 13 
bars in length – formed an effective loop which repeated in a 
slightly unpredictable way”30.
Later, Bryars developed the homeless man’s natal and 
functional refrain until the composition with the cosmic ef-
fect, while permanently repeating the same motif until this has 
gradually been transformed into the great. It was broadened 
by the composer, involving accompaniment and developing 
the motif harmonically with instruments, involving the voice 
of Tom Waits and compounding different rhythms, when one 
voice is singing later than another, some characters repeat-
ing with a longer duration that finally gives the effect of one 
holistic impression of the Universe sound with human traces. 
Functional became artistic, harnessing cosmic forces, which 
was noticed by the composer as pre-existing in the motif ex-
pression. The first type refrain was developed and integrated 
into the second type refrain, and small refrain was developed 
into the great refrain. It could stand up on its own in that 
meaning which Jim Vernon (2014) has, emphasising the ef-
forts and professionalism of the composer and artist, but not 
the meaning of Deleuze and Guattari. In a Deleuzoguattarian 
sense, the great refrain is somewhere between the virtual and 
actual; it is cosmic. Vernon, who for the analysis of music in 
the Deleuzean perspective took the examples of Bryars’ music 
and raised the question: it is “unclear how artistic, and there-
after specifically musical assemblages would differ from any 
rhythmic interaction that develops from the given” and “what 
makes a territory, and how does it produce specifically artistic 
30 Story retrieved from http://www.gavinbryars.com/Pages/jesus_
blood_never_failed_m.html [30 april 2016].
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assemblages?” (Vernon 2014: 56–57). He doubts the Deleuzean 
treatment of music and its formation using chaos forces, the 
liberation of sonic affects from their territorial functions in 
composition, especially natural, non-musical sounds, and their 
independence, as well as autonomous floating for the final end of 
music, when it stands up on its own. Vernon thinks differently: 
according to him, music can stand on its own, but it happens 
only on a compositional basis, the work of the composer and 
artist, not on cosmic forces from the outside. In the example 
of Bryars’ compositions, as well as the interview with him, 
Vernon sees the ability for the music to stand on its own not as 
much by the affect and art machine, but on the contrary – with 
the author staying at a distance from the performance of his 
composition. Deleuze and Guattari outlined that “the great 
refrain arises as we distance ourselves from the house, even 
if this is in order to return”, but it is more important for them 
to point out – “since no one will recognize us anymore when 
we come back” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 191). This huge dif-
ference after leaving home in deterritorialization lets us think 
about the great transformation in the process, which depends 
on forces from the outside, not only artistic perfection. Music 
in comparison with other arts is less materialised and more 
abstract, actualized during every singular expression, which is 
why its strength, according to Vernon, is in the score, protecting 
the compositional idea, no less than in the expression. Vernon 
gives examples of Bryars who, despite being very familiar to 
jazz improvisation in music, “after the very brief existence of 
the group”, playing on improvisational manner, “moved back 
exclusively to scored music” (Vernon 2014: 60). In interview 
presented by Paul Griffiths, Bryars outlined that his interest 
in the composition is based on philosophical access: “to find 
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compositional means which may lead to things that sound like 
something else, but through a different approach, which is dif-
ferent intention and therefore a different meaning” (Griffiths 
1985: 153) and has “tended to write rather lengthy programme 
notes, giving the flavour, the background, the thoughts that 
have gone into the piece” (Griffiths 1985: 154). Bryars was in 
the vortex of new experimental music, met Cage, and knew 
minimalists such as Steve Reich and Philippe Glass, but he did 
not have the intention of “mimicking them”31. Discussing the 
role of repetition for functional and aesthetic purposes and giv-
ing the example of Bryars and other musicians, Vernon thinks 
that the piece of art must be “liberated from habit, interest, 
goal and reception” (Vernon 2014: 60) and in that sense can 
be autonomous, while nature in comparison with art is “too 
directed to functional goals” (Vernon 2014: 60). For such a 
liberated effect, the importance of the input of any composer in 
composition and later in its expression, instruments and other 
performance’s circumstances, according to him is unquestion-
able, even if music is experimental and improvised, free from 
any strict plan.
The little refrain of bird, child or old man, coming authenti-
cally from the natural world, are unique territorial assemblages. 
We see the uniqueness of the old man’s refrain, which seems 
childish, in Bryars’ case. It is kept as a leitmotif during the 
entire composition. Deleuze and Guattari state that: “Music is 
31 Bryars in 1963 or 1964 wrote the letter to Messiaen with a question 
about modes and received a letter where he suggested to buy his 
book. He did that and it seems that helped him to work with idiom 
for one jazz composition and Cage-ish peace, and probably with later 
compositions as well (from the interview in Paul Griffith’s New Sounds, 
New Personalities, 1985).
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traversed by a becoming-woman, becoming-child, and not only 
at the level of themes and motifs: the little refrain, children’s 
games and dances, childhood scenes. Instrumentation and 
orchestration are permeated by becomings-animal, above all 
becomings-bird, but many others besides. The lapping, wailing 
of molecular discordances have always been present, even if 
instrumental evolution with other factors is now giving them 
growing importance, as the value of a new threshold for a prop-
erly musical content: the sound molecule, relations of speed and 
slowness between particles” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 272). In 
Bryars’ composition, artistic rearrangement and deterritoriali-
zation happen through the development of the little motif into 
the great artistic composition completed by the orchestra as 
the first type refrain is growing into the second. In the beginning 
it appears as a diagrammatic direction – “a germ of order or 
rhythm” (Deleuze 2003b: 102), and sounds in agreement with 
Zepke as an “existential motif ”, which “installs itself like an 
“attractor” within a sensible and significational chaos” (Zepke 
2005: 157). Later it becomes an organic process, reminding one 
of meditation, a slow process and keeping the uniqueness of the 
little refrain until the end of the composition, when the “artist 
detaches some material, frees the motif so that it can attract and 
compose new sensations and senses–new affects–according to 
a new refrain” (Zepke 2005: 157). The composition includes 
non-uniform material, but without using difficult chromatic 
or complicated rhythmic modulations. Instead of that, it is the 
precise development and variation of Form through the en-
countering of the professional and nonprofessional, composed 
and not composed until it becomes Force.
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The Small and Great Refrain:  
Herzog’s Diagram for Wagner
It is more difficult to predict the idea and find a way of trans-
formation of the functional refrain into the artistic in Herzog’s 
film. Herzog is very tentative to life and nature’s small, subtle 
details and magnitude embodied in them. The world for him 
is full of sounds and rhythms, and he tries to show the world’s 
relationship to music with a similar, but not the same, intention 
as Deleuze or Deleuze and Guattari’s. Deleuze was interested 
in expression, the actualization of virtuality through the as-
semblages of different sounds, while Herzog is interested in the 
creation of professional art and its purity, and as Deleuze says 
in the chapter “The figures of Large and Small” in Cinema 1: 
The Movement-Image about Herzog’s movies: heroic madness for 
the Pure idea and from another side – enfeeblement (Deleuze 
1986b: 184). Herzog’s documentary film The Transformation 
of the World into Music (1994) can be taken into consideration 
using Deleuzoguattarian philosophy because the film shows the 
opera Parsifal by Wagner, to whom Deleuze and Guattari paid 
huge attention, being exercised on the stage. Parsifal is very rich 
in music, using unusual harmonic progression in leitmotifs, a 
difficult structure, and variation with sound pitch. It is full of 
transversal lines, fighting and bringing cosmic forces into a great 
piece of art. Wagner’s friend Friedrich Nietzsche also noticed 
that with admiration, though in On the Genealogy of Morals he 
ardently criticised Wagner for his latest turn onto Christian-
ity, as well as the philosophy of ascetic life, taken from Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and manifestation of weak people’s 
values. Deleuze was keen on Wagnerian Parsifal, but differently 
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from Nietzsche he notices an indefinable, multiple identity of 
Parsifal. In Cinema 2: The Time-Image he outlines the double 
meaning of the presentation of body and voice potentiality in 
the film of German director Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, who in 
1982 adapted Wagner’s Parsifal for the screen.
The special interest is in the short scene presenting the par-
allel singing of the opera’s Grail motif on the stage by the choir 
and professional soloist and by the theatre’s worker behind the 
stage. That is the same motif, which is repeating in two different 
assemblages at the same time. They are the same by melody and 
rhythm, but different by tonality, they have a lot of external 
characters which appear in a particular expression, managing 
tone of voice, and depend on professional performance and 
non-professional humming. Can they be called small refrain 
and great refrain, as has been done with Bryars’ composi-
tion? How do both expressions of the same motif coincide in 
Herzog’s film, if so? For what purpose are they put in paral-
lel? What does both of them performing together add to the 
professional artistic shot in Herzog’s film? It is the question 
of the coexistence of great and small, artistic and not artistic 
and the threshold between them, which should be overstepped 
for novelty. The old fireman humming a tune from Wagner’s 
opera Parsifal, in parallel with the big orchestra led by the solo-
ist, gives an impression of double refraining, which despite the 
same musical phrase seems incompatible and in the same time 
very warm, natural, allowing one to hear the opera through the 
“sieve” of the worker. An effect is achieved in this film scene: 
the unexpectedly simplified and sensitively performed famous 
opera motif, and its interrelation with the entire opera, not only 
the particular motif by a usable thread. It presents the lifting 
from the large refrain onto the small one, returning back to 
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the very beginning of music and the short phrase, and allow-
ing to appear what has been already deterritorialized: “Music 
is precisely the adventure of the refrain: the way music lapses 
back into a refrain…; the way it lays hold of the refrain, makes 
it more and more sober, reduced to a few notes, then takes it 
down a creative line that is so much richer, no origin or end of 
which is in sight” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 301–302). The old 
man’s authentic singing in a few notes expresses Earth forces 
while his naiveté allows him to become a child. Can his refrain 
create a much richer line? What was the idea of Herzog? In the 
film Herzog has interviewed and filmed many workers behind 
the stage as well as famous artists of stage. He was filming 
the process of becoming music differently to the Deleuzean 
meaning of becoming and was interested in technical subtlety 
as well as approach of those who were involved in creating the 
performance. The fireman singing a famous fragment of the 
composition marks his home territory as well as the homeless 
man does in the first example of Bryars’ composition. His real 
territory is a small room behind the theatre’s stage, providing 
it with fire protection equipment. That is very important to 
present for the author of film. The fireman has “lived” there 
for many years, so it became his natal territory. The fireman’s 
refrain is territorializing and also functional refrain.
Looking from a Deleuzoguattarian perspective on the ex-
tract of Herzog’s film, not onto Wagner’s opera, this coexistence 
of authentic and professional singing float into one assemblage 
and give the effect of an art machine, which transforms the 
separation of great and small as well as figures of The Large and 
The Small mentioned by Deleuze in Cinema 1: Movement-Image. 
Deleuze and Guattari say that there is no “distinction between 
musician birds and nonmusician birds. Rather, it is the labour of 
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the refrain: Does it remain territorial and territorializing, or is it 
carried away in a moving block that draws a transversal across 
all coordinates – and all of the intermediaries between the two?” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 302). In this shot the distinction be-
tween the two undoubtedly exists and is rather large, though 
two parallel singing motifs are neither one, nor two. Each one 
can be treated as circumstances of the exterior milieu in coun-
terpoint, as well as interior relations in their territory. So their 
conjunction, while the first is artistic and the other functional, 
creates a new artistic refrain created by Herzog on another 
plane, when “one was already present in the other; the cosmic 
force was already present in the material, the great refrain in 
the little refrains, the great maneuver in the little maneuver” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 350). Nevertheless, both refrains run-
ning parallel anticipate one (creators and listener) to the virtual, 
and in Gallope’s words “marks how humans reorient themselves 
away from the actual back to the virtual” (Gallope 2010: 90). 
That turns one back to potential, which is in the gap, neither one, 
nor another refrain: “These are no longer territorialized forces 
bundled together as forces of the earth; they are the liberated or 
regained forces of deterritorialized Cosmos” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 326). That is possible because of the cycle returning back 
is done by another artist – not Wagner, but Herzog. The refrain 
was doubled by the worker, partly replacing the soloist, similar to 
the replacement of the mother by Death in Mussorgsky’s Lullaby 
in the Deleuzoguattarian description (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
300). Herzog’s difference from Mussorgsky’s case is that the 
replacement happens not within one musical composition plane, 
but on the other artistic plane, when the refrain crosses between 
two planes. Intra-assemblage was lifted into inter-assemblage. 
In Deleuze’s words, “the line which comes diagonally from the 
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heart of things and distributes volcanoes: it unites a bubbling 
sensibility and a thought which rumbles in its crater” appeared 
(Deleuze 1994: 230). The non-professional voice in the face of 
the orchestration and the opera presents an encounter of the 
natural and cultural, the functional and aesthetic, the natal 
and cosmic, when “the natal stretches what happens in the 
intra-assemblage…; it cuts across all the inter-assemblages and 
reaches all the way to the gates of the Cosmos” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 333). It seems that the parallel of artistic and not 
artistic laid somewhere on the basis of this shot idea. Involving 
a non-musician into the aesthetical plane of composition opens 
the door for becoming between two multiplicities, the zone of 
chaos forces, through taking the diagonal line and coming to the 
event, and finally as Herzog’s film title says to come to the effect 
of “the transformation of the world into the music”, or in Deleu-
zoguattarian words “transform one into the other as they pass 
through doors and across thresholds” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
272), searching for the final end of music. In Deleuzean terms, it 
is the time-crystal, crystal-image and sound-crystal, when two 
versions of the same motif show, although unfortunately applied 
to Herzog’s other film (Heart of Glass) in Cinema 2: The Time-
Image (Deleuze 1989: 75) as the “whole range of manufacturing 
for the world” of music.
The final end of music mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari 
is supposed to be actual, when “the cosmic force was already 
present in the material, the great refrain in the little refrains”, 
but at the same time they “Produce a deterritorialized refrain as 
the final end of music, release it in the Cosmos” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1987: 350), which means its being virtual, its move allowing 
one to hear a lot of sounds, and their assemblages, differently 
and in parallel existing at the same time, as it is exemplified by 
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Wagner’s refrain(s) in Herzog’s film. In the case of Bryars, final 
end of music and standing up on their own is in the compositional 
arrangement and actualization according to it, when it sounds 
harmonically and rhythmicly perfect. Both examples have dif-
ferent diagrams, directed towards the opening for the forces; 
both have the similar intention while playing with refrains, but 
both rather remain on the way to Great refrain, staying tied to 
the artistic compositional plane, which determines it, instead 
of becoming the abstract machine creating the Great refrain. 
We partly agree with Vernon’s statement, that talking about 
final end in music in the Deleuzean way is rather vague, as it 
in Vernon’s words “reveals the limits of Deleuze’s philosophy 
of music” (Vernon 2014: 63). At least, until we understand it 
as the professional work of the composer / director and artist 
in their relationship with the audience, not as something that 
happens somewhere behind, between human and non-human. 
So Deleuze and Guattari posed the question “what is not musi-
cal in human beings, and what already is musical in nature” 
(Deleuze, Guattari, 1987: 309), which continually opened 
another question of origin of the final end of music, of course if 
there is a sense to talk using such an ambitious concept without 
any hint of humour or irony.
Becoming Cosmic in a (non)Deleuzean Way
The art transformation into the abstract machine, which opens 
for outside forces and aestheticizes the cosmos, instead of clos-
ing the artistic refrain in the compositional frame in Guattari’s 
Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (1995) perspective is 
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more overtly described. Great refrain is cosmic and aesthetices 
social and political planes. It creates a cosmic effect, then erases 
borders between art and non-art, and even more as excavated 
by Zepke (2009) – it produces an effect behind this distinction, 
on a different plane of every day, as he found in examples of 
Allan Kaprow’s installations and events. For rethinking small 
and large refrain, as well as the cosmic effect of a great refrain 
it might be helpful to turn to some living performances; this 
time we can refer to the ones in Lithuanian art life. Lithuanian 
artist George Maciunas (1931–1978)32, who lived and created 
in the US and founded the Fluxus movement, was undoubtedly 
one of the beginners who tried to erase the border between 
art and the everyday, to fuse the cultural, social and political. 
The like-minded members of the Fluxus Manifesto and their 
events, performances in the streets, houses, and flats were revo-
lutionarily directed against officially recognised, professional 
art, authorship, non-functional commodity, and were declared 
living art, anti-art, non-art reality and ready-made art. Maciunas 
supported the ideas of Marcel Duchamp and Cage (Sakalaus-
kas 2002: 47, 119), organised concerts of Fluxus festivals, and 
created 12 Piano Compositions for Nam June Paik and other 
performances using musical instruments and everyday sounds, 
which he treated as music. One can find his followers all over 
the world. The Fluxus movement can be easily understood and 
interpreted in a Deleuzoguattarian perspective by using their 
32 Originally his name was Jurgis Mačiūnas. He has born and grew up in 
Kaunas (Lithuania), but during World War II emigrated to Germany 
with his family and later to USA (New York). Living abroad after 
conflict with the Lithuanian community, he corrected his name to 
George Maciunas (Sakalauskas 2002: 54).
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concepts33. Nevertheless, there is another artistic access that 
can be understood as an extension of art’s purpose and func-
tion, fluctuating between the functional, social and artistic and 
not repeating Maciunas’ way.
Some artists creating in Lithuania, such as drum player 
Vladimir Tarasov and Gitenis Umbrasas mentioned above in 
the chapter “Art and Life: Catalytic Power of Art”, exemplify 
how this conjunction between the functional and artistic dis-
appears, broadening the territorial expansion and transferring 
the machinic contagion into a social field. They can be treated 
33 Steve Wilmer presentation Fluxus as Nomadic Art Movement at the 
conference Deleuze + Art. Multiplicities, Thresholds, Potentialities in 
Dublin (April 8–10, 2016) was introducing George Maciunas works 
in correspondence with Deleuzoguattarian philosophy.
Vladimir Tarasov. Installation Gobustan. 2009. DVD.
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as not-Deleuzean – rather Guattarian – but also as not Deleu-
zoguattarian by their radical connection to tradition; also as 
becoming Deleuzoguattarian using other access to art. These 
cases are artistic performances or installations, where the idea 
is embodied in events using artistic constructions that create 
the unceasing and flowing in many directions of the social 
move. Does it work by affect? Definitely, yes – it is an apparent 
contagion with a variation of intensity.
Tarasov, a great jazz player34 experimenting with the sound 
and aleatoric compositional subtleties, and also a painter and 
performer, has created numerous installations to investigate the 
possibilities and limits of sound (Water Music 1994, Installation 
at Solitude 1996, Music of Spirits 1998, Concert of Flies 1993, She-
hina 2003, Inside Out 2006, Gobustan 2009). He used to give im-
pulses for the independent fluctuation and unpredictable logic 
of installations, combining sound and image and different time 
and space perceptions, in that way creating a micro-universe. 
Sometimes it was started off with a few predictable sounds, 
sometimes unpredictable, but fixed by the composer as a little 
refrain. For example, in his installation Water Music (1994), 
displayed in the New York Ronald Feldman gallery (with Ilja 
Kabakov), he experimented with the sound of the drops of wa-
ter falling into buckets. The rhythm was unpredictable in the 
same way as one cannot predict the falling of raindrops, after 
the rain has ended, into the lake from the branches of oak trees 
around it. This was an experience by Tarasov many years ago 
that got imprinted in his memory. However, the sound pitch of 
34 Vladimir Tarasov was a drum player in the prominent jazz trio GTC 
(Viačeslav Ganelin, Vladimir Tarasov, Vladimir Čekasin), performing 
in Lithuania and other countries in the 1980s–1990s.
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the water dropping into the buckets was designed and predicted 
in advance. The ambience of the sound was naturally created 
by the rhythm of dropping water, the interplay of rhythms and 
the pitch, and not by the artist. On the question of whether he 
can demonstrate “the mediation and peace that is experienced 
in harmony with nature in a museum and gallery,” he answered 
that can be done “by assigning twelve pitches to the sounds of 
non-musical instruments. However, you would want something 
more. In “Water Music” I came closer to my goal” (Tarasov 
2008: 49). He tried to broaden the space or find unusual space 
for his installation; sometimes they were in nature (Installation 
at Solitude 1996 with Sarah Jane Flohr). In Tarasov’s Shehina 
(2003), originally created in a Serbian synagogue and later 
exhibited in the galleries of other countries, the artist put on 
symmetrically many books of the Bible on a big plate, all of 
which were open. The installation was placed in a dark space 
in a special gallery room reminiscent of any temple. The wind 
or blowing air was thumbing the pages of the books like it 
was reading of them. It was a small artistic refrain. The wind 
reading of the books created the noise of turning pages that 
spread over the open room entrance. In addition, the sound 
of turning pages was mixed with the sounds of sacral music 
and street noise (recorded in advance and performed during 
the opening of the installation) as well as the sounds inside 
the gallery. Non-audible words of the Bible read by the wind 
mixed with the surrounding sounds produced a joint human 
and non-human effect, mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari. 
Books (written by human) were read by nature synchronically 
although in different rhythms: the whisper of the pages mov-
ing in the wind created a series of sounds. Tarasov views the 
wind as an archetype from the Bible, which “…blows where it 
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wants, you can hear its sough, but do not know where it comes 
from and where it goes” (Tarasov 2008). Does it become a great 
refrain? Tarasov’s installations in many cases (though not in 
all) are performed in galleries. Though restricted in closed 
spaces and using some artificial methods (like artificially blow-
ing wind and other recorded sounds), Tarasov’s experiments 
with sound go behind the artistic frame, provoked to perform 
the surrounding and in that way aestheticize it. According to 
Tarasov, “at least one element of an installation needs to be 
authentic for it to function; to create its depth” (Tarasov 2008: 
73). The installation lives its own life, depending on the depth 
and through the authentic element opening the installation to 
the new, unexpected interruptions of sounds or visual from na-
ture, in that way extending the prime idea, also creating a new 
rhythmic pulsation. Unfortunately, the other limitation of his 
performances and installations is the duration of their display.
Vladimir Tarasov. Shehina. 2003. Installation.
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The master of giving a starting point for the appearance 
of the great refrain is the artist Umbrasas. His works were 
created for political, social and ecological purposes. He didn’t 
work much with sound; instead, he preferred other art mate-
rial (sculpture, painting), but also included natural sound. The 
installations Chirping Cross, The Miracle and Banks of Love were 
created as works of art (a chirping sculpture with a fresco on 
the story of St. Francis of Assisi on the Cross; a mosaic skilfully 
embedded on a brick; a composition of flowers designed as a 
dialogue on the opposite banks of the river), while at the same 
time to perform specific functions, like a nesting box for birds 
to dwell, giving new life to a worn-out brick; planting flowers 
and taking care of them every spring. They continue to live after 
the artistic performance finished and became social events. The 
small refrain and repetitions in his performances and installa-
tions, marking territorial borders in correspondence with social 
functions and the artistic idea, are gradually extended to a great 
refrain.
The performances and installations by Umbrasas create 
an abstract machine that involves social and biological life ac-
companied by everyday sounds. They have persisted in working 
without any special intervention of the artist broadly for more 
than 10 years. Now it has become cosmic, in a sense that it 
aestheticizes everyday life and apparently erases the borders 
between the artistic and the non-artistic (functional, social, 
cultural), and also between the small and the great. However, 
for this contagion and rhizomatic movement, something ar-
boreal has to be laid in the beginning. That starts not from 
Zero, as Deleuze and Guattari understand it, but from Zero, 
which in its essence has a source in deep tradition. Contrary to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s statement that “[m]aking a clean slate, 
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starting or beginning again from ground zero, seeking a begin-
ning or a foundation – all imply a false conception of voyage 
and movement (a conception that is methodical, pedagogical, 
initiatory, symbolic…)” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 25), this 
point of Zero, which is not an empty form, but a fundamental 
Zero, later allows for movement in all directions. Foundation 
is being sacrificed for the sake of rhizomatic expansion: at the 
same time, appearing to withdraw and disappear within the 
horizontal cause that surrounds and overwhelms it, and within 
the diagonal that spreads into the social machine. In this way 
it becomes universal. Thus, agreeing with the main concepts 
and ideas on rhizomatic movement and the abstract and art 
machine in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, there is still a 
possibility to overcome borders between the art and the non-art 
in another, not exactly Deleuzoguattarian way. Arboreal struc-
ture, used by the abovementioned artists is probably close only 
to natal refrain described in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, especially if natal relates to traditional, not 
to nature. “The natal is new figure assumed by the innate and 
the acquired in territorial assemblage” but “in the natal, the in-
nate tends to be displaced” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 386–387), 
as exemplified in the performances and installations created by 
Tarasov and Umbrasas.
Tarasov and Umbrasas are open to the unexpectedness, the 
forces from the outside, but at the same time they use tradi-
tional materials, techniques and forms: fragments of frescos 
and mosaics, nature and religious symbols and archetypes; 
they are neither hidden under the surface nor declared above 
it. They are on the surface, seen and perceived in the social life 
as part of the pop culture, not the artistic one of traditional or 
“high” culture, although growing into a great social event. They 
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are publicly recognized exclusively as bio, eco and social acts, 
in most cases without reflecting of significant artistic value, 
encompassed into the installation or performance. American 
performer Bill Viola experimenting with sound and image in 
a similar way strives to cause an effect. Initially he is driven 
by the idea in most cases coming from a religious tradition, 
and he uses forces from inside, founded in tradition, not from 
the Zero, and then allows them to produce the flow outside, to 
join with cosmic forces. “What differents is that Viola offers a 
radically different content – a profound spiritual reflection – 
from any other contemporary artist working in this way. The 
form seemingly remains the same, but the message is changed” 
(Townsend 2004: 14). Viola’s transmission from artistic to 
political, from spiritual to secular, according to his investiga-
tor Chris Townsend, is “not only subversive but extremely 
brave” (Townsend 2004: 15). Experiments with water sound 
and repetition (Five Angels for the Millennium 2001; The Raft 
2004; Stations 1994) as well as Wagner’s music (The Stopping 
Mind 1991) are very close to those of Tarasov, especially his 
performance with the sound of water drops. They both can be 
recognized as those who try all possibilities of sound and pre-
sent new excavations on how to work with sound, ambience and 
image in much more broader spaces than traditional galleries 
and to create a spiritual effect in contemporary life. “To Viola 
the sound of being, heard from the distance, is the combination 
of all the disparate elements that make up the infinite variety 
of sensations and physicality, resolved into a constant low rum-
bling – the frequency of existence” (Davies 2004: 159). Could 
these artists be examples of contemporary art that through 
contagion involves the entire world, confuses the forces of the 
earth with the cosmos, the chaos with the cosmic forces, thus 
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bringing novelty? Or are they left out of Deleuzoguattarian 
concepts and the conception of art? In our understanding, to 
be nomadic and to create intensities, waiting for events while 
deterritorializing and reterritorializing the refrain, is not suf-
ficient for great creation – the “final end of music” or “art”. In 
the interpretation of these examples in the Deleuzoguattarian 
perspective, Pickstock’s insights are useful. She argues that the 
Messiaen nonretrogradic rhythm that was one of the sources 
for Deleuzean philosophy allowed us to understand music as 
an expression of the divine triad, including the Holy Spirit and 
angelic chorus as a possibility for the line of flight and escape 
from return, though Messiaen “realized that non-identical 
repetition is not pure except in God; for human beings it has 
always to be mixed with deployment of identically repeated 
patterns” (Pickstock 2008: 194). According to Pickstock, in the 
desacralization of music, the use of concepts, such as the line 
of flight and diagonal, are senseless: “Deleuze’s diagonal ‘line 
of flight’ can never ascend or reach further, but always returns 
to the sway of the vertical and horizontal coordinates. It is not 
really post-Baroque but pre-Baroque, since it achieves only a 
nihilistic version of polyphonic exact plotting of intersections. 
An immanent diagonal can only sink with a vertical collapse 
back into the earth or vanish in a horizontal temporal swoon 
which leaves historical time altogether. It is not a true trans-
versal at all” (Pickstock 2008: 192). The use of such concepts 
as God, divine, sacral, heaven or angel, are somewhat difficult 
to relate to Deleuze and Guattari’s way of thinking, although 
their thoughts can be easily used to analyze religious music. 
Nonetheless, the idea that spiritual forces play a big role in the 
creation of art – music and music performances – are probably 
not as extraneous for Deleuze as Pickstock claims. In a more 
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restrained way and using Deleuzean concepts from Cinema 2. 
The Time-Image, it can be stated that for harnessing and ex-
pression spiritual forces a seed must be sowed, which later 
will germinate and produce not only cosmic effects through 
the affects, but also will become the crystal. This spirituality is 
embedded neither in the seed nor in the Crystal, neither in the 
person nor in the social. It is everywhere, just as a hint.
Improvisation as Deterritorialization:  
Waiting for the Unexpected
In discussions on deterritorialization in music, some questions 
arise: which style of music should be chosen to describe terri-
torialization and deterritorialization, which one is more proper 
and exemplifying for the analysis of territorial movement. In 
the description of deterritorialization in music, Deleuze and 
Guattari have been writing about classical and experimental 
music, skipping pop and jazz, which is why they were claimed 
to be elitist (Buchanan 1997, Bidima 2004, Holland 2008). 
However, their emphasis on improvisation has encouraged 
investigators to discuss deterritorialization in jazz, which in 
essence is improvisational. On the other hand, Jean Bidima and 
Vernon find that jazz music is not as free and deterritorializing 
as some imagine it is, so its abilities are exaggerated. Every jazz 
improvisation is an assemblage and in order to work on it one 
has to know the theme and structure of the composition, which 
is why jazz improvisation is rather playing with jazz elements 
within assemblage (Bidima 2004, Vernon 2014). One can only 
partly agree with that, because of the very different styles in 
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jazz: from traditional to free, from playing standards to experi-
menting with sound without compositional frames. Despite the 
variety of musical styles, improvisation is undoubtedly a big 
force of the emancipation of sound, melody and rhythm. It is 
probably reasonable to distinguish idiomatic improvisation 
and free improvisation (Costa 2011) or iterative and itinerative 
improvisation (Wallin 2010), that allows for seeing the rela-
tionship between the theme, improvisation, and refrain. Every 
improvisation during the series of repetitions brings more or 
less novelty because of the existence of a differential pattern 
of repetition in itself. Differential refrain, which according to 
Holland “maximises proportions of difference” is typical to jazz 
music, as it is more flexible in comparison with classic music 
and allows for catching a line of flight a lot more easily as well 
as to lift from one type of refrain to another. Holland outlined 
lift from cultural to global, efforts to escape geographic bor-
ders, letting music be socially innovative through the nomadic 
journey using live play or contemporary media (Holland 2008). 
Deleuzoguattarian music philosophy and especially their idea 
of deterritorialization and bringing cosmic forces, as Holland 
states, cannot solve the problems of social refrain and create 
conditions for people to come, which seem to be of crucial 
importance not only for Holland, but for many investigators 
of Deleuzoguattarian music philosophy in its relation to real 
music. The question of music’s audience seems to be left be-
hind in the Deleuzean philosophy. Nevertheless, the French 
philosophers’ famous statement “… to improvise is to join with 
the World or meld with it” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 311) gave a 
lot of directions to think about improvisational music. At least 
a few can be distinguished: 1) improvisation as a tool to “join 
with the World”, 2) the purpose of “melding with the World”, 
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3) the dangers in this nomadic journey of music and encounter-
ing forces of chaos, and 4) the role of the composer and musi-
cian in the process of becoming music and music standing up 
on its own. The list can obviously be continued further.
All of these questions are interrelated and in general they 
provide inquiry into the Deleuzoguattarian perspective on 
overstepping the personal, cultural and geographic borders 
in music, as well as borders of music styles, and in doing so 
they extend the idea of artistic performance to becoming music, 
harnessing non-sonorous forces from chaos and achieving an 
effect in the event.
Music works with different textures of sounds and noise, 
including non-musical sounds, sounds of nature or any other 
artificially modulated (electronic) sounds, as well as non-so-
norous sounds, and silence. The Deleuzoguattarian concepts 
of chaos and cosmos, virtual and actual and their descriptions, 
open the access to analyze the appearance of sounds and their 
configurations in the process of improvisation. That in many 
aspects has already been done by researchers such as Robert 
Walser (1993), Swiboda (2002), Higgins (2010), Paul F. Berliner 
(1994), Jeremy Gilbert (2004), Holland (2008), and others, who 
used the example of jazz. Improvisation according to the ordi-
nary dictionary means to play with no preparation in advance, 
creating and performing at the same time. That can be a very 
slow and fluent process, but on the contrary – experimenting 
in a sudden way in different directions and modulations with 
playing techniques. In the Deleuzoguattarian perspective, that 
is an estrangement of a strict plan by using technical tools on 
the plane of aesthetic composition, and at the same time us-
ing the percepts and affects when “the plane of composition 
involves sensation in a higher deterritorialization, making it 
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pass through a sort of deframing which opens it up and breaks 
it open onto infinitive cosmos” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 197). 
That is related to the modulation of harmonic and rhythmic 
structures and their interrelation, but most importantly it ex-
tends the creational possibilities by the musician’s encounters 
with sound, which can be cosmic or from nature – not necessar-
ily sounding as musical, either actual or from the virtual plane.
The special jazz characteristic is a variation of improvisa-
tions in different directions, depending on the obstacles and 
flashes, which turn musicians towards unexpected paths. Jazz is 
nomadic and rhizomatic, especially free jazz, though idiomatic 
improvisation usually returns music to the centre, which keeps 
the main motif, and does that by bringing innovation and ex-
tending main theme. The improvisational cycle creates a new 
message. Holland, following Attali, states that the message in 
jazz is usually discovered, but not socially constructed (Holland 
2008: 29). So it cannot be predictable in advance. It appears in 
becoming. This becoming has happened (or is expected to hap-
pen) in almost every jazz improvisation for a long time since the 
appearance of jazz. It seems that Deleuze and Guattari’s words 
“Becoming is never imitating… But everything of importance 
happens elsewhere: in the becoming” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
305) had to appear in their theory after being acquainted with 
jazz. Unfortunately, the becoming in jazz has been narrated very 
lightly in the philosophy of Guattari. In Chaosmosis: an Ethico-
Aesthetic Paradigm he describes new paradigm and exempli-
fies becoming for aestheticizing the world within these words: 
“That’s Debussy, that’s jazz, that’s Van Gogh” (Guattari 1995: 
93), but in their common description of becoming there is no 
reference to jazz music and the great jazz players. Meanwhile, 
becoming music, becoming sound can be found in the examples of 
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musicians such as Miles Davis, Bill Evans, John Coltrane, Keith 
Jarrett and Jan Garbarek and many others. Everyone comes into 
this process in his own way, through the line of flight.
Jason Wallin, in correspondence to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy, and Aoki, in the process of improvisation finds the 
creation of a “fuzzy space” of chaos forces, those that are not 
only productive, but also reactive, and that can be in “absolute 
deterritorialization of music qua noise” (2010: 74), which 
in Wallin’s opinion can be dangerous. That is why he tries to 
show the flowing improvisation on the basis of the main theme 
in the composition, which can “stabilize Being”, as he finds in 
the performances of Davis and Coltrane. When one thinks of 
these musicians, unavoidably the virtual non-sonorous plane of 
sounds should appear in one’s imagination, as well as different 
sounds-noise which appear in the process of the actualization of 
the non-sonorous line of flight. Sounds from the virtual can be 
transformed into the creational product or turn into destruction 
and fall into a black hole. The path between these two directions 
is not easily recognizable; sounds flow through all the borders 
and dangers. From the Deleuzoguattarian perspective, the path 
is between creation and destruction, productive and reactive, 
molar and molecular; the abstract machine lets them fluctuate 
on the very thin border, when from Attali, Theodor Adorno and 
some other music theorists’ point of view, the destruction can be 
treated as a matter of legitimation, a matter of social and cultural 
norms. Despite these differentiations in viewpoint, the sound-
noise, which unexpectedly and not in an ordinary way appears 
in jazz during improvisation, is as important as a variation with 
rhythm, melody, chord and harmony changes. Sometimes it is 
even of great value. It is a vector. Unpredictably appearing sound 
provides a stimulus for improvisation in a particular direction, 
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creates character and specifies a musician’s style or band’s inter-
relation. Davis’ technical mistakes can be used as an example: 
his trumpet playing in “half-valved note”, “swallowed, burbled, 
or ornamental note”, “clams”, “fluffs” (Swiboda 2002: 151) or 
Jarrett’s ecstatic screaming voice, interrupting the compositions.
It is of great interest to investigate jazz musicians’ readiness 
and working for the line of flight in their improvisation, waiting 
for the event in a non-predictable moment while playing in a 
group (duet, trio, and quartet) as well as solo. Holland prefers 
group playing to solo, when he is talking about group activity, 
especially for the purpose of social deterritorialization through 
the improvisation instead of “being imposed from the top down 
by a composer or band leader” (Holland 2008: 202), which is 
arboreal. At the same time he does not diminish the role of 
great players such a Coltrane or Dave Brubeck. Distinguishing 
and naming different personalities is not less important than 
bands for the illustration of different improvisational aspects 
in Deleuzoguattarian perspective. Swiboda (2002) as well as 
Robert Walser (1993) gave the example of Davis’ novelty by 
his special way of playing the trumpet and creating the most 
impressive improvisations in jazz history, while Nick Nesbitt 
very precisely described Coltrane’s extremely distinctive 
“aesthetics of intensities” by exhausting the standard material. 
The musicians’ encounters on the stage during improvisation 
have a huge influence on each other’s style and development of 
jazz music in new directions and as Nesbitt claims shows that 
the musical body (in Coltrane’s case the Quartet) “is capable 
of, making musical impossibility possible” (Nesbitt 2010: 179). 
An ensemble playing is not of secondary importance. How do 
heterogeneous lines in an ensemble’s improvisation come to the 
common? How do they come to affects and line of flight, how 
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does dividual play give an effect? In the situation when each 
musician has his own character and individual style, and at the 
same time as Rogério Costa noticed, their ‘improvisation works 
on their faces, “defacing” them’ (Costa 2011: 9), and involves 
them into a smooth plane, the art machine, which is open to 
new chaos forces. Deleuze and Guattari, in their description of 
the synthesis of disparate elements and “the fuzzy aggregate”, 
when “the material must be sufficiently deterritorialized to be 
molecularized and open onto something cosmic, instead of 
lapsing into statistical heap” outline the consistency and sobri-
ety (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 344). In the condition of “a certain 
simplicity in the nonuniform material” sobriety “makes for 
the richness of the Machine’s effect” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
344). That happens in the group improvisation, when sound is 
travelling across different trials and noises, sometimes lapping 
back to reproduction, sometimes starting anew and sometimes 
turning the entire group to the event.
Between Personality and the Body Without Organs: 
Keith Jarrett
The inspiration to rethink Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter “1837: 
Of the Refrain” in relation to Keith Jarrett’s music brought up 
the old experience of listening to his music three decades ago – 
a tape record from the seventies – the album Facing You (1971). 
There was an amazing piano playing with interruptions from 
the sound of a voice and an incredibly sensitive perception of it. 
Of course such influential impression could happen because of 
the vacuum of music records and no access to any radio stations 
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in Soviet Lithuania, where the author of this text lived. It was 
amazing that Jarrett has been playing with his entire body, so 
indulged and in a very special way, what has been negatively 
described by critic John Litweiler, who noticed “his autoerotic 
groans, sighs, grunts, and moans as he leaps from his chair to 
thrust his pelvis at the keyboard while he plays “and in contrary 
emphasized by musician Jack DeJonete “his love affair with 
piano” (Carr 1991: 190). The play with a body was felt by his 
young fan in Lithuania without any access to a visual record of 
the concert and was conceived only from audio material. The 
tape record was the only possible acquaintance with music 
before the video material appeared in Lithuania that allowed 
to see the musician on stage. The enigma of Jarrett was already 
analysed by critics; some were very harsh and condemning, 
others polite and flattering. To understand his enigma from a 
Deleuzoguattarian point of view, as well as to probe the Deleu-
zoguattarian concepts in practice, the concepts of “becoming”, 
“body without organs”, “affects” as well as sound “crystal” could 
be attempted. But first of all the refrain and deterritorialization 
seems to be applicable to Jarrett’s music, when the tension be-
tween home and travelling in unknown fields is constantly felt. 
The musician by himself (or together with a trio or quartet)35 
through the effect of a very particular piano keystroke and pure 
sound as well as long improvisational passages, was working 
on variations of the main motif in the compositional frame. 
His arpeggiato, speed changes, and unexpected interruptions 
of voice opened the compositions to cosmic forces and the ap-
pearance of sound crystals.
35 In the trio, Jarrett played with Gary Peacock (bass) and Jack Dejohnette 
(drums), and in the quartet with Dewey Redman (tenor saxophone), 
Charlie Haden (bass), and Paul Motian (drums).
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Additionally, besides the usual A Thousand Plateaus: Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia and What is Philosophy? most com-
monly used for musical analyses, Deleuze’s latest – essay, “The 
Exhausted”, included in Essays: Critical and Clinical, is really 
helpful in understanding this musician and composer, his style, 
his success and the breaks in his musical career. It seems that 
the musician in all of his “musical journeys” of improvisation is 
flirting with chaos and death, tempting to overstep Earth’s bor-
ders, and is ready to take the line of flight in deterritorialization.
Jarrett was a jazz icon at the end of the last century and he 
still is today, having won many awards. He received very good 
musical education in his childhood, so he was a good musician 
from a technical point of view and in different music styles: 
he was as good player of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Johann 
Sebastian Bach, Ludwig van Beethoven, as well as different 
kinds of jazz (fusion, jazz-rock, postmodern). He was influenced 
by Debussy, Ravel, Mahler, Bartok, and gamelan music36. His 
compositions are interesting and well known by their structure, 
and even more interesting is his improvisational style, especially 
playing with his entire body. First of all, he is remarkable for 
his unique keyboard touch in playing bent notes and ostinato 
passages as well as rich chords. Secondly, his playing is accom-
panied by interruptions of his ecstatic voice (groan, moan), and 
thirdly he moves in his entire physique, sometimes playing in a 
half standing position. During the performance, he is a “body 
without organs”, where “the body without organs is opposed less 
to organs as such than to the organization of the organs insofar 
as it composes an organism” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 30). Fin-
gers, voice and physique all together play piano and doing that 
36 As mentioned by Jarrett’s critiques (Carr 1992: 127).
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they move in different paths and rhythm, but create a unity in 
performance. The music and musician become one – the ma-
chine of sound and music creation during the improvisation. It is 
the process of becoming music. The sound of voice is expressed 
not in unison and not dissonantly, it is somewhere on another 
plane, his origin is between nature and art. That is nature’s 
trick, interrupted in art creation in many compositions from 
Facing You (1971), Bremen Concert (1973), Köln Concert (1975), 
Bregenz / Munich concerts (1981), Sun Bear Concert (1976), My 
Song (1977), Jarrett Trio Live in Japan (1993, 1996) and others. 
The authentic and spontaneous vocal expression is usual for 
many jazz musicians, but Jarrett’s style is special. Despite some 
critics treating it as “cockiness” and a “kind of theatrical postur-
ing”, Ian Carr finds different words: “The movements, his vocal 
sounds allied to his phenomenal powers of concentration – his 
ability to ‘improvise with consciousness’ – all combined to help 
him achieve the state of grace, the rapt state of total inspiration 
in which the self is forgotten and the intelligence lives only in 
musical creation”, while Jarrett by himself expresses that as a 
“study with the impossible on the stage” (Carr 1992: 67). The 
vocal interruption becomes organic like a rhythmic element, 
marking territory, but in opposition, it is a crack in his refrain, 
a note that within the assemblage there is something of a dif-
ferent plane. Those are references to the places of “thickness”, 
the body’s declaration about the missing sound depth and 
trial to escape from the limited territory. Deterritorialization 
can happen at every moment, when a crack in the structure of 
composition appears: “one opens the circle a crack, opens it all 
the way, lets someone in, calls someone, or else goes out oneself, 
launches forth. One opens the circle not on the side where the 
old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, one 
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created by the circle itself. As though the circle tended on its 
own to open onto a future, as a function of the working forces 
it shelters. This time, it is in order to join with the forces of the 
future, cosmic forces. One launches forth, hazards an improvisa-
tion” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 311). It can be Jarrett’s cry, the 
unpredictable passage or the sum of many things, and all of that 
happens when Jarrett by himself plays solo or all musicians in the 
trio or quartet (double bass, drums, and saxophone) come into 
the line of flight, a kind of ecstatic situation and becoming in 
event. Waiting for the moment and ecstatic moment have been 
outlined by Jarrett as unavoidable in performance when joining 
with the music. On the one hand, most of his compositions are 
based on repetitions; they have their frames, and a main theme 
and are written in score. He used to write score for his musicians 
and wrote music for Garbarek (Belonging, 1974), who for many 
years played with Jarrett. On the other hand, the process of free 
improvisation is inseparable in almost every performance. That 
marks Jarrett’s musical travel from Earth to cosmos and back. As 
Carr noted, Jarrett is usually working with a very precise image 
and consequently thought of image of every composition; it 
is a unique link between high concentration of consciousness 
and improvisation in affectation. He created compositions in 
his mind wherever he was: at home or doing everyday things 
in his studio. In many cases he was clear concerning the begin-
ning and the end. His thoughts were realized in improvisation, 
when a lot of space for novelty appears, which is why Jarrett in 
his interview in the TV documentary The Art of Improvisation 
says: “When I think of improvisation I started from zero to 
zero to where I go, but I don’t connect one thing to another… I 
intrude myself ” (The Art of Improvisation, 2005). This “myself ” 
was kind of a sacrifice for the music. Jarrett was very precise 
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and pretentious towards music; first of all the sound of piano, 
its texture, the skill to hear it, to get it and the way to play it, 
as well as to experiment with it, using travel between tonality 
and atonality until the sound becomes molecular, crossing the 
virtual plane and dropping into the actual. In the interview, 
Jarrett mentioned that it was always risky to meet “some sort 
of sound, for you gonna die” (The Art of Improvisation, 2005). 
This according to Deleuze and Guattari happens in the risky 
situations of deterritorialization when “sound invades us, impels 
us, drags us, transpierces us. It takes leave of the earth, as much 
in order to drop us into black hole as to open us to cosmos. It 
makes us want to die”, “Ecstasy and hypnosis” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1987: 348). But while in this situation Deleuze and Guattari 
see the fall into the affect in the art machine or black hole, Jarrett 
treats this situation as depending first of all on him as a medium 
between the music and cosmos. He is a kind of artisan, who can, 
as Deleuze and Guattari describe, leave “the earth behind”, but 
at the same time he has always been reflecting himself and the 
realization of his thought.
His playing with his body in ecstasy was noticed in almost 
every performance. Linda Martina Young finds in Jarrett’s 
body expression during improvisation not only walking on the 
edge, but also “the moment with a surprising grace” (Young 
2008: 180), related to some mystical experiences. Jarrett openly 
declared music relation to mysticism and in his play that was 
obvious. His body move in ecstasy could be seen as flesh with-
out bounds, translating only forces flowing through him as it 
is in Deleuze’s description of Francis Bacon’s paintings. Chris 
Stover describes such kind of affected forces in the process 
of improvisation and affected performing body being part of 
the event, though not necessary in the moment of ecstasy as 
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performing a body encountering other bodies. He says: “To 
conceive of porous thresholds between performing bodies and 
musical-objects-as-bodies is to foreground the performative 
aspects of improvised music-making and to break down the 
hierarchy, and possibly even the distinction, between agent, 
action, and the content of that action” (Stover 2016: 3). Sonic 
materiality is not separated from the improvising body.
Whatever Jarrett was playing (fusion, free, classic, jazz-rock, 
ethnic music), in Carr’s view, he was searching for “it”. That 
could happen in every moment and everywhere. Therefore, 
he tried a lot of instruments, starting with the piano, organs, 
electronic keyboard to the saxophone, drums, timbales; he 
expected that natural material (wood, leather) of more archaic 
traditional instruments could bring a more pure sound (like 
in Spirits, 1985), but unfortunately his genius is known only 
in piano. His sensitiveness to “it” as a qualitative expression of 
material in the event is close to Deleuze and Guattari’s haecce-
ity, which is “A degree, an intensity, is an individual, a Haecceity 
that enters into composition with other degrees, other intensi-
ties, to form another individual” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 253). 
In the chapter “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, 
Becoming-Imperceptible” Deleuze and Guattari give some ex-
amples of intensity, consistency, speed and slowness in compo-
sitions. Consistency keeps all heterogeneous elements in unity, 
or at least allows them to couple in the moment. Speed and 
slowness as well as intensity allow them to get into the zone of 
“thickness” and smooth plane (Köln concert, Sun Bear concerts). 
Jarrett’s speed in arpeggiato and ostinato, as well as his rhythmic 
line of chords travelling through atonality allows him to get 
into this plane of consistency, where “Speeds and slownesses 
inject themselves into musical form, sometimes impelling it 
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to proliferation, linear microproliferations, and sometimes to 
extinction, sonorous abolition, involution, or both at once… 
And that is because he or she affirms the power of becoming” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 296–297). On this plane of thickness 
Jarrett unfolds “it”, the sound block, the new texture and mean-
ing of sound. His own voice affirms this event of becoming.
Unfortunately, the machine of Jarrett’s music production 
has suddenly stopped. The 1990s was fateful for Jarrett. He was 
absolutely exhausted by CFS (Chronic fatigue syndrome), the 
exhaustion of the body, mind, and senses. As Nesbitt described 
the exhaustion of the motif in Coltrane’s playing (Nesbitt 2011), 
the exhaustion of the music-musician body can be stated in 
Jarrett case. No music, no concerts, no voice.
Deleuze’s essay “The Exhausted” is useful for the reconstruc-
tion of Jarrett’s coming to music creation with new forces after 
the break. One stops if he is tired and needs a rest. One has the 
possibility, and that requires a decision to go further or not to 
go. As Deleuze says, “When one realize some of what is possible, 
one does so according to certain goals, plans and preferences: 
I put on shoes to go out and slippers when I stay in” (Deleuze 
1998: 152), as in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass, and 
What Alice Found There when the Red Queen on the race asks 
Alice to rest and to get forces to move further. The example 
of Alice’s tiredness was in the institutional context explicated 
by Florelle D’Hoest and Tyson E. Lewis (2015). Outlining the 
same position of Alice and the Red Queen, they try to find the 
path between tiredness and exhaustion. The exhaustion in a 
Deleuzean way is absent of the possibilities and potentiality 
to go further, because “one was tired of something, but one is 
exhausted by nothing” (Deleuze 1998: 153). We can say that 
Jarrett’s exhaustion of potentialities came from his rowdy 
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audience (from many critical reviews, his disrespectful behav-
iour and sharp comments for the audience, such as “assholes”, 
is well-known) and pretentions for organizers. But that was not 
the cause. This cause could be related to the above mentioned 
expectation to touch “it”, to be close to cosmic and spiritual, to 
open some crystals. That does not need rest, but the exhaustion 
of the possible. Deleuze distinguishes four ways of exhausting 
the possible: “forming exhaustive series of things, drying up the 
flow of voices, extenuating the potentialities of space, dissipat-
ing the power of the image. The exhausted is the exhaustive, 
the dried up, the extenuated and the dissipated” (Deleuze 1998: 
161–162). Following Samuel Beckett’s TV performances and 
Kafka’s literature, Deleuze gives an explication of situations 
of voice and speech exhaustion and interruption of a different 
kind of sounds without the potentiality to breaking the refrain 
and finally the double denotation of the possible. That opens 
the door for new creation. “The combinatorial exhausts its 
object, but only because its subject is himself exhausted. The 
exhaustive and the exhausted. Must one be exhausted to give 
oneself over to the combinatorial, or is it the combinatorial 
that exhausts us, that leads us to exhaustion – or even the two 
together, the combinatorial and the exhaustion? Here again, 
inclusive disjunctions. And perhaps it is like the front and back 
side of a single thing: a keen sense or science of the possible, 
joined, or rather disjoined, with a fantastic decomposition of 
the self ” (Deleuze 1998: 154). The period of pause in Jarrett’s 
music life was Jarrett’s exhaustion of the body and voice. The 
voice, which was ecstatic, and signalled findings of the event 
during concerts, at the same time has signalled his body’s 
exhaustion during the performance, the exhaustiveness and 
loss of forces in the ecstatic moment. As Deleuze states, “The 
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voices are waves or flows that direct and distribute linguistic 
corpuscles. When one exhausts the possible with words, one 
cuts and chops the atoms, and when one exhausts the words 
themselves, one dries up the flows” (Deleuze 1998: 156). After 
Jarrett’s play’s break (being ill) and when he started to work 
again on the compositions, his voice disappeared for a while. 
His new performance, starting from The Melody in the Night, 
With You (1998), was quiet, without any voice, without any 
special effects in expressions. Jarrett’s coming back to the stage 
took a time. He continued to work, to improvise and he had 
new energy, though he was more inclined to play standards: 
Standards Trio (1999–2002), also Jasmine (2007), Somewhere 
(2009). It seems that he has returned, but differently, with more 
sobriety and at the same time perfection in his compositions. 
Nevertheless, his voice came again to his playing, and playing 
with his entire body. The combinatorial exhaustion finally al-
lowed him to continue his journey in music.
It is interesting to compare Jarrett’s and Davis’ work with 
sound in a Deleuzean perspective. Both were great musicians, 
who for two years played together. Both were more or less inter-
ested in Modern European music of Bartok, Ravel, Debussy, and 
Messiaen. Both were awarded the Léonie Sonning Music Prize, 
and both for a while were exhausted. Swiboda (2002) finds some 
political aspects in Davis’ playing, the African-American minor-
ity postulation of their authentic way in music, not too much at-
tention to pure sound and efforts to play it correctly, sometimes 
skipping notes or playing the notes not technically, because his 
goal was special – becoming music straight on the stage. That 
was his exact method of deterritorialization, his access to the 
appearance of cracks. In Walser’s view Davis was a good musi-
cian, but a rather bad trumpet player in a technical sense (Walser 
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1993). Evidently both jazz players had their own style and a way 
to create music and to play it. If Jarrett’s cracks were spontane-
ous interruptions (meaning his voice), which were reflected by 
him, Davis’ strange sounds as cracks came from his not precise 
but authentic performance. If Jarrett kept himself at a distance 
from drugs, Davis was addicted to them. Jarrett valued Davis’ 
style and behaviour on the stage a lot. He said in the interview 
for the film Miles Ahead: The music of Miles Davis (1986), that 
Davis would rather play badly and allowed that for his musicians 
instead of playing what was already played. In both cases, the 
musicians were searching for the line of flight and becoming, 
becoming music. Davis in relaxed way outlined that “jazz is of 
the moment, you play the moment. Each moment is fresh” (Miles 
Ahead: The Music of Miles Davis, 1986), while Jarrett outlined 
that becoming and the event “takes your nervous system to be 
alert for every possible things, in a way that cannot be said for 
any other kind of music” (The Art of Improvisation, 2005). In 
a description of this process of improvisation and becoming, 
Young (2008) emphasizes the body of the musician. She sees 
Jarrett’s body as an art machine, which produced music and him 
as a musician. Every time the musician appears in the process of 
creation, as could be explicated in Deleuze’s words: “We are not 
in the world, we become with a world” (Deleuze 1994: 169). That 
seems a natural way for those who are “living in jazz”, though 
Deleuze and Guattari did not find a chance to talk broadly about 
that in their texts and it is not clear if they would agree with that. 
Obviously there are a lot of ways for music deterritorialization, 
especially in jazz. The new improvisational ways and styles in 
jazz are coming from everywhere: ethnic, classic, avant-garde, 
very well-educated jazz players, as well as jazz players coming 
from the underground or “electric” jazz, all with their special 
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access to combine rhythm, harmony and disharmony, a new 
texture of sound and a special timbre, and first of all a fresh 
breeze of life. Swiboda finds that with Davis African-American 
modal, jazz brought the line of flight, it came to embody the ma-
chinic phylum, the war machine. Jarett played a different kind of 
jazz – fusion, highly intellectual, trying to capture the cosmic by 
involving his entire body, becoming music, being part of enun-
ciation and affect in the way of forming what is unformed. Is he 
a part of Davis’ started war machine? Lithuanian composer and 
musicologist Linas Rimša and his colleague Remigijus Leipus 
think that Davis had a significant gift: he noticed and gathered 
very talented people whose ideas exceeded their time on Earth 
(Leipus 2002: 146). Jarrett was probably one of them – not in the 
way of African-American resistance against white Americans, 
but in the way of resistance against western consumerism, the 
capitalistic way of the mass and pop culture based on pleasure. 
He played in order to turn the assemblage from Earth and the 
everyday to the cosmic and eternal.
Unformed Sound in Multimedia Composition:  
Andrius Šarapovas’ Silverdust
A number of experimental art projects, combining music and 
visual arts based on the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, are be-
ing created all over the world. They are all different, but at the 
same time having something in common and recognisable for 
those familiar with Deleuzoguattarian ideas. As an example 
we can choose projects created by musicians and visual art-
ists in different countries such as Belgium (Starling, 2015) and 
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Lithuania (Silverdust, 2013), both presented during Deleuzean 
conferences: Starling – in Deleuze Studies Conference 2016 in 
Rome, Silverdust – in the conference The Dark Precursor 2015 in 
Ghent. Every author (Paolo Giudici and Andi Spicer in Belgium 
or Andrius Šarapovas in Lithuania) has his own access to solv-
ing the problem of heterogeneity in art, to express an idea of 
becoming, to infold and unfold the material in art composition 
by producing art machine, percepts and affects; nevertheless, 
some artistic solutions have become evidently Deleuzean or 
Deleuzoguattarian. Deleuzoguattarian interpretations, appli-
cable for different styles of art for many years now are being 
replaced by art created in the Deleuzoguattarian style, which 
is interpreted differently, and probably in many cases in not a 
Deleuzoguattarian way.
While Paolo Giudici and Andi Spicer’s project Starling, 
where image in accordance and discordance with the inter-
pretation of bird sounds and Mozart’s music perfectly and 
very creatively visualizes the ideas of multiplicities, series of 
repetitions, folding and becoming-bird, Šarapovas’ multimedia 
project Silverdust seems more complicated, dealing with hetero-
geneity, searching for links between three different arts, while 
they are expressed and narrated in different forms.
The Lithuanian project seeks to reveal and in a special 
way expose what is hidden under ordinary audio and visual 
demonstration, to capture what is between hearing, seeing and 
narrating and even more, what is unheard, unseen, not nar-
rated, only expected in sensations. That is an effort to catch 
what is unrepresentative. The project works with music, poetry 
and dance, edited by montage and sound postproduction. The 
composition and production of the project are made by Lithu-
anian artist Andrius Šarapovas. All other artists involved in 
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this project – Vytis Nivinskas (double bass), Andrius Navakas 
(poetry), Lora Juodkaitė (dance), Algis Mikutėnas (camera) – 
are well known in Lithuania and other countries. The project is 
compounded of 12 short pieces and was presented to the public 
in Vilnius and Copenhagen. The pieces should be treated, ac-
cording to Šarapovas, as separate compositions, which can be 
assembled in many ways, though by watching all of them in 
sequence one can feel a common rhythmic pulsation and tends 
to treat all pieces as one composition.
The uniqueness of this project is that it is framed by follow-
ing some ideas of Deleuze. Šarapovas has been interested in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, having studied their work, 
and now tries to apply their concepts and test their ideas in short 
films (Now You Can Heal, 2013; Conversation, 201537), and music 
37 The title of the film Conversation, which is a direct translation from 
Pokalbiai (in Lithuanian) according to Šarapovas is planning to be 
translated as Sublingua (Šarapovas, Duoblienė 2016).
Andrius Šarapovas. Silverdust. 2013. Performance. Dancer lora Juodkaitė.
288
compositions. The music is very important in his films. He is 
experimenting with “running lines”, series of repetition, creating 
and observing nomadic movement and the journey of sound, 
waiting for the resonance of different series in composition and 
expected events and lines of flight. Different arts in Silverdust 
run separately, parallel or in different directions. They are full 
of breaks, cracks, ruptures, and at the same time they create 
unity through the invisible links. Additionally, Šarapovas did 
an investigation of every participating artist’s perception of links 
between different arts in this project. Unfortunately, it has still 
not been presented officially; nevertheless, it has been shown 
already in another short film form, which in that way continues 
Šarapovas’ research on heterogeneity in combining different 
arts. The interview with the author (Šarapovas, Duoblienė 2014) 
partly gave access to investigate the project Silverdust. During 
the conversation about sound crystal and time crystal, the au-
thor placed emphasis on the unexpected sound, which comes 
and disappears, which potentially is in the composition, but we 
do not know when and in which form it will appear.
The main interest in relation to Deleuze is to investigate 
how Deleuze and Guattari’s mention of “raw sounds” in the 
book What is Philosophy? stimulates the appearance of the art 
machine, the vibration and clinches between different art lines 
in the composition Silverdust. How much raw sound and how 
much sound modification during the sound editing deterrito-
rializes the refrain of composition, mentioned in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia? 
How does this machine erase the boundaries between natural 
and artificially modified sounds in music and produces clinches 
with dance and poetry? Is it the work of a dark precursor, de-
scribed in Deleuze’s early work Difference and Repetition?
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The most important aspect was to find out how the raw, not 
framed sound in a musical sense, which Deleuze and Guattari 
called non-musical, – but which we would term unformed, 
comes to multimedia composition The main proposition in this 
subchapter is to understand unformed sound in a broader way, 
as unpredictably interrupting musical composition sound from 
the everyday, musically unorganized sound, which comes into 
composition as a reminder of the potentiality of sounds, their 
multiplicity and singularity, their infinitive series and potential 
being in univocity. It can be heard as noise. Raw sound, noise, 
as well inaudible sound in silence has great importance in Sil-
verdust. During the entire composition, one can hear sounds as 
a rubbing surface, the scratching of the floor, squeaking doors, 
the grinding, strange sound of the old double bass bow, etc.
Different Arts and Common Rhythm  
in the Composition
When thinking about the links of different arts in Silverdust, the 
hypothesis that the basis for the composition is text (poetry) 
arises. It covers the surface (stratum) of the interdisciplinary 
composition. Text is the most distinctive, the most aggressive, 
full of existential meanings; though one does not hear the full 
poetry; it is possible to catch only some phrases. Nonetheless, 
the text draws the frontiers of the composition’s territory by 
rhythm. It tries to dominate the composition, not allowing 
something more distinctive to appear, which would break the 
territory that is marked by words. Deleuze and Guattari say: 
“Music seems to have a much stronger deterritorializing force, 
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at once more intense and much more collective, and a voice 
seems to have a much greater power of deterritorialization” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 302). In our case both – reading 
poetry and music are rhythmicly contending, competing for 
priority to territorialize and deterritorialize the refrain of com-
position. While poetry territorializes by rhythm and deter-
ritorializes by meanings, music does that by improvisations in 
pitch, timbre and also rhythm. The first attempt, according to 
the author was to narrate poetry following the already created 
music, but in the process it appeared that it was not successful 
(Šarapovas, Duoblienė 2014). The musical improvisation was 
more flexible and easier for experimenting. Forcible music tries 
to find a line of flight in the situation of the powerful rhythmic 
reading of poetry.
All pieces have quite interesting titles of poetry, though 
they are not announced on the screen. It seems that they do 
not matter, but they do. They can be reconstructed from the text 
as well: To Banality, Textiles, Feather and Ash, Nothing, Comfort, 
etc. These keywords give rhythm to the pieces of composition 
by syntax and ensure the refrain. Each piece of the composition 
starts with the process of tuning the instruments, practising 
a dance move, and many different sounds-noises. However, 
the rhythmic text works through the contrast: a stable, per-
manent rhythm, and on the contrary – meanings that refer to 
nothingness and being nowhere. Meanings of the words are 
references to another plane – the plane of surface, intrigue to 
wait for an event through eternal return: “if I turned myself 
fully inside out I would coincide with my surface: so that even 
blood would flow on that side of my skin: but what remains on 
this side?” (piece 2) and journey “lands of journeys that never 
end all round as a button ring” (piece 3) or fulfilment of cosmic, 
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potentially existing sounds “filled with sound” (piece 9). The 
dominance of the words is quite mischievous, but on the other 
side, the meanings of the words expand attention and transpose 
it onto the music and image.
In his study on Boulez, Griffiths analyses performances 
where texts conquer music, as well as Boulez’s writings, where 
the composer proposes a “seizure of the poem through music”, 
meaning that “amalgamation through a correspondence of 
structure may proceed so far that text has been displaced” 
(Griffiths 1978: 45). Griffiths finds that “this happens almost 
completely in outer movements of Plis selon pli, Don, and Tom-
beau, which use one of Mallarme’s earliest non-juvenile poems 
and one of his last”. In his view these movements stand for the 
birth of art: “after a dedicatory setting of the opening line, the 
text disappears and the work goes into a state of nascence” 
(Griffiths 1978: 46). Griffiths reflects on how Boulez uses the 
poetic structure and notices the hidden relationships within 
the poems. A similar concept of performance can be recognised 
in Šarapovas’ musical composition. Words or sentences said 
loudly or quietly, fluently or ruptured, keep the composition 
in a poetic rhythm. As Šarapovas mentions, during the sound 
editing “Poetry, a synthesis between an idea and a feeling, 
is made into a sound by loops which are cyclically repeated 
phrases or by using a noise gate when only louder sounds are 
allowed to pass through. In this way, the phonetic sounds start 
changing their meaning and the musical sound is foregrounded 
allowing the detachment of the pre-existing poetry contexts 
and constructing new frames” (Šarapovas, Duoblienė 2014). 
The destruction of the relations between the original meanings 
creates hidden relations and gives the possibility to overstep 
the prime rhythm of refrain. While Boulez experimented 
292
with poetry by looking at metrical arrangement, the temporal 
relations of words to decorate music and change their spacing, 
Šarapovas took another strategy for escaping the dominance of 
the poetry and at the same time flirting with it. Poetry is like 
home, a place that is meant to be left by an artist and a place 
where one can always return to. That keeps all performance 
artists in a certain rhythm-repetition.
Despite the strong textual rhythmic pulsation, compo-
sitional rhythmic pulsation can be compared to Messiaen’s 
invention of the rhythm as a mirror or Deleuze’s description 
of attendant rhythm. Every piece of composition starts with 
some sort of noise and marks a slow “birth of composition”. The 
beginning of every piece is always similar to any other perfor-
mance or concert rehearsal, when instruments, cameras and 
dancers all have their trial, every line has its own rhythm, and it 
all seems like a chaos. Deleuze and Guattari state that “Chaos is 
defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with 
which every form taking shape in it vanishes” (Deleuze, Guat-
tari 1994: 118). It is both a birth and a disappearance. The ter-
ritory of the performance is gradually shaped by the rhythm of 
sonic and visual movement during the journey between chaos 
and cosmos, absence and essence, multiplicity and singular-
ity. Different art lines come to a culmination and all rhythmic 
lines evidently, not virtually, become one and interact with 
the melodic line or little phrase almost in the middle of every 
piece. Sound and image support each other and so it seems that 
all arts are in harmony. In the finale (the third part of almost 
every piece of composition) the pulsation becomes slower and 
heavier and gradually the sound disappears or transforms into 
“noise”. Such a construct of a three-part composition in every 
piece was emphasised by the author Šarapovas. Extrinsically 
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it is evident that rhythmic culmination is somewhere around 
the middle of every piece. Rhythmic pulsation starts from the 
creative attempt and finalises with the distortion and strewing 
in every piece. The end deterritorializes and a new short piece 
starts again from the process of a slow (only sometimes fast) 
territorialization. It is not a non-retrogadic rhythm despite the 
mirror effect of passive-active-passive. The secret of Šarapovas’ 
rhythmic line is that this slowness at the end of every piece 
is not slow; it is actually of great intensity and of a speed of 
a very fast plane – a plane of chaos. Thus the compositional 
accents from a Deleuzean perspective are reversed: speed in 
every piece of the composition is gradually increasing and after 
the culmination it shoots up into another plane of thickness, 
which is heterogeneous and smooth, from the first impression 
braked, destroyed, nevertheless “breathing” in one chaosmic 
rhythm. Moving on three different lines (dance, poetry, 
music) with their own rhythms, finally they reach the point 
where the common rhythm is born in-between opening them 
into chaos: “The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens 
them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus’ 
answer to chaos. What chaos and rhythm have in common is 
the in-between – between two milieus, rhythm-chaos or the 
chaosmos…” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 313).
It seems that the central point – the loud beat around the 
middle of every piece – is an attendant rhythm described by 
Deleuze in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation: “more pro-
foundly, attendant only indicate a constant, a measure or ca-
dence, in relation to which we can appraise variation” (Deleuze 
2003b: 71). Despite the rhythm as stated by Deleuze and 
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
not being a meter with equal intervals, attendant rhythm gives 
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symmetrical pulsation in the repetition of pieces during the 
entire composition.
The active rhythm appears exactly in the moment when the 
attendant rhythm, beating around the centre of every piece of 
composition is calming down gradually, and in that way multi-
plies a variation of performance figures, “increasing variation 
or amplification” while the passive in contrary appears in the 
centre “with a decreasing variation or elimination” (Deleuze 
2003b: 71) when the attendant is most clear and audible. So 
this passive-active-passive reverses onto active-passive-active 
in every piece, and all of them compound a kind of cycling 
structure of the composition, no matter which order one uses 
to watch the pieces.
Despite the common impression of the rhythmic inter-
relation between sound and image, image works in a slightly 
different rhythm. Image probably follows sound in order of 
importance. Gregg Redner in his book Deleuze and Film Music 
(2011) invites us once again to rethink the link between film and 
music, image and music theories and to find any methodologi-
cal bridge. Stating that the concept of sensation is a common 
methodological platform, he follows Deleuze and Bogue and 
investigates the inter-fuses of “I Feel” “in the midst of things” 
and claims that “sensation allows us to relate two very different 
art forms on a sympathetic and equal artistic plane. The basis of 
this dialogue is the manifold ways in which sensation informs, 
impacts and influences each area of study” (Redner 2011: 39). 
Agreeing with the description of sensations, which appear in 
the way of the sound flow towards percepts and affects, it is 
important to stress the appearance of rhythm in-between im-
age and sound. Sensations are organised in accordance with 
signs which cross over between series in rhythm. In Cinema 
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2: The Time-Image, Deleuze gives some explanation on music 
and image, using ritornello38 melody and gallop rhythm, sound 
and time crystals, and presents how sound becomes optical 
and crystalizes time. He states that “the melodic ritornello is 
only a musical component which contrasts and is mixed with 
another, rhythmic component: the gallop” (Deleuze 1989: 92). 
The gallop like a horse “carries away and speeds up”, while 
ritornello like a bird determines the rebirth from itself, when 
the gallop gets to the “final destruction and extinction”. Those 
are two dimensions of musical time: “the one being hastening 
of the presents which are passing, the other the rising or falling 
back of pasts which are preserved” (Deleuze 1989: 93). Cinema 
music helps to release the ritornello and “time itself becomes 
a thing of sound” (Deleuze 1989: 94). These two dimensions 
are not very easily distinguishable. The interchange of their 
position in that way gives the effect of image crystals. That hap-
pens because, in Redner’s words, music gives image an internal 
rhythm (Redner 2011: 33).
While lines of different arts in the project Silverdust are 
composed as separate stories with ambiguous connections 
among them, the image is absolutely occupied by the modern 
dancer. The dance of Juodkaitė is like a move of the body 
without organs. The body moves as waving, sometimes as a 
broken line, in changing rhythm, using many repetitions, but 
always different. Her body is fragmented, transferring empha-
sis to the hand, face, leg, breast, and lock of hair, sometimes 
only a shadow. The body is permanently reconstructed in the 
38 In Cinema 2: The Time-Image we find both terms: ritornello and refrain; 
in the chapter “The Crystals of Time” on the problem of film music, 
the translators (Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) use the original 
term ritornello.
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movement, harnessing outside forces in its own rhythm, some-
times encountering with body of sound (music and poetry).
While the composition decomposes attention in different 
directions, and every art line runs rather independently, the 
film keeps the observer’s attention on the whole. The sound is 
not diegetic, it does not illustrate the image, and only in some 
cases a straight interconnection is distinct. Investigating sepa-
ration, autonomy and on the other hand clinches, couplings, 
and closeness in vibrations of characters, Deleuzean thought 
about differentiation and identity is helpful. The question of the 
differentiator in Silverdust, and under which power or releas-
ing of power an event happens, the composition creates the 
resonance of all lines, the common rhythm, and consequently 
creates a wholeness, which has at least two explanations and 
findings: first the compositional arrangement (author’s work) 
and second the characters’ rearrangement within the composi-
tion (work of the art machine).
According to the first, the main artist and composer 
(Šarapovas with the help of double bassist Nivinskas) are those 
who create differentiations and identities between different 
lines of arts and their series in the composition. Doing that, 
they use ritornello less as a melody, and more as playing with 
rhythm – the gallop, which helps to overstep territory, when in 
Deleuzean words the galloping rhythm conquers all noises and 
exhibits links among arts, and from the other side constructs 
the ritornello through attendant rhythm, letting it have the 
centre of gravitation. Perhaps it is only a partial explanation of 
composition in relation to understanding deterritorialization 
and rhythm. The art machine is no less important in the crea-
tion of art, when rhythm becomes independent of the author 
and therefore more complicated.
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Compositional Rearrangement:  
The Art Machine of Unformed Sound
Coming back from rhythm and time pulsation in art to the 
unformed sound, raw sound and raw image, the Deleuzean 
comparison of working with sound and image is useful. In A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia where Cage 
is mentioned, “who first and most perfectly deployed this fixed 
sound plane, which affirms a process against all structure 
and genesis, a floating time against pulsed time or tempo, 
experimentation against any kind of interpretation, and in 
which silence as sonorous rest also marks the absolute state of 
movement” and also Godard, who “effectively carries the fixed 
plane of cinema to this state where forms dissolve, and all that 
subsists are tiny variations of speed between movements in 
composition” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 267), it directs us onto 
a visual image, which lacks a fixed plane as it lacks sound. So 
in Silverdust ’s contexts we are interested in the image mostly 
as unformed, as well as the unformed sound, presented as raw 
material, material behind the scene (in other words image noise 
/ trash) and how they interrelate, eventually how that helps to 
develop pieces of composition until they come to the event 
in a common rhythm, not a beat. The emphasis is transferred 
from the external compositional arrangement onto the internal 
rearrangement, when characters from different art lines interact 
during the composition: they come close and move away, vibrate 
and resonate. In order to understand their movement and flow, 
it is first of all helpful to distinguish unformed sound or noise.
As Deleuze and Guattari state: “The difference between 
noise and sound is definitely not a basis for a definition of 
music or even for the distinction between musician birds and 
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nonmusician birds” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 302). While 
agreeing with the previous statement, we are talking about 
this distinction in order to understand how the latter helps 
to create the smooth space. Noise and natural or raw outside 
sounds come to the composition unexpectedly and unpredict-
ably and fill smooth space. For example, in the piece No. 3: we 
hear cracking, tapping, rapping, a rubbing surface, grinding, 
as well as the vibration of some sounds we do not hear (a kind 
of silence), but feel they potentially are. “…smooth space is oc-
cupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, and sonorous and 
tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or ice” as state Deleuze 
and Guattari (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 479).
Unformed sounds are welcomed into the composition. As 
Šarapovas stated in an interview, “When everything is said 
and all harmony, rhythmic things step aside, there is nothing 
in front of you; the new briefing and intensity for creation ap-
proaches” and the pretext for that is raw sound (in a wrong way, 
an old double bass sound, phone call, and the sound of a door 
opening is played). Strange sound includes outside what was 
not expected. These sounds are the cracks of a circle (refrain of 
the composition), a bridge to counterpoints and a condition for 
experimenting with the intensity of frequencies, the variation of 
pitch, timbre, and rhythm in the process of deterritorialization.
It seems that the noise or unformed sound by intruding 
into the composition creates an art machine which is not under 
control anymore. It inspires musicians and other project art-
ists to react on this interruption as an inclusive detail. From 
this point of view, musically unformed or in other words raw 
sound, as well as a probing image (or raw image, image noise 
or trash) in the beginning of every piece of the composition, is 
more important for the development of the art machine than 
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framing the pieces into three compositional parts. This marks 
the transversality of different characters.
A variety of raw sound has its own way in this art machine 
and creates couplings and divisions. “Sound owes this power 
not to signifying or “communicational” values (which on the 
contrary presuppose that power), nor to physical properties 
(which would privilege light over sound), but to a phylogenetic 
line, a machinic phylum that operates in sound and makes it a 
cutting edge of deterritorialization” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 
348). In this process “it is necessary for the non-musical sound 
of the human being to form a block with the becoming-music 
of sound, for them to confront and embrace each other like two 
wrestlers who can no longer break free from each other’s grasp, 
and slide down a sloping line” (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 308).
The non-musical sound of a human being can be the voice, 
but not necessarily so. It could also be other sounds that come 
with body movement – breathing and coughing, as well as the 
body encountering the environment: wooden floor scratching 
while standing with an instrument or dancing, a door squeak-
ing, the noise coming through an open window. That comes 
naturally into the composition, letting that sound be in a block 
of becoming-music sound. It is recorded by the author and later 
it is multiplied using the montage and sound post-production. 
Unformed sound deterritorializes musical refrain (inside music 
assemblage). Deterritorialization using cracks of unformed 
sound also comes to dance assemblage, performing according 
to the music, while poetry with its very clear rhythm tries to 
keep its territorial line.
If in the process of deterritorialization unformed sound is a 
crack, in the situation of affectation it could be treated as flesh 
which leads to blocks of sensation, percepts and affects, using 
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cosmic forces. Deleuze and Guattari in the book What is Philos-
phy? say: “Flesh is only the developer which disappears in what 
it develops: the compound of sensation” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1994: 183). As mentioned before, unexpected and unformed 
sounds inspire the performances team to improvise, so first of 
all Šarapovas reacts to the moment. Deleuze in Difference and 
Repetition mentioned that moment, “the one which ‘is lacking 
in its place’ as it lacks its own identity”, when he talks about 
the dark precursor. (Deleuze 1994: 120). There is not a very 
clear connection between flesh, which works in affect, and the 
work of the dark precursor when different series communicate 
and come to resonance and give an effect. Both act with strong 
invisible forces, differentiation, and capturing pre-existence, 
though the moments stress different things: affect and effect.
Unformed sound as a flesh provokes the further work of the 
art machine in the process of sound editing and montage. As 
Šarapovas in the interview said, he quiets (turns down) text 
(poetry words), sometimes frames that in repeating series, he 
modifies music sounds into noise, and he leaves a lot of visual 
noise (preparatory, working moments in the image). Erasing or 
quieting some poetry words in the art machine gives briefing to 
other sounds (music and additional non-music sounds). In the 
piece No. 2 tuning the instruments and a demonstration of the 
filming process as image noise / trash gives us a message about 
the multiplicity of elements, which are on and under the surface; 
some are potential, waiting for their appearance in the process 
of creation. Experimenting with unformed sounds and images 
lets them move from one to another assemblage, to rupture 
different series, to capture and lose sound in the middle of the 
journey between absence and presence. Consequently, sounds 
are held as Deleuze and Guattari state, in their “extinction”, 
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their “production and development” by the multimedia art ma-
chine and in experimenting with different a pitch, timbre and 
rhythm. The art machine with the help of Šarapovas as part of 
the machine tries to compound raw sound / noise within music 
assemblage, and keeps the connection with other assemblages 
of poetry and dance. The montage allows for an interconnection 
between the raw sound / noise in music and poetry and the im-
age noise or fragmented / split image, opening the conditions 
for vibrations and couplings between heterogeneous elements 
as well as a division. Thus we have the process of creation, new 
intra-connections and interconnections of different art char-
acters in the assemblage while playing with sound and image 
modification. Such an experiment, partly continuing Cage’s 
suggestion to explore “not only hitting, but rubbing, smashing, 
making sound in every possible way” (Cage 1961: 87)39 for the 
emancipation of sound and rhythm, stepped farther, applying 
the same access for working with image in the art machine.
That happens in the process of becoming: becoming music, 
becoming art. It is the work of the artisan, as Deleuze and Guat-
tari say. Šarapovas comments on his work with these words: “it 
is a rounding idea as a ball and from the other side-environment, 
their encounter gives a product” (Šarapovas, Duoblienė 2014). 
So it depends on him, as the author and producer of the idea 
and also on the dark precursor, because no one knows when 
that happens, when it comes to the event, when all series will 
be harmonised in one chaosmic rhythm.
It is very nicely expressed in the piece Comfort (piece 9), where 
the mix of image fragments and repetitions is demonstrated, as 
39 The influence of Cage and his explanation of noise has been mentioned 
in Šarapovas’ interview with Duoblienė (Šarapovas, Duoblienė 2014).
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well as in playing with the text “filled with sound” and sound, 
and that creates a kind of mosaic. The art machine displaces 
and removes some characters in the assemblage and multiplies 
some sounds which might seem as noise, but which reminds us 
of sound multiplicity and cosmic potentiality; the sounds that 
move between chaos and cosmos. That happens through the 
affect in the process of editing, erasing all boundaries between 
raw and produced, music and non-music, natural and artificial, 
noise and music sound, and consequently composed image, 
image noise, and fragmented image. All series of arts (music, 
poetry, and dance) or in final production, audible and visible, 
communicate according to the appearance of differences, which 
come unexpectedly, then strange sound includes something new 
from the outside and a strange visual image includes what is 
outside the official image. These differentiations disappear in 
their communication and play, opening a smooth space and 
creating a vibration between different arts series, their exposed 
and hidden characters, and their resonance in another moment, 
that moment of the appearance of flesh.
In conclusion, we can state that Šarapovas’ project comes 
very close to Deleuze and Guattari’s insight, saying: “All that, 
however, would be possible only because the invisible precursor 
conceals itself and its functioning, and at the same time con-
ceals the in-itself or true nature of difference” (Deleuze 1994: 
119). That happens because of the displacement and disguise of 
the differentiator, which in our interpretation can be provoked 
by unformed sound, bringing up the potentially existent sin-
gularity, expressed in a unique way just for one time, and on 
the other side reminding us of their gradually compositional 
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Monografija Ritmas ir refrenas: tarp filosofijos ir meno yra 
tarpdisicplininė: remiantis Deleuze’o ir Guattari įžvalgomis, 
siekama atsekti minties navigacijos linijas nuo filosofijos link 
skirtingų meno formų (literatūros, kino, tapybos, muzikos) ir 
atgal. Pradedant nuo dinaminės problemų ir sąvokų kartogra-
fijos, kurias kaip tinkamas tokiems minties eksperimentams 
įžvelgė Sauvagnarguesas, Buchananas, Bogue’as, Zepke, šiame 
tyrime siūlomos dvi naujos sąvokos: ritmas ir refrenas, kurios, 
anot autorių, yra tinkamos kaip navigacinės jungtys galimose 
filosofijos ir įvairių menų (literatūros, kino, tapybos, muzikos) 
sankabose. Autorės svarsto, kaip ritmas ir refrenas Deleuze’o 
ir Guattari tekstuose tampa filosofinėmis sąvokomis ir įgauna 
ontologinį statusą, transcenduojantį siauras filosofijos ir meno 
apibrėžtis. Jos funkcionuoja tarpinėje teritorijoje: tarp minties, 
garso, žodžio ir vaizdo, meno kūrinio, filosofijos ir gyvenimo. 
Būtent žvelgiant iš tokios ontologinės perspektyvos, šios dvi 
sąvokos įgauna galią atverti ne horizontaliuosius, o vertikaliuo-
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